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Philosophers usually seek for and justify moral and political orders by two 
methodologies. Rationalism claims that social organization of human beings should fit 
with human nature, and believes that a predefined conception of human nature, defined in 
terms of human capacities for the exercise of reason, can be established as the 
independent criterion for choosing and justifying the proper moral and political order. 
Institutionalism, on the other hand, believes that human nature is at least significantly 
shaped by the actual construction of moral and political orders by human beings, and by 
internalizing the social institutions in which they live, they create themselves.  
In this essay, I argue that rationalism is not a good methodology because it does 
not reflect the correct relationship between human beings and their institutional life. I will 
develop a philosophical theory of institutionalism, and argue that an institutionalist 
justification of the ideal of liberal democracy will encourage a political development 
towards liberalization and democratization. I will also argue that Rawls‘s justification of 
liberal democracy is such an institutionalist justification, and although it might seem to 
suggest otherwise, it not only speaks to citizens of western democracies, but also speaks 
to all moral persons from all other societies.  
The political development towards liberalization and democratization is a 
normative demand for any human society, if such a society strives to be a well-ordered 
society with long term legitimacy and stability. The exact degree of liberalization and 
democratization for any particular society will depend on the available means of 
communication and organization, but the normative demand for such a political 
development is present in every human society.  
Institutionalism represents human freedom in human beings‘ creation and 
justification of social institutions, which are man-made rules and norms aimed at 
guaranteeing social order among interacting human agents. As a ―liberalism of freedom,‖ 
institutionalism is therefore committed to a highest ideal of human institution building: 
institutions of a society should be justified to, and be obeyed by, all the members of this 
society, so that such a society is a political autonomy.  
In these terms, Rawls‘s justification of liberal democracy, although dependent on 
a public political culture of modern western democracies, is nevertheless not limited to 
this context. As an instantiation of institutionalism, Rawls‘s theory has a dimension of 
universalism. Ultimately, Rawls‘s justification of liberal democracy encourages every 
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During the last three decades, John Rawls has been arguably the most famous 
defender of liberal democracy in philosophy. Compared with previous generations of 
philosophers, Rawls, perhaps due to more historical experience with democracy 
behind him and modern philosophical achievements he has absorbed, has lifted our 
understanding of liberal democracy to a new level. In a time when liberal democracy 
is expanding its stage to the whole world, Rawls‘s work deserves serious reflection, 
especially reflection from the perspective of democratic theory. Nevertheless, Rawls‘s 
major arguments for liberal democracy appear to be highly dependent upon a public 
political culture already committed to certain liberal and democratic values; Rawls 
seems to be more concerned with the survival of liberal democracy in already 
democratized countries than with its creation and expansion in other places. For 
people from non-liberal and non-democratic cultures, reading Rawls is therefore both 
exciting and perplexing.  
For both academic and practical reasons, I set out to find the universal tone in 
Rawls‘s dialect. I argue that Rawls‘s justification of liberal democracy encourages a 
political development towards liberalization and democratization, both inside his own 
society and in other societies. For this purpose, I need to explain why Rawls chooses 
to speak only from a specific tradition, and why this local preaching can have 
universal implications.  
I begin with an interesting feature of Rawls‘s system, that is, unlike traditional 
political philosophers, Rawls doesn‘t try to establish the superiority of his ideal 
political order with a systematic comparison of different forms of political order. This 
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feature cannot be explained by taking Rawls as presupposing the superiority of liberal 
democracy, since that will simply make Rawls‘s whole system a vicious circle.  
So I ask: what is the criterion based on which traditional political philosophers 
can compare different forms of political order, and why Rawls does not use the same 
kind of criterion to argue for the superiority of his favored form of political order?  
Here I discover a common trait of all or most traditional political philosophies: 
they first establish a theory of human nature, and then look for a political order that 
best suits this nature. When we look at Rawls, we cannot find this kind of theory 
about human nature; indeed some commentators even take Rawls‘s lacking of such a 
theory as a proof that Rawls‘s political philosophy deserves no serious scholarship. A 
sympathetic reading of Rawls needs to find out why Rawls doesn‘t have such a theory, 
and why he doesn‘t lay his theory of justice on the foundation of such a theory of 
human nature.  
My answer to this challenge can be put straightforwardly like this: Rawls 
doesn‘t need such a theory of human nature to be the foundation of his political 
philosophy because he has a totally new methodology for doing political philosophy. I 
call Rawls‘s new methodology ―institutionalism,‖ and the traditional methodology of 
political philosophy ―rationalism.‖ Rationalism has a closed conception of human 
nature as the fundamental criterion for good political order, while institutionalism 
believes that the nature of human beings is open to their free engagement with 
institutions, and their self creation thereof.  
Rawls‘s own words confirm this institutionalist interpretation in many places, 
although he never uses the word ―institutionalism‖ to describe his own system. I will 
quote Rawls to confirm our interpretation whenever doing so is appropriate. Here I 
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quote one long paragraph. When Rawls discusses Locke‘s theory of natural law, he 
observes that  
Locke‘s conception of natural law provides us with an example of an 
independent order of moral and political values by reference to which our 
political judgments of justice and the common good are to be assessed. Correct 
or sound judgments are true of, or accurate with respect to, this order, the 
content of which is in large part specified by the fundamental law of nature as 
God‘s law. Thus Locke‘s view contains a conception of justification distinct 
from the conception of public justification in justice as fairness as a form of 
political liberalism. However, justice as fairness neither asserts nor denies the 
idea of such an independent order, or justification as showing moral and 




In the above paragraph, Rawls clearly distances his major methodology, a public 
justification of a public conception of justice, from a Lockean justification from 
natural law, which presupposes an order of values that is ―independent‖ from our own 
efforts of institution building. Rawls‘s method of public justification, according to 
himself, doesn‘t need to assert or deny such an assumption.  
My interpretation will further explain why this is so. Institutionalism believes 
that to establish and to secure a social order, a common system of social institutions 
needs to be established, and to be followed by all or most members of this society. To 
reach this goal, this system of institutions, or the basic principles of justice supporting 
this system, needs to be justified to, and therefore to be internalized by, all or most 
members of this society. This is what Rawls calls a public justification of a public 
conception of justice. Understood as such, a public justification is always an 
―internal‖ justification; it must address the reason of the members of the society, and 
as such it must address it from these members‘ points of view, or rather, from the 
viewpoint of their ―common‖ reason or public reason—not from the viewpoint of a 
―reason‖ regarded as the possession of human beings as such independently of the 
                                               
1 See p. 112 of PP.  
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actual social and political context in which they are called to exercise it. If we 
interpret Rawls‘s public justification as an institutionalist justification, we can see that 
Rawls‘s justification of his own principles of justice is a public justification addressed 
from an internal point of view, and by resorting to basic political ideas latent in the 
public political culture of his own society, he does not call his own philosophy into 
question. Rawls is writing as a citizen of a modern liberal democracy; he addresses 
his co-community members as a citizen, not as an external observer or a philosopher 
king, so to speak.  
Moreover, institutionalism believes that any justification of any type of social 
order, at least so long as it aims to be effective, should be understood as an 
institutionalist justification. Even a rationalist justification, if it really works, must be 
working on the basis of public justification. A natural law theory can work to justify a 
social order, for example, only when the audience can accept, or can be tricked into 
believing, the conception of natural law. More generally, a rationalist justification can 
work only when its audience shares the rationalist belief, namely, that there is a pre-
determined human nature, as a fact or as an ideal, which constitutes as the criterion 
for social arrangement. The justification of a monarchy, for example, usually relies on 
rationalism. For thousands of years, most human beings living on the earth did not see 
the possibility of having social order without a heritable kingship. The belief in such a 
kingship may first caught people‘s minds as a matter of fact, the reorganization of 
which might be an achievement priced with long term suffering and heavy loss of 
human lives. Such a belief would then develop into a political ideal, with heritable 
king and other heritable offices ideally acting as the guardians of the social order and 
the public good. When such an ideal is coherently followed, social order can be 
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secured; when this ideal is systematically violated, on the other hand, such a society 
will sooner or later lapse into chaos.
2
  
On this account, institutionalism is both contextual and universal. It is 
contextual because it resists the temptation of resorting to an external or absolute 
conception of human nature as the criterion for human institution building; it is 
universal because it understands all types of societies, and all ideological justifications 
of social orders, based on the need for a public justification of a public conception of 
justice. On the other hand, institutionalism neither affirms one single model for public 
justifications, nor does it encourage the idea that different social orders or different 
ideologies might be incommensurable. In other words, institutionalism tries to walk a 
fine line between absolutism and relativism—or at least so I will argue.  
To further clarify the universal dimension of institutionalism, we can borrow 
Aristotle‘s political theory for a while. In many places, Aristotle suggests that all three 
major forms of government, namely a government ruled by one, or ruled by few, or 
ruled by the majority, can all turn out to be the right form, so long as common good or 
public interest is secured.
3
 To this interesting theory, we add one more point, and 
suggest that so long as all or most of the members of a society can understand their 
society according to a shared conception of justice, and can perceive their social order 
as protecting and promoting their own interests, they will have good reason to obey 
the institutions of their society, and as a result social order is maximally assured. This 
                                               
2 This analysis, of course, is only a debatable caricature of our long historical experience with kingship 
as a form of political order. I do not cite books about history here because merely citing examples 
would not help much in terms of theoretical induction. Nevertheless, in this essay, I will offer this kind 
of analysis of our historical experience with different forms of political order whenever such a general 
analysis is instrumental for constructing our own theory of institutionalism. Although the validity of 
these analyses should be ultimately tested against the readers‘ understanding of the history, these 
analyses mainly perform the function of facilitating theory in this essay, and I will leave them as what 
they are.  
3 This theory is mainly developed in Book III of Politics. For examples, see parts III, VI, and VII, in 
Stephen Everson‘s edition, Cambridge University Press, 1988.  
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reasoning, of course, presupposes that most human beings have a sufficient sense of 
rationality and reasonableness, so that they can conceive and pursue their own 
interests properly, and can act according to their sense of justice. But this assumption 
is different from a pre-determined conception of human nature, for according to the 
theory of institutionalism we will develop in this essay, people‘s sense of rationality 
and reasonableness will acquire different contents under different institutional 
backgrounds. Overall, this essay argues that human social institutions, and the social 
orders secured by them, are the free constructions of human beings under different 
social and natural circumstances, not pre-determined by a conception of human nature 
conceived in any particular way. Human nature, if there is one, is such a free 
engagement with institutions for the sake of establishing and securing social order, 
and a happy life above that. The sense of rationality and reasonableness presupposed 
in institutionalism is only moral powers required by such an engagement; by itself, it 
doesn‘t speak for any particular social arrangement.  
On the other hand, our institutionalism, based on people‘s moral sense of 
rationality and reasonableness, other theoretical considerations internal to 
institutionalism, and most importantly, our historical experiences with different 
systems of social institutions, can indeed point to some direction for human institution 
building across time. This part of our theory of institutionalism goes one step further 
than what Rawls has explicitly said, but accords with, I believe, Rawls‘s theory in its 
whole. The main point of this essay is that by arguing that Rawls‘s justification of the 
ideals of liberal democracy is an institutionalist one, and by working out a full version 
of institutionalism independent from Rawls‘s own theory of justice, we can prove that 
human institution building, under different circumstances and across time, does 
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indeed have a single highest goal to achieve, and the ideal of liberal democracy 
properly embodies this goal.  
The main argument of this essay, therefore, is that an institutionalist 
justification of the ideals of liberal democracy, such as Rawls‘s, would not only 
justify liberal democratic ideals before the citizens of a liberal democracy, but also 
justify these ideals in front of other peoples of other societies. More particularly, this 
argument emphasizes two points. First, for any type of society supported by any type 
of institutional structure, if its social order is to be maintained and refreshed in the 
long run, this society needs to develop towards the ideals of liberal democracy, 
namely, the majority of its people needs to be involved more and more in the process 
of establishing new institutions for newly possible practical actions, revising the old 
institutions that may become inappropriate in light of new circumstances, and overall, 
in the process of justifying and internalizing different social institutions, the voluntary 
obedience to which is essential for securing social order. Second, under modern 
technological and social conditions, when practical actions and interactions within a 
society become so complex and so diversified, when more and more communication 
channels are opened to more and more people, the ideal of liberal democracy is the 
only justifiable ideal for any human society to pursue. Cultural differences among 
societies, important as they are, should only be accounted as different avenues to 
realize this ideal.  
When we understand the ideals of liberal democracy according to 
institutionalism, these ideals will be revealed as dynamic goals for long term 
institution building, not as a definite set of social institutions or cultural attitudes that 
can be realized once and for all in any particular society. Up until now, there is no 
doubt that western societies have approached these ideals closer than most other 
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societies. But other societies surely can approach the ideals of liberal democracy via 
their own cultures and traditions, and in doing so they do not need to copy every 
element, or follow every historical step, of western liberal democracies. Thus, as a 
dynamic ideal, liberal democracy represents an expanding process, with more liberties 
and more participation ever increasing, not along a direct line, but undeniable in the 
long run. To distinguish our institutionalist ideal of liberal democracy from a static 
ideal of liberal democracy, we will often discuss it as a process of liberalization and 
democratization.  
Institutionalism gives its primary concern to securing social order through 
construction of social institutions. This may draw to itself a criticism, namely, that 
institutionalism cares only about social order, not about individual freedom. This is 
surely a misunderstanding. Ultimately, institutionalism is a ―liberalism of freedom.‖
4
 
It treasures human freedom in two dimensions: we are free to form, revise, and to 
rationally pursue our conceptions of good, and we are free to form, revise, and to 
improve our social union through ―man-made‖ institutions. Liberal democracy is 
justified in institutionalism not simply because liberal democracy is required by the 
need for long term social order, but also, and more importantly, because liberal 
democracy is ideal for securing and expanding our freedom in these two dimensions. 
On this front, Rawls also concurs with institutionalism. His liberty principle, and its 
priority, will be discussed in due course as this essay moves on.  
Although the main ideas of this essay burgeoned in reading Rawls, our theory 
of institutionalism can be developed independently, and can stand alone in its own 
right. This relationship between institutionalism and Rawls gives this essay a structure 
like this. In the first chapter, I will contrast rationalism and institutionalism, clarifying 
                                               
4 Rawls uses this word in the end of LP and in the lecture about Hegel in MP.  
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both certain more traditional meanings that have been attached to these terms and the 
meanings to which we will stick in this essay. The second chapter concentrates on 
illustrating the basic ideas of institutionalism, and develops institutionalism as a 
theory of agency formation and institution building. The dimension of institutionalism 
specially bearing on political development will be worked out in the third chapter, 
with further elements of institutionalism, such as our institutionalist conceptions of 
liberty and power, unwrapped. In the fourth and the last chapter, we will then finally 
interpret Rawls‘s methodology as an instantiation of institutionalism, and argue that 
Rawls‘s justification of the ideal of liberal democracy encourages a political 
development towards liberalization and democratization. For this purpose, Rawls‘s 
specific theory of justice will be left aside and special attention rather given to 
Rawls‘s method of public justification, his conception of the moral person, and his 
ideal of liberal democracy.  
 10 
Chapter I Rationalism and Institutionalism 
 
In this first and preliminary chapter, I compare rationalism and 
institutionalism as two different methodologies for seeking and justifying moral and 
political orders. Through this comparison, I will argue that although as 
―methodologies,‖ they can both support various moral and political doctrines, 
institutionalism is actually a better methodology. If we want to justify a political order, 
such as a democracy, we had better develop an institutionalist justification rather than 
a rationalist one.  
In order to find and justify some moral and political principles to guide our 
social actions and interactions, rationalism believes that human reason, as our nature, 
is a self-sufficient and universal guide. Rationalism motivated most moral and 
political philosophers, especially since the modern age, but it cannot explain the fact 
that the free use of reason did not yield universal agreement among human beings, 
especially over moral and political issues. This weakness, I will argue, requires that 
we deploy another methodology in moral and political philosophy, namely, 
institutionalism.  
Institutionalism understands societies not in the units of human beings, but in 
the units of human actions. This switch of concentration has enormous consequences. 
If we start from human beings as the units of human society, we would want to study 
these units first, and then draw conclusions about how they organize themselves into 
society, and what they should do to make their social life better. This is what a 
rationalist has in mind when she gives priority to studying human nature or human 
reason. If we begin with human actions as the basic units of human societies, however, 
we can see that human beings carry out practical actions not only from consideration 
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of rationality, but also from, among other things, consideration of the meanings of 
their actions as perceived by co-members of their society. This leads us to the study of 
human institutions, which are to be understood in the broadest sense as rules and 
norms that give ―meanings‖ to human practical actions. When people act not only 
according to how they think, but also according to how they understand social 
institutions, they will to some extent be ―defined‖ by these social institutions. In other 
words, they are not just human beings, but also human agents, who are capable of 
carrying out practical actions according to social institutions. In this sense, human 
beings don‘t have a definite or pre-institutional human nature. Rather, human beings 
construct themselves through practice of social institutions, whereas different social 
institutions will cultivate different human agents. Institutionalism thus believes that in 
order to find and justify moral and political principles for a society, we need to 
understand the internal connection between human agents, human actions, and social 
institutions.  
The discussion of rationalism and institutionalism will proceed in this order: 
their established meanings will be clarified first, followed by specifications of their 
more definitive meanings that will be used in this essay. Correspondingly this chapter 
is divided into four sections. In the first section, I will analyze the meanings of 
rationalism in modern philosophy. With the help of Oakeshott‘s diagnosis of 
rationalism in politics, I will show, in the second section, the implication and the limit 
of rationalism in moral and political philosophy. The third section will present the 
concept of ―institutionalism‖ as it is used in the social sciences, especially in 
economics, and reveal its strength and limits. In the fourth and the last section, I 
discuss the concepts of ―practical action‖ and ―institution,‖ which are the central 
concepts of institutionalism to be presented in the next chapter.  
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Throughout these sections, rationalism and institutionalism are to be 
repeatedly compared as two methodologies for justifying moral and political values, 
but it is important to recognize that rationalism and institutionalism are also 
methodologies for describing facts. Indeed, on moral and political issues, all 
justifications have certain elements of description. Some philosophers may oppose 
deriving normative conclusions from facts; they may resort to objecting to the 
supposed commitment to the so-called ―naturalistic fallacy‖
5
 to solidify their position. 
What we need to notice, though, is that a charge of such fallacy doesn‘t really concern 
people in real life, even though it can in fact have the beneficial effect of encouraging 
people to be more critical in their deliberation over different normative reactions to 
facts. In any case, whether or not there is a fallacy in actually deriving normative 
conclusions from facts, people should obviously not be discouraged from making 
good or reasonable normative decisions based on what they know about facts. Indeed, 
to get sound conclusions regarding normative matters, we need to get as much 
information as possible about facts. Enlightened moral or political opinions do not 
come from innocence in Eden. To have a better future in our moral and political lives, 
we must admit, in the most serious manner, that there is moral knowledge, and that it 
is in some way in fact ―derived‖ from both facts and values. As a study of practical 
philosophy, therefore, this essay will for the most part ignore any further issues raised 
by charges of such ―fallacy‖, and clarify certain related issues only when the context 
makes doing so appropriate. Throughout this essay, correspondingly, I will take 
                                               
5 Opposition to the ―naturalistic fallacy‖ is usually believed to have originated from Hume, yet many 
interpreters argue that this is not what Hume really means. In fact, Hume never upholds the view that 
moral doctrines only have emotive subjectivity, or that they have no objectivity whatsoever—which is 
commonly thought to be his particular view in opposition to that fallacy. For a summary of this later 
interpretation, see Larry Arnhart, ―The New Darwinian Naturalism in Political Theory,‖ in American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 2 (June 1995).  
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rationalism and institutionalism as both explanations of moral and political 
phenomena, and justifications of moral and political doctrines.  
 
Rationalism in the Traditional Sense 
The word ―rationalism‖ has two connected meanings in modern philosophy.
6
 
In general, it means that human reason is reliable and trustworthy in our pursuit of 
knowledge and moral order. This belief in reason was promoted against the medieval 
doctrine that men are sinful and weak and therefore should submit their reason to 
God‘s directions, perhaps mainly through the revelations in the Bible. Rationalism in 
this sense of confidence in human rational capability played a big role in early modern 
times, but it is not a modern idea by itself. In fact, even in the middle ages, there are 
philosophers, such as Thomas Aquinas, who believe that human reason is a 
trustworthy guide to truth.
7
 Most ancient Greek philosophers work under this 
rationalist belief in human reason too. Nevertheless, in modern philosophy, 
rationalism in this general sense carries a birth mark of the Renaissance and the 
Enlightenment movement. Compared with earlier versions of rationalism, modern 
rationalism gives reason a more definite meaning, a more independent status, and a 
more prominent place in our search for truth and moral order.  
This special enchantment with ―reason‖ can be illustrated with several high 
cries of enlightenment. Generally speaking, the Enlightenment movement is 
motivated by a metaphor of ultimate liberation and autonomy of human reason. This 
                                               
6 For general reflections on rationalism, see A. Kenny, Rationalism, Empiricism and Idealism, Oxford 
University Press, 1986.  
7 Aquinas believes that ―nothing prevents the same things from being treated by philosophical studies 
insofar as they can be cognized by the light of natural reason, and also by another science insofar as 
they are cognized by the light of divine revelation.‖ See Summa theologiae Ia.1.1, ad 2. I quote this 
from section 14 of Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump‘s entry ―Aquinas, Thomas‖ in Routledge 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward Craig ed., Routledge, 1998.  
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belief cried up in Rousseau‘s condemnation that ―Man is born free; and everywhere 
he is in chains,‖
8
 and climaxed in Marx‘s announcement of an imminent communist 
revolution, in which ―Proletarians have nothing to lose. They have a world to win.‖
9
 
In the same spirit, Kant called for liberation of reason from ―self-incurred 
immaturity.‖
10
 The underlying optimism of the Enlightenment movement reveals 
itself in all of these claims, that is, once liberated, human beings will be well-guided 
by the free use of their reason in a rational moral and political order.  
The second and narrower sense of ―rationalism‖ in modern philosophy is a 
particular view in epistemology, which says that reason alone, without seeking help 
from sense experience, can establish and validate a significant measure of real 
knowledge concerning the underlying nature or essence of things. Rationalism in this 
sense refers, paradigmatically, to epistemological doctrines put forward by 
Descartes,
11
 Spinoza and Leibniz, among others; on the opposite camp, we have 
empiricists, such as Locke, Berkeley and Hume, who generally believe that, since our 
knowledge owes its ultimate source to our sense experience, we are incapable of a 
significant measure of real knowledge concerning the underlying nature or essence of 
things. As this categorization goes, Kant then unites the merits of both rationalism and 
empiricism into a system of transcendental idealism, according to which we are 
capable of a significant measure of real knowledge concerning the underlying nature 
or essence of things, but only with respect to the ―phenomenal world,‖ not ―things in 
themselves.‖  
                                               
8 See section 2 of The Social Contract, at the beginning, in “The Social Contract” and Other Later 
Political Writings, Gourevitch ed., Cambridge University Press, 1997.  
9 See the end of The Communist Manifesto, in Marx: Later Political Writings, T. Carver ed., 
Cambridge University Press, 1996.  
10 See the beginning of ―An Answer to the Question: ‗What is Enlightenment‘,‖ in Kant: Political 
Writings, ed. H. Reiss, trans. H.B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 54.  
11 There might be a special connection between Cartesian dualism and rationalism. Descartes 
established the foundation of modern philosophy by singling out human mind as an independent entity. 
In this sense, he gives ―reason‖ a prestigious role in our epistemic efforts.  
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To some extent, we can say that rationalism in the narrow sense is the general 
sense of modern rationalism applied in epistemology, and what we will discuss in this 
essay is the general sense of modern rationalism applied in moral and political 
philosophy. In this arena, a moral or political philosopher is a rationalist if she 
believes that human reason alone constitutes an independent guide in our search for 
moral or political order. A rationalist in this sense can either insist, for example with 
Kant, that the content of human reason can be known through transcendental 
introspection, or she can also claim that human reason, as the nature of human beings, 
can be discovered through empirical studies. An example for the latter case can be 
found in the so-called ―science of human nature.‖ Encouraged by Newtonian 
scientific revolution, many 18
th
 century philosophers, including Hume, Bentham, La 
Mettrie, and Condorcet, believe that the same methods used in physics can also be 
applied to the study of human nature, and once we attain to a sufficient knowledge of 




This sense of rationalism dominated the Enlightenment movement in the 18
th
 
century and the early 19
th
 century. In some weakened forms, such as perfectionism 
and libertarianism, it has stayed influential until today. But there is a fatal limit in 
rationalism: it cannot account for what Rawls calls ―reasonable disagreement.‖ 
Rationalism may be right in claiming that without a blind faith in revelations, what 
can guide our earthly pursuits for knowledge and moral order is only our own rational 
                                               
12 See Christopher Berry‘s entry ―Human Nature, Science of, in the 18th Century‖ in Routledge 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward Craig ed., Routledge, 1998. A self claimed rationalist in our own 
time, Noam Chomsky, also holds the view that there is a definite human nature. More particularly, 
Chomsky believes that we have innate linguistic capacity, which exists before learning any language, 
and makes learning language possible in the first place. For a clarification about rationalism and human 
nature by Chomsky himself, see his dialogue with Foucault, ―Human Nature: Justice vs. Power,‖ in 
Foucault and His Interlocutors, edited by Arnold Davidson, The University of Chicago Press, 1997.  
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faculty. But in real life, reason can give us different or even conflicting instructions. 
Despite this fact, rationalism assumes that there is only one correct conclusion if we 
use our reason properly. Rationalism is therefore a form of universalism. It says that 
since we all possess human reason that has a common form in its every instantiation, 
we should ultimately arrive at the same conclusion if we all stay faithful to our reason. 
According to this logic, there could be only two reasons for people to refuse the 
rational conclusion: either they are lying or they are dumb.  
Usually people exemplify this universalism with the model of natural science, 
where convergence of opinions is expected for every issue in the long run. But even 
here philosophers can disagree. Thomas Kuhn, for example, illustrates how this model 
of convergence is misleading, and how most scientists can do fruitful research only 
under the dominant methodological scheme of their time, which is to be abandoned 
and replaced by another scheme after a scientific revolution, once and again.
13
 In the 
realm of morality, the diversity and disagreements of ideas and doctrines are even 
more resilient. Here we see our ideas about what is good for human life divided by 
religious, cultural, generational, and local differences, and the hope of convergence, if 
it really exists, lies far beyond our reach. These resilient disagreements were not 
expected by rationalist belief in the universality of human reason, neither could they 
be explained by that belief.
14
  
This very limit of rationalism leads people to wonder whether there are 
alternatives to the rationalist belief. From the late 19
th
 century on, rationalism began 
to receive criticisms, from Kierkegaard and Nietzsche (among others) at first, then 
                                               
13 For Kuhn‘s view, see his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press, 1962. 
For a systematic survey of modern philosophers refusing the model of convergence, see Richard Rorty, 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton University Press, 1979.  
14 It is interesting to notice that Rawls turns to political liberalism because he realizes the resilience of 
the fact of pluralism. As I will show in footnote 24, this realization helps Rawls get over the elements 




 century continental philosophers, such as Heidegger, Foucault, and 
Derrida. These philosophers share the same dissatisfaction with rationalism, but after 
getting rid of rationalism, they usually are unable, and in some cases are reluctant, to 
give us any sense of direction. ―Post-modernism‖ is perhaps the most appropriate 
uniform name for their point of view, although as the name speaks for itself, it is 
mainly a negative claim, not a positive construction. After totally abandoning the 
universalist element of rationalism, these philosophers found no legitimate positive 
pursuit besides encouraging diversities.  
In this essay, I propose an alternative to rationalism in moral and political 
philosophy. I call this alternative ―institutionalism,‖ and will define this term in order. 
But before we proceed further into institutionalism, we need to understand how 
rationalism works as a normative doctrine and a methodology in moral and political 
philosophy.  
 
Rationalism in Politics and its Limit 
Michael Oakeshott was perhaps the first philosopher to explicitly use the name 
―rationalism‖ to criticize a general tendency in moral and political philosophy.
15
 In an 
article written in 1947,
16
 right after the Second World War, Oakeshott examined ―the 
most remarkable intellectual fashion of post-Renaissance Europe,‖ the rationalism in 
politics. Since Oakeshott‘s criticism of rationalism was not influential in his own time, 
and was not well-received thereafter, I will examine it in detail in this section. We 
                                               
15 By this I do not mean he is the only philosopher who has criticized political rationalism. Hayek, for 
example, also denounces political rationalism represented by French Enlightenment thinkers such as 
Rousseau, believing that this rationalism leads to ―totalitarian democracy.‖ For Hayek, these thinkers 
are ―deeply imbued with Cartesian rationalism,‖ while philosophers in English tradition, such as Hume 
and Burke, are more aware of the importance of institutions. See Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 
Routledge, 1960, Chapter 4.  
16 Michael Oakeshott, ―Rationalism in Politics,‖ in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, Basic 
Books, 1962.  
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need to keep in mind, however, that Oakeshott himself is a conservative political 
philosopher, and his criticism of rationalism is part of his vindication of his 
conservatism. Our essay here, on the other hand, will not confirm any version of 
conservatism. Oakeshott‘s critique of rationalism is therefore discussed here with a 
clear distance: we partly accept Oakeshott‘s analysis of rationalism in politics and its 
origins, but instead of concluding with conservatism, we believe that the reasonable 
alternative to rationalism is institutionalism.  
We begin our discussion of Oakeshott‘s analysis of rationalism in politics with 
his definition of rationalism:  
The general character and disposition of the Rationalist are, I think, difficult to 
identify. At bottom he stands (he always stands) for independence of mind on all 
occasions, for thought free from obligation to any authority save ‗the authority 
of reason.‘ His circumstances in the modern world have made him contentious: 
he is the enemy of authority, of prejudice, of the merely traditional, customary 
or habitual. His mental attitude is at once sceptical and optimistic: sceptical, 
because there is no opinion, no habit, no belief, nothing so firmly rooted or so 
widely held that he hesitates to question it and to judge it by what he calls his 
‗reason‘; optimistic, because the Rationalist never doubts the power of his 
‗reason‘ (when properly applied) to determine the worth of a thing, the truth of 
an opinion or the propriety of an action. Moreover, he is fortified by a belief in a 
‗reason‘ common to all mankind, a common power of rational consideration, 
which is the ground and inspiration of argument: set up on his door is the 
precept of Parmenides—judge by rational argument. But besides this, which 
gives the Rationalist a touch of intellectual equalitarianism, he is something also 
of an individualist, finding it difficult to believe that anyone who can think 




Oakeshott clearly extracts, in the above paragraph, two central claims of rationalism: 
the self-sufficiency and the universality of the power of ―reason.‖ Conjoining them, 
rationalism claims that human beings everywhere will reach the same conclusion 
regarding moral and political order if they free themselves from customary bias or 
cultural traditions, and use their built-in reason properly. The major task of a 
rationalist, therefore, is to discover the real content of this ―reason,‖ through shrewd 
                                               
17 ―Rationalism in Politics,‖ in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, Basic Book, 1962, pp. 1-2.  
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observations of various human experiences or through a priori or transcendental 
deduction of pure reason. After the true content of the reason is successfully 
uncovered, the moral and political order that we should pursue will present itself 
under the sunlight.  
According to Oakeshott, the rationalist finds the methodology of skepticism 
especially helpful in his pursuit of the real content of the reason. Skepticism helps the 
rationalist to reach beyond the biases and customs covering reason, and to see reason 
as it is. Oakeshott also believes, in the cited paragraph, that there is an internal 
connection between skepticism and optimism: the rationalist dares to doubt 
everything because he believes that the radical doubts will lead him to the real content 
of reason. Oakeshott seems to suggest that this optimistic belief is nevertheless 
unfounded; otherwise Oakeshott would have chased this fantasy in his own thinking.  
It is not hard to find evidences in modern philosophy to confirm Oakeshott‘s 
legitimate observation of the internal connection between rationalism and skepticism. 
Indeed, there are several stories within the history of rationalism that are particularly 
indicative of this dilemma of rationalism, that is, on the one hand, rationalism believes 
that once we get rid of the bias and prejudices imposed by customs and traditions, we 
will discover the true content of the reason, while on the other hand, the rationalist 
might find nothing after he peeled off every layer of the petal and reached into the 
core. Descartes believes that if he ―wanted to establish anything at all in the sciences 
that was stable and likely to last,‖ he must ―demolish everything completely and start 
again right from the foundations.‖
18
 But after a tedious journey of trying to doubt 
everything, Descartes can only rest his mind in the faith (although he decks it out in 
                                               
18 See Meditation I of Meditations on First Philosophy, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, ed. 
and trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch and A. Kenny, Cambridge University Press, 1984-
1991.  
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the form of what would have to be—if it really deserved the name at all—a viciously 
circular ―proof‖) that since a God infinitely good in nature exists, our reason can be 
trusted. George Berkeley claims that ―I do not pin my faith on the sleeve of any great 
man. I act not out of prejudice & prepossession. I do not adhere to any opinion 
because it is an old one, a receiv'd one, a fashionable one, or one that I have spent 
much time in the study and cultivation of.‖
19
 But after he famously concludes that ―to 
be is to be perceived,‖ he cannot make peace with the possibility of the continual 
existence of those things that are not perceived by any actual observer without 
introducing god as the ultimate guarantee of the persistence of ideas. Hume is also 
determined to ―reject every system…however subtle or ingenious, which is not 
founded on fact and observation,‖
20
 but in the end, he can only say that ―reason is, and 
ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office 
than to serve and obey them.‖
21
 These examples vividly show that the rationalist‘s 
belief in the true content of the reason is strong yet fragile at the same time.
22
  
The two central claims of rationalism, the self-sufficiency and the universality 
of the power of the reason, according to Oakeshott, lead to ―two other general 
characteristics of rationalistic politics‖: ―politics of perfection‖ and ―politics of 
uniformity.‖ Rationalists believe that politics is about rationally solving problems by 
technically applying rational principles, and once rational solutions of the problems 
are implemented, a state of perfection would have been achieved. Also, since perfect 
                                               
19 George Berkeley, Philosophical commentaries, generally called the Commonplace book [of] George 
Berkeley, bishop of Cloyne, editied by A.A. Luce, Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1944, p. 465.   
20 See Hume, Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd edition 
revised by P. H. Nidditch, Clarendon Press, 1975, p. 173.  
21 See Book II, Part III, Section III of Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to 
introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects, edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge and 
P.H. Nidditch, Clarendon Press, 1975.  
22
 Of course, in the case of the ―rationalism‖ of the empiricists Berkeley and Hume, we are returning to 
the broad sense of ―rationalism‖ to make our point.  
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solutions are those solutions that suit human reason, rationalists usually do not worry 
about whether different circumstances require different solutions. Encouraged by 
these beliefs, rationalists never hesitate in introducing new plans into our political life. 
They implement different political projects, one wave after another, with no regarding 
to their cultural and political traditions. They have this inexhaustible energy and 
confidence because they take political practice as a practice of correctly applying 
rational principles.  
Oakeshott believes that rationalism contributes both vices and virtues to 
modern politics: ―Not only are our political vices rationalistic, but so also are our 
political virtues‖ (p. 21). As to its origin, Oakeshott traces this rationalist belief to the 
founders of modern philosophy, especially Francis Bacon and Descartes; rationalism 
in politics goes back even further to Machiavelli. But overall, for Oakeshott, 
rationalism was not created by any philosopher; it was the product of the 
―circumstances,‖ and ―so long as the circumstances which promoted the emergence of 
rationalistic politics remain, so long must we expect our politics to be rationalist in 
disposition‖ (p. 29).  
Now what circumstances gave birth to this ―unavoidable‖ trend of rationalistic 
politics that is based on principles rather than on traditions? Oakeshott doesn‘t believe 
that we owe ―our predicament‖ of rationalistic politics to ―the place which the natural 
sciences and the manner of thinking connected with them has come to take in our 
civilization‖ (p. 29). Neither does Oakeshott believe that the demand for technological 
knowledge, which is recognized by Oakeshott with pity as the major doctrine of 
rationalism, is ―the inevitable result of an industrial civilization‖ (p. 33, footnote). To 
make this connection between rationalism and modern sciences and industries, for 
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Oakeshott, would mistakenly validate the claim that ―rationalistic and the scientific 
points of view necessarily coincide‖ (p. 29).  
The circumstances that prompted the emergence and sustained influence of 
rationalistic politics, for Oakeshott, is the modern condition of our ―lack of political 
education‖ (p. 30). That is, rulers in modern politics, unlike rulers in the middle age, 
come into power usually with no political experience, and as a result, they need some 
shortcut to know how to handle their job. Rationalism provides such a shortcut by 
capturing complicated political matters in abstract principles and techniques. This 
shortcut might give these leaders enough confidence in executing their job, but the 
confidence is only an illusion. Deep inside, they are still ignorant about politics. The 
negative influence of rationalism in politics, according to Oakeshott, is that every 
generation of political leaders tries to build the rational political order freshly anew, 
only to discover that the traditional bonds of our political society are in ruin once and 
again.  
The main characteristics of rationalism are expounded by Oakeshott very well, 
but his analysis of the origin of rationalism is questionable. Rationalism rose onto the 
world stage, and became more and more popular in early modern times, not due to the 
lack of political education, but mainly due to the growth of scientific knowledge and 
its application in modern technologies and industries. Indeed, the explosive growth of 
knowledge and the rationalist belief that we can know the world as it is have been 
mutually enhancing each other for several centuries. This rationalist belief was then 
easily simulated in sciences directed at men and their society, which resulted in what 
Oakeshott calls ―rationalism in politics.‖ The positive side of the rationalist belief is 
that it has been very helpful in promoting the growth of every branch of knowledge. 
Without the widespread skepticism about customs and traditions, without the 
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relentless desire to know what the world really is, innovations of knowledge in the 
modern times would be unimaginable. Nevertheless, the negative effects of this 
rationalist belief on modern societies are also obvious: people became so passionate 
for, and so confident with, this belief that they repeatedly tried to build human society 
totally anew, and to get rid of the unsatisfactory factors of social life through 
wholesale solutions.  
Another aspect of rationalism may also contribute to the authoritarian 
tendency of rationalist politics. Since rationalism takes ―reason‖ as the ultimate 
human nature, the most fundamental human faculty, it is logical to infer that although 
every human being has the potentiality to use his or her reason up to the universal 
standard, some members of a society may turn out to be more capable in practice of 
exercising their rational faculty. When this is the case, it is in the other members‘ 
interests to follow these people‘s leadership. Indeed, since a rational moral and 
political order, as well as true knowledge about the world, is ultimately suitable and 
good for the rational soul of everybody, there is no reason to refrain from forcing 
one‘s own opinions onto other people—so long as those opinions are really rational 
discoveries. The hierarchy of rational capability among different people, therefore, 
constitutes a justification of the hierarchy of decision-making among them. At least in 
some cases, rationalism allows paternalism to be the justifiable political order.
23
  
Scholars have long been warning about the danger of building a fascist or 
communist society based on the rationalist belief that a rational society can be built 
                                               
23 Karl Popper made this point when he demonstrated the difference between the rational and the 
reasonable as early as in 1945. He believes that although as a rational faculty, reason ―may be 
possessed and developed by different men in vastly different degrees,‖ ―we can never excel others in 
our reasonableness in a way that would establish a claim to authority.‖ See his The Open Society and 
its Enemies, 5th edition, Routledge, 1966, Chapter 24, p. 499 in 2002 reprint. We should keep in mind, 
however, that Popper defines ―reason‖ as including both our capability of rationality and our capability 
of reasonableness. Defined in this way, ―rationalism‖ doesn‘t support any authoritarian regime.  
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once and for all, with every citizen either voluntarily or forced to endorse the same 
ideology. Arendt‘s analysis of the origin of totalitarianism clearly identifies this 
process; Isaiah Berlin famously charges that Hegel‘s rationalism is the intellectual 
origin of totalitarianism; Popper‘s refutation of utopianism is motivated by the 
awareness of the danger of rationalism; Weber‘s concept of rationalization also 
embodies this logic very well, even before any modern form of totalitarianism was 
seriously practiced.
24
 Whether the same danger is present when we try to justify 
democracy with the same rationalist belief, though, is another problem. A rationalist 
who believes in democracy is usually tempted to believe that when everybody gets 
enough education, and think for themselves rationally enough, they will come to the 
same conclusion about what is right and what is just, namely, a democratic social 
order.
25
 Just for this reason, this rationalist justification of liberal democracy, I believe, 
can be as dangerous as other forms of rationalist utopianism.  
                                               
24 For their different analyses of the connection between intellectual over-confidence and modern 
totalitarianism, see Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York: Harcourt Brace, 2nd 
edition, enlarged, 1958; Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969; 
Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies (first edition in 1945); and Max Weber, Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft (Economy and Society, 1922). To be balanced on this issue, we should notice that 
rationalism could also be used to facilitate a totally different political doctrine: if we follow Leibniz‘s 
theodicy and argues that whatever happens in our world must be backed by reason, we may end up 
promoting a fatalist doctrine, which basically provides no sense of direction. In fact, these two totally 
opposite doctrines, since they can both be derived from rationalism, can sometimes be combined in 
certain theories. To some extent, Marxism is such a combination of totalitarianism and fatalism: it 
claims, with a contradictory yet charming tone, that communism is both the unavoidable historical 
necessity and the normative goal that we should pursue. Ian Shapiro goes so far as to name the tension 
between confidence in knowledge and desire for liberties as the basic tension of enlightenment 
movement. Here is his representation of this tension: ―If there are unassailable right answers about 
political legitimacy that any clearheaded person must affirm, in what sense do people really have the 
right to decide this for themselves? But if they are free to reject what science reveals on the basis of 
their own convictions, then what is left of science‘s claim to priority over other modes of engaging 
with the world? We will see this tension surface repeatedly in the utilitarian, Marxist, and social 
contract traditions, without ever being fully resolved.‖ See Shapiro, The Moral Foundations of Politics, 
Yale University Press, 2003, p. 17.  
25 Rawls is not an obvious example for this category, but in some sense, Rawls in TJ was tempted to 
justify liberal democracy based on this rationalist hope, when he claimed that the original position 
represents a point of view from which we ―regard the human situation not only from all social but also 
from all temporal points of view,‖ and therefore a point of view all ―rational persons can adopt within 
the world.‖ (TJ, the last paragraph.) Originally Rawls tried to frame his arguments from the original 
position as a rational choice theory; later in PL he dismissed this connection. See footnote 7 on p. 53 of 
PL; footnote 2, p. 82 of JF.  
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The deep influence of rationalism on the moral and political arena of modern 
times is perhaps due to the need for an effective strategy of communication in a mass 
society, not due to the lack of experience in modern political leaders, as Oakeshott 
suggests. With the recourse to the absoluteness (self-sufficiency) and the universality 
of human reason, a rationalist can easily persuade others, and perhaps even himself, of 
what he is proposing to do in politics. Rationalist belief works in a modern society in 
this way: certain experts claim that they have found certain doctrines to be rational, 
and that everybody who deliberates rationally enough would agree to these doctrines; 
certain politicians are excited by these claims, and organize together to mobilize the 
mass people to join them in the pursuit of this rationalist social order; after they come 
into power by populist support, they force these doctrines on everybody in the country; 
partly due to the pressure of socialization, partly due to their sense of powerlessness 
as isolated individuals, and partly due to their admiration of power, most people 
inside that country would more or less voluntarily attach themselves to these doctrines, 
and to the totalitarian regime.  
The alternative to rationalism suggested by Oakeshott, a vague version of 
conservatism, is also unsatisfactory. He suggests that we don‘t trust reason as much as 
the rationalist does, and instead put our trust in tradition, the tried and tested social 
practice. In every step forward, Oakeshott advises, we should stay suspicious and 
cautious, with humble admission that we may not understand our social fabric very 
well and therefore should not adjust it merely according to our wishful thinking.
26
 
Granted this is a suggestion from an old wise man, we still don‘t know what the 
positive goal of a conservative is. Obviously conservatives don‘t want to insist that 
                                               
26 Oakeshott presents a vivid description of the ―conservative temperament‖ in ―On Being 
Conservative,‖ the main theme of which is a preference of small and slow innovations over big and 
rapid improvements. See Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, article 7.   
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the status quo is always automatically justified, given that it is a tradition. In any case, 
the rapid rhythm of modern life cannot be slowed down, especially when there is an 
international competition for development going on. The real issue is, therefore, 
where and how we could proceed from the status quo, not how to preserve the status 
quo or the tradition. To move forward, we have nothing to rely on besides our rational 
deliberation. In this sense, conservatism is not an alternative to rationalism, but only a 
supplementary caution to rationalism. This confirms Hayek‘s observation that ―the 
decisive objection to any conservatism‖ is that conservatism ―cannot offer an 
alternative to the direction in which we are moving. It may succeed by its resistance to 
current tendencies in slowing down undesirable developments, but, since it does not 
indicate another direction, it cannot prevent their continuance.‖
27
  
The conservative needs to make some concessions to the rationalist. He must 
admit that our rational deliberation is necessary for us to proceed from the tradition, 
and for us to even be able to appreciate the rational merits of the tradition. After this 
admission, the conservative can then offer his admonition that our rational 
understandings of the tradition and our rational plans for the future are always fallible, 
and reformation should be piecemeal in case we make wrong choices. We should 
show respect for traditional social practices, but this respect is not, as even the 
conservative would agree, due to some mysterious power of the past. Traditional or 
past social practices worked well only because they sustained a balance between 
individual members‘ personal efforts, their understandings of their society and their 
anticipations from their society, and the movements of the society in local units and as 
a whole.
28
 It is important to be aware of the fact that this kind of balance or 
                                               
27 See the after word ―Why I am not a Conservative,‖ in The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge, 1960.  
28 This point, as well as other points presented at early stages of this essay, will become clearer as the 
main arguments for institutionalism are further illustrated.  
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equilibrium is never stable in stillness, and changes are always happening. The 
rationalist may put us in danger when he preaches wholesale rational solutions for all 
social problems, but he is not wrong when he suggests that no social arrangement is 
automatically justified just because it used to work well. Combining the merits of both 
the rationalist and the conservative, we say that all social arrangements should be 
rationally justified and adjusted, not once and for all, but in an endless process of 
moving forward within old and new traditions.  
I believe that we can capture this delicate balance between rationalism and 
conservatism with a normative stand that I am promoting in this essay, namely, 
institutionalism. The conservative usually cannot offer the rationalist a satisfactory 
answer about why the tradition deserves respect; indeed, the conservative can 
logically admit that he doesn‘t know the reason, and doesn‘t need to know. This 
usually leads the rationalist to charge that the conservative is simply sticking to the 
tradition irrationally and stubbornly, and therefore doesn‘t deserve being listened to. 
To this deadlocked conversation, the institutionalist can contribute a middle-ground 
reconciliation. The institutionalist admits that human social institutions, including 
morality and other social and political ideas and structures, are working in a way that 
is not reducible to individual understandings; but on the other hand, the institutionalist 
insists that there is nothing wrong when individual members of a society try to make 
sense of their social surroundings with their tiny brains and hearts, and to initiate 
social changes with their own understandings and expectations. The priority, for the 
institutionalist, is to avoid oppression over the free use of reason, whether the 
oppression is from the conservative imposition of the traditional, or the rationalist 
indoctrination of a perfect future.  
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The institutionalist strikes this balance not because he wants to implement a 
civilized compromise between the rationalist and the conservative. Rather, the 
institutionalist has his own normative stand, which enables him to stand on the 
middle-ground, no matter where the conservative and the rationalist stand. In the next 
two sections, we will present the normative doctrine of institutionalism, beginning 
with an exploration of the established meaning of institutionalism in the social 
sciences.   
 
Institutionalism in The social sciences 
As we did with rationalism, we will first clarify the traditional meaning of the 
word ―institutionalism,‖ and then present the theory of institutionalism as it will be 
used in this essay.  
―Institutionalism‖ is a term widely used in economics, political science, legal 
theories, sociology, anthropology, among other disciplines. The basic insight of 
institutionalism is that to understand a social phenomenon, it is not enough to 
understand the content of human reason expressed by individual ―rational‖ choices, 
because the institutional mechanisms through which individuals interact with each 
other, and against which they make their choices, are also important. This insight can 
be properly captured, I believe, in a philosophical doctrine, an alternative to 
philosophical rationalism. Before we dwell on this task, however, let‘s first see how 
institutionalism works in the social sciences.  
Institutionalism in the social sciences was developed generally as a reaction to 
rationalist theoretical approaches. As happened in the history of philosophy, modern 
social sciences had long been working on a rationalist assumption, which states that 
since social order is good for individual members, it must arise from individuals‘ 
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preferences as determined by their separate rational interests. Adam Smith, for 
example, famously claims that market economy can work in good shape because 
every individual participant‘s pursuits of personal interests constitute an ―invisible 
hand,‖ which automatically generates an economic order.
29
 Earlier than Smith, 
Hobbes, although he admits that if every individual is left to make his own choice, 
collectively there wouldn‘t be any order but chaos of the state of nature, also believes 
that social order arises from everybody‘s rational calculation, that is, ―fear of violent 
death and of wounds disposes men the same way, and for the same reason,‖ therefore 
―desire for ease and sensual delight disposes men to obey a common power.‖
30
 This 
rationalist assumption, again, is about the self-sufficiency and universality of human 
reason.  
Following these founders, modern social scientists had long been working on 
the basis of this rationalist model, which takes individuals and their interests and 
preferences as given, and explains social phenomena as aggregations of individual 
choices. In economics, for example, research had been concentrating on theorizing 
about individual choices, first in Neoclassical economics, then after Arrow published 
his ―General Possibility Theorem‖ in 1951,
31
 in Social Choice (also by the name of 
―rational choice‖) theories and game theories. For Neoclassical economists, 
economics is ―the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between 
                                               
29 Adam Smith (1759), The Theory of Moral Sentiments, edited by D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie, 
Oxford University Press, 1976, Part IV, Chapter 1, p. 184. See also Adam Smith (1776), An Inquiry 
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, edited by R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner, 
Clarendon Press, 1976, p. 471.  
30 Thomas Hobbes (1651), Leviathan, or the Matter, Form and Power of Commonwealth, 
Ecclesiastical and Civil, edited by Richard Tuck, Cambridge University Press, 1991, Part I, Chapter 11.  
31 Amartya Sen‘s lecture upon receiving 1998 Nobel Prize, ―The Possibility of Social Choice,‖ 
published in The American Economic Review, Vol. 89, No. 3 (June 1999), pp. 349-378, p. 351. For 
Kenneth Arrow‘s theorem, see Social Choice and Individual Values, New York: Wiley, 1951.  
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ends and scarce means which have alternative uses.‖
32
 For social choice theories, the 
basic challenge is stated in Arrow‘s Theorem: when individual members of a society 
are asked for their preferences among the same basket of items, their choices do not 
add up to a determinate choice of the society as a whole. The task for different social 
choice theories and game theories, therefore, is to study the interaction between 
individual preferences and collective decisions, treating the latter as the aggregation 
of the former. These studies do not lack of consequential theoretical achievements, 
but they assume a rationalist conception of human nature. In light of institutionalism, 
this assumption is defective: it overlooks the mechanisms against which individual 
choices are made and through which collective interactions are carried out. These 
mechanisms take care of transaction costs, which ―are the economic equivalent of 
friction in physical systems.‖
33
 Without studying them, economics, no matter how 
well it uses the mathematical tools, would still remain at its primitive stage, like the 
stage of the development of physics before it seriously addressed friction.  
To overcome this defect, an institutional understanding of human beings was 
put forward, first by the ―Old‖ institutional economics around the beginning of the 
20
th
 century, then by the ―New‖ institutional economics roughly after 1960, the year 
in which Ronald Coase published his ―The Problem of Social Cost.‖
34
 These two 
schools have significant differences in styles and emphases, but their institutional 
                                               
32 Lionel Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, Macmillan, 1935, p. 
15.  
33 Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational 
Contracting, Free Press, 1985, p. 19.  
34 See Ronald Coase, ―The Problem of Social Cost,‖ Journal of Law and Economics, October 1960. 
Another contention traces the origin of new institutional economics as early as 1937, when Coase 
published his famous article ―The Nature of the Firm,‖ in Economica, New Series, Vol. 4, No. 16, 
November 1937, pp. 386-405. For the claim that New Institutional Economics began with this article, 
see Coase‘s own retrospection, ―The New Institutional Economics,‖ The American Economic Review, 
Vol. 88, No. 2 (May 1998), pp. 72-74. For a short yet comprehensive exploration of the movements of 
old institutional economics and new institutional economics, see Malcolm Rutherford, ―Institutional 
Economics: Then and Now,‖ The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Summer 2001), 
pp. 173-194.  
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understanding of human beings is more or less the same. Thorstein Veblen, one of the 
founders of the ―Old‖ institutional economics, expresses this understanding very well: 
―The situation today shapes the institutions of tomorrow through a selective, coercive 
process, by acting upon men‘s habitual view of things, and so altering or fortifying a 
point of view or a mental attitude handed down from the past.‖
35
 For the new 
institutional economics, individual choices or rational choices are almost infinitely 
open and therefore provide no definite direction without ―the existence of an 
imbedded set of institutions that has made it possible for us not to have to think about 
problems or to make such choices.‖ That is, ―Individuals make choices based on 
subjectively derived models that diverge among individuals and the information the 
actors receive is so incomplete that in most cases these divergent subjective models 
show no tendency to converge.‖
36
 Institutionalism in economics thus broke with the 
tradition of rationalism in classical and neoclassical economics, which assumes the 
self-sufficiency and universality of rationality.  
Institutionalism in the social sciences may present different versions of this 
institutional understanding of human beings in different branches of knowledge, but 
the institutionalist criticism of the traditional approaches is more or less the same. 
According to institutionalism, social orders among human beings, including their 
religious, moral, political, legal, and economic orders, are not prescribed by a pre-
institutional and universal human nature called ―reason;‖ rather, these orders are 
framed by different human beings‘ practical interaction, and institutional engagement, 
with each other in local and historical contexts. To quote a famous passage from 
institutionalism in legal studies, ―systems of norms, aims and values are not 
                                               
35 Veblen (1899), The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of the Evolution of Institutions, 
Transaction Publishers, 1989, pp. 190-191.  
36 See Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge 
University Press, 1990, p. 23 and p. 17 respectively.  
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organizing and justificatory forces logically prior to social reality…; rather, they are 
systems of deliberation and control, which are constituted through social action and 
interaction.‖
37
 Originated and framed in such a process, social orders everywhere bear 
marks of local and historical experiences, and thus are contextual; the same beliefs or 
terms regulating actions may have different meanings, justifications, and effects in 
different contexts. Social orders lie ultimately at people‘s hearts, so to speak, and 
people‘s hearts are framed in different ways by their divergent experiences of dealing 
with their co-community members. As the late judge Oliver Holmes repeatedly 
assured us, the life of the law is not logic, but experience, and ―an answer cannot be 
obtained from any general theory…. The grounds of decision are purely practical, and 
can never be elicited from grammar or from logic.‖
38
  
Now, is this contextuality of social orders the alternative to rationalism 
proposed by institutionalism? Are we to be satisfied with this divergence of social 
orders? Institutionalism, as we find in the social sciences, does have a good point in 
its criticism of the self-sufficiency and universality of rationalism, but as a better 
understanding of human beings, does such institutionalism provide a better approach 
of research?  
For both the proponents and critics of institutional economics, institutionalism 
in economics seems to provide no alternative other than an emphasis on empirical 
studies of particular institutions. As one of the new institutional economists says, ―the 
core ideas of institutionalism concern institutions, habits, rules, and their evolution. 
However, institutionalists do not attempt to build a single, general model on the basis 
of those ideas. Instead, these ideas facilitate a strong impetus toward specific and 
                                               
37 See MacCormick and Weinberger, An Institutional Theory of Law: New Approaches to Legal 
Positivism, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1986, p. 26.  
38 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law, Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1881, p. 264.  
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historically located approaches to analysis.‖
39
 Or as Herbert Simon complains, new 
institutional economics ―suggests a whole agenda of microeconomic empirical work 
that must be performed…Until that work has been carried out…the new institutional 
economics and related approaches are acts of faith, or perhaps of piety.‖
40
 More 
generally, institutionalism in the social sciences, by recognizing the local and 
historical characteristics of social orders, promotes the awareness of the 
interconnection between the subject of a particular social science with a much wider 
social, cultural and historical background. This awareness in turn inspires a more 
empirical and more realistic study of the respective social phenomenon.  
To be sure, this concentration on empirical studies is no small achievement. In 
economics, for example, before the new institutionalists intervened, neoclassical 
economics had long been following the model of hypothesis and deduction, namely, 
to make assumptions in order to simplify the situations, and then to make deductions 
from these assumptions. The claimed universality of economic science was therefore 
based on some unrealistic assumptions, such as ―the assumptions of perfect 
competition, perfect information, perfect contract enforcement, and complete markets 
and contracts…‖ The ―benchmarks‖ developed under these assumptions ―are likely to 
be misleading in realistic settings.‖
41
 ―There is a lack of empirical work,‖ as North 
complains,
42
 and institutional economics provided such an incentive to study concrete 
economic phenomena under different institutional environments.  
                                               
39 Geoffrey Hodgson, ―The Approach of Institutional Economics,‖ Journal of Economic Literature, 
Vol. 36, March 1998, p. 168.  
40 See Herbert Simon, ―Organizations and Markets,‖ Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory, Vol. 5, No. 3 (July 1995), p. 275.  
41 See Karla Hoff and Joseph Stiglitz, ―Modern Economic Theory and Development,‖ at the webpage,  
http://www.worldbank.org/research/bios/khoff/hoff-stiglitz-frontiers%20of%20dev%20ec.pdf , p. 427.  
42 Douglass North, ―Understanding Institutions,‖ in C. Menard ed., Institutions, Contracts, and 
Organizations: Perspectives from New Institutional Economics, Cheltenham, 2000, p. 8.  
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Nevertheless, understood in this way, institutionalism in the social sciences 
seems to be a pure negation of the universal model of the rationalist approach it 
criticizes. Instead of aiming at discovering universal laws of social phenomena, 
institutionalism in the social sciences seems to satisfy itself with descriptions of 
details and emphases on particularities. As one of the old institutional economists says, 
―As economics progresses in the direction of a description of economic behavior, 
serious questions are raised, not only as to the vitality of the older types of economic 
law, but anything deserving the name ‗economic law‘ can survive. Sequences there 
are, but they are relative to time and space.‖
43
 Institutionalism in the social sciences, 
in this sense, seems to be unable to revive any element of universalism after it 
correctly refuses the rationalist assumption of the self-sufficiency and universality of 
human reason. John Commons, for example, shows serious interest in developing a 
universal model of institutionalism,
44
 but he refuses to construct a normative theory of 
institutionalism indicating any direction of development. Commons states his 
ambition of institutionalist universalism in his famous definition of an institution: ―If 
we endeavor to find a universal circumstance, common to all behavior known as 
institutional, we may define an institution as collective action in control, liberation 
and expansion of individual action.‖ Commons further believes that ―from this 
universal principle of collective action in control, liberation and expansion of 
individual action arise not only the ethical concepts of rights and duties and the 
economic concepts of security, conformity, liberty and exposure, but also of assets 
                                               
43 John Maurice Clark says so in a roundtable discussion, ―Institutional Economics,‖ in American 
Economic Review, Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 1932), p. 106.  
44 Commons‘s positive theory of institutionalism is presented in two books: Instituitonal Economics: 





 Nevertheless, when it comes to comparing different institutional 
systems, he refrains from making a judgment. For example, although he thinks that 
the ―American method of voluntary follow-your-leader capitalism is much more 
powerful, flexible, and efficient than the legal compulsion of either the cartels of 
Germany, the Fascism of Italy, or the communism or Russia,‖ he ultimately believes 
that ―it is doubtful whether, under modern conditions, a decision can be reached as to 
which is the better public policy—the communism of Russia, the Fascism of Italy, or 
the Banker Capitalism of the United States.‖
46
 On this front, new institutional 
economics doesn‘t fare better than old institutional economics. In general, new 
institutional economics also emphasizes ―the limits of general theory in the social 
sciences. It favoured approaches that are sensitive to key-differences in socio-
economic systems through time and space.‖
47
  
In contrast to the empirical character of institutionalism in the social sciences, 
the institutionalism developed in this essay will be theoretical and normative. Before 
we present our normative theory of institutionalism in the next chapter, however, it is 
necessary to clarify two central concepts of institutionalism, namely, practical action 
and institution, in the following section.  
 
Practical Actions and Institutions 
A society can be said to consist either of membership persons or of actions 
carried out by its members. The latter description is more appropriate because actions 
can be carried out not just by individual persons, but also by various levels of 
                                               
45 See John Commons, ―Institutional Economics,‖ The American Economic Review, Vol. 21, No. 4 
(December 1931), pp. 649-650.  
46 John Commons, Institutional Economics: Its Place in Political Economy, pp. 896, 903, respectively.  
47 Geoffrey Hodgson, The Evolution of Institutional Economics: Agency, Structure and Darwinism in 
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collective bodies of individual persons, and these collective bodies are usually hard to 
define in terms of individual persons.
48
 The French population, for example, consisted 
of the same group of people before and after 14 July 1789, but the French society and 
the French nation were totally changed on that day. We are tempted to say that this 
change happened ultimately in each individual Frenchman‘s actions, but obviously a 
full explanation of the change cannot be secured unless we also understand this 
change in terms of these people being parts of the French society and the French 
nation. This is true especially when we take into consideration the fact that those 
Frenchmen took actions with their own understandings and expectations about what a 
good and just French society should look like, not just with their concerns for their 
individual gains.  
Since rationalism is based on a conception of the nature of either human 
beings as individual persons or human beings as collective bodies, analyzing societies 
into their membership persons has been a very effective strategy for rationalist moral, 
social, and political theories. Institutionalism, on the other hand, understands societies 
in terms of practical actions carried out in these societies, and the rules or institutions 
regulating these practical actions. Correspondingly, institutionalism analyzes the 
members of a society not in terms of persons, but in terms of agents. Institutionalism 
deals with agents at both individual level and different collective levels, and for 
collective bodies of individuals, we had better call them ―agents,‖ not ―persons,‖ 
although the latter name can be appropriate in some contexts. In this section, we 
                                               
48 The English word ―person‖ originated from the Latin word ―persona,‖ which means a mask worn by 
characters in classical dramas. Thus The Oxford English Dictionary (online) defines the primary 
meaning of ―person‖ as ―A role or character assumed in real life, or in a play, etc.; a part, function, or 
office; a persona; a semblance or guise. Hence: any of the characters in a play or story.‖ Thus the word 
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Nevertheless, due to its more common meaning as ―a human being,‖ I will not use the word ―person‖ 
so often to make the point of institutionalism.  
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define practical actions and institutions, the two central concepts in institutionalism, 
to prepare the way for the presentation of institutionalism in the next chapter.   
The concepts of practical action and institution can be illustrated, again, with a 
comparison with the basic concepts of rationalism. Rationalism, as the foundation of 
modern social sciences after Descartes, is characterized by a sense of distinction 
between the ―inner self‖ and the ―outside world.‖ Social phenomena, according to 
rationalism, occur when individual minds meet with each other in a public space 
called ―society.‖ The fundamental concepts in rationalism are therefore individuals 
and their society. By contrast, institutionalism doesn‘t rely on this dichotomy of 
individuals and their society, but instead understands human beings and their society 
in terms of practical actions carried out by individuals and collective bodies of 
individuals within the society, and the institutions and understandings
49
 guiding these 
practical actions.  
Depending on different weight put on these two concepts, there are two 
schools or two tendencies inside the camp of rationalism: individualist rationalism 
generally believes that the society is the tool for individuals to realize their separate 
and collective goals, while holist rationalism insists that individuals are only of 
instrumental value for the goals or ends of the society. For individualist rationalism, 
as is shown in the cases of Hobbes and Adam Smith, individual human beings meet 
with each other in society with their own personal interests and desires in their bags; 
the society is valuable for them because it is the place where they can satisfy their 
innate wants, through competition and cooperation. To use a metaphor, the society is 
                                               
49 I will not go so far as to claim that institutions are the only motivator of practical actions. Obviously 
people are motivated by many different factors to act, such as their understandings of their rational 
interests, and their feelings and imaginations. In this essay I will mainly consider two types of 
motivations, concerns of rationality and concerns of reasonableness. This in no sense limits these two 
types of motivation as the only working forces behind all practical actions.  
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a market, where individuals with different interests and desires can find what they 
want through exchanges. For holist rationalism, as is represented in Hegel‘s holistic 
rather than individualistic understanding of reason, the human society as a whole 
body has its own life or goal, the realizing of which is to be carried out through the 
efforts of individuals. Here another metaphor is used: the society is a ―living 
organism,‖ which can only function well if its different parts, understood as 
individuals, are consciously or unconsciously performing their own functions.
50
  
For both individualist rationalism and holist rationalism, however, the most 
important task is the same thing, which is to discover the nature of human beings (the 
content of reason), either as individuals or as collective bodies (societies). By contrast, 
institutionalism relies neither on this concept of human nature, nor on individuals and 
the society as its fundamental concepts. Unlike rationalism, which, following a 
Cartesian dualism, takes individuals and the society as ultimately two separate 
existences, institutionalism recognizes the ontological relevance of the society for the 
very existence of individual persons. Individual persons, for institutionalism, are 
always viewed as members of a society. This drives home the point that human beings 
are social animals, that is, without human societies (big or small human communities), 
there are no human beings. Biologically, an individual human being can perhaps 
                                               
50 Although Hegel may not be a diehard supporter of totalitarianism, as Popper and others contend, 
there seems to be no doubt that Hegel‘s holistic theory of the state does not constitute a democratic 
theory of the state. This point can be demonstrated by a quotation from Hegel: ―To hold that every 
single person should share in deliberating and deciding on political matters of general concern on the 
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right that what is done should be done with their knowledge and volition, is tantamount to a proposal to 
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in virtue of the possession of such a form that the state is an organism at all.‖ Hegel therefore only 
allows individuals democratic participation to the extent that this participation works for the function of 
the state as a whole organism. Here I am only using Hegel as an example of holistic rationalism; a 
comprehensive assessment of Hegel‘s political philosophy cannot be offered in this short essay. For the 
quotation, see Hegel, Philosophy of Right, translated by T.M. Knox, Clarendon, 1942, p. 200. For 
Popper‘s criticism of Hegel, see The Open Society and its Enemies, chapter 12. For a defense of Hegel 
against the charge of totalitarianism, see Walter Kaufmann, ―The Hegel Myth and its Method,‖ in 
Walter Kaufmann, From Shakespeare to Existentialism: Studies in Poetry, Religion, and Philosophy, 
Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1959, pp. 88-119.  
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survive; but without any exposure to human societies, a human being cannot develop 
human intelligence and the sense of the human agency.
51
 Thus in particular, and most 
crucially for our considerations, the meaning of individual human choice, ―rational‖ 
deliberation, and action cannot be assessed apart from its place within a particular 
society, as an independent variable to be balanced against whatever might be regarded 
as the demands of that society. As Rawls says when he talks about ―the deep social 
rootedness of people within an established framework of their political and social 
institutions,‖ ―the concepts of person and society fit together; each requires the other 
and neither stands alone.‖
52
  
The social nature of human beings can be demonstrated very well by the social 
nature of human languages. It is obvious that for individual human beings to come 
together and construct a social order, especially a social order on large scales and in 
high complexities, they must be able to communicate with each other with some 
forms of natural language. Any natural language, however, due to its complex 
structure and the arbitrary connections of words, meanings, and references it 
establishes, must be constructed by generations of individuals living within a 
linguistic community, not by any individual‘s independent design. To some extent, we 
can say that a human being is a human being only if she can communicate with other 
human beings by linguistic expressions, including both oral languages and sign (or 
                                               
51 There is a powerful hypothesis in anthropology, which proposes that human intelligence of coping 
with complex situations by complex rational calculations and complex plans of actions is possible only 
through continuous exposure to a social environment. To some extent, we can say that group 
intelligence is the pre-condition of individual intelligence. For a general exploration of this hypothesis, 
see Kummer, Daston, Gigerenzer, and Silk, ―The Social Intelligence Hypothesis,‖ in Human by Nature: 
Between Biology and the Social Sciences, edited by Weingart, Mitchell, Richerson, and Maasen, 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 1997. For a philosophical reflection on social intelligence 
and evolutionary morality, see Valerie Stone, ―The Moral Dimensions of Human Social Intelligence,‖ 
in Philosophical Explorations, Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 2006).  
52 See MP, p. 366.  
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gesture) languages. The social nature of language therefore confirms the social nature 
of human beings.  
It was not a small achievement for philosophers of language to accept the 
social nature of language. At its early stage, philosophy of language tended to fix 
meaning and reference to empirical verifications, which basically requires only an 
individual facing the outside world. This approach was deemed attractive perhaps 
because the major concern for philosophers of language at this stage was the language 
of the natural sciences, which relies first and foremost on empirical data for its 
clarification and verification. Later on, when philosophers of language widened their 
attention to language in general, and particularly to ordinary language, they more or 
less converged on the thesis that language is first and foremost a social practice based 
on rules and norms. As Wittgenstein vividly illustrates, even if a lion could talk, we 
would not be able to understand him anyway,
53
 since his life and thinking is so alien 
to ours. To understand each other‘s language, we need to not only understand the 
words and the rules of a language, but also attribute to each other a status of rational 
agency, thinking and speaking as a member of a particular human society, of which 
we must therefore also have some understanding. In this sense, language is a type of 
social institution, or rather, one of the most fundamental institutions for any human 
society.  
In an effort to strike a balance between individuals and the society, 
institutionalism takes ―practical action‖ as one of its fundamental concepts.
54
 A 
                                               
53 See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigation, Basil Blackwell, 1953, p. 223.  
54 Recent philosophical reflections on actions were perhaps initiated by Donald Davidson. See his 
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford University Press, 1980, in which he proposes that we distinguish 
actions from merely happening events by the criterion of the presence of intentionality. In social 
theories, however, actions and agents became important concepts at an earlier stage, perhaps initiated 
by Max Weber, for whom the interpretation of the ―meanings‖ of social actions is essential for 
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practical action is an action carried out ultimately by individuals, alone or within a 
group, but it carries practical considerations or meanings that cannot be 
comprehended apart from social factors. In this sense, practical actions are places 
where individual human beings and their society mix together, or the places where 
individuals express their social nature.  
Practical action, as a category, does not include every kind of human action. 
There are human actions that are only out of organic necessity and usually do not call 
for practical guidance, such as breathing, eating, and sleeping. These actions can be 
completely understood with a language of causal relationship. In terms of non-
practical actions, we can indeed maintain that a crazy man is not so much different 
from a man with sanity, for a crazy man usually can handle his organic life activities 
in pretty normal ways.
55
 By contrast, practical actions cannot be understood merely in 
terms of physical or spatial movements. In order to make sense of a practical human 
action, from an observer‘s point of view or from a perspective internal to the subject 
of the action, we need to treat the action as backed not just by driving forces or causes, 
but also by motivational reasons. Driving forces are mainly those forces moving us as 
biological organisms, the existence of which is more or less independent of our 
practical considerations. How we are to be moved by these driving forces, how we are 
                                                                                                                                      
sociological studies. See his Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Economy and Society, 1922), trans. G. Roth 
and C. Wittich, University of California Press, 1978, first chapter.  
55 Some cases of insanity can be better understood in terms of practical actions rather than in terms of 
physical damages. That is, some people become insane because they can no longer understand and 
undertake practical actions in the normal sense. As a result, they cannot interact with other people; in 
other words, they lost contact with their moral communities. It is usually an exaggeration to say that 
they totally lose touch with reality, since many of them can still maintain their biological life very well. 
I would rather say that they lost touch with the moral or practical reality of their society. For them, 
things have different meanings; they can make sense and carry out practical actions, but they are no 
longer dealing with real people now, and instead are dealing with imagined practical concerns, such as 
the horrors and joys in their fantasies. Understood in this way, the distinction between sanity and 
insanity is really a problem of degrees. Even pretty normal people can have very unrealistic 
imaginations and reactions to the input from the outside. Our practical actions are really fragile 
constructions. Insanity perhaps is the necessary price we are paying for directing our social life with 
practical concerns instead of following our natural instincts.  
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to steer these forces in our own interests, and how we are to conceive and pursue our 
needs and interests, are nevertheless dependent upon our practical considerations. For 
this reason, it is important to realize that practical considerations can be put into place 
behind any human action. So for example, although we must eat when we are hungry, 
what we eat and how we eat can be endowed with practical meanings. In ancient 
times, there were strict rules and rituals for eating, especially under certain socially 
meaningful circumstances.
56
 A modern vegetarian can advertise against eating meat, 
out of concerns for health or for moral decency. In any case, practical actions should 
be the major concern when we study human societies, while cultural differences can 
be interpreted as only differences in the ways people understand and undertake 
practical actions.  
Generally, people carry out practical actions out of two kinds of practical 
considerations or reasons (motives): what goals they want to achieve in terms of 
rational gains and interests, and what kind of persons they want to achieve in 
themselves, as perceived by their fellow community members, i.e., what roles they 
want to play in their society.
57
 These two considerations are usually intertwined, but 
generally we can make a distinction between them as two types of motives or goals. 
The first type of goals, at least in some cases, can be realized by individuals working 
alone, but the second type of goals is essentially social, requiring the actual or 
                                               
56 For an interesting survey of manners governing trivial daily actions, such as eating with others, see N. 
Elias, The History of Manners, New York: Pantheon, 1982.  
57 Colin Campbell calls these two goals of action ―instrumental‖ and ―expressive‖ respectively. He 
further believes that most human actions include both instrumental and expressive elements. See 
Campbell, The Myth of Social Action, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 115, 118, 131. This 
distinction of two motives of actions was first put forward by Max Weber. See his Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft (Economy and Society, 1922), trans. G. Roth and C. Wittich, University of California 
Press, 1978, first chapter. Jurgen Habermas relies on this distinction, or the distinction between 
―consent-oriented‖ (or communicative) and ―success-oriented‖ (or purposive-rational) actions, to 
develop his theory of communicative action. See Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, 
Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1984/1987. We still need to remember, though, that there are other 
human motivations that might not fit very well into this categorization. One good example is our 
feelings, especially those strong ones that have heavy influence on our actions.  
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imagined presence of other person(s). To accomplish a goal of the first type, a person 
needs to rationally work out a way, or a means, to reach that goal. To realize a goal of 
the second type, however, a person needs to know other people‘s past and possible 
future opinions and reactions, and to think in terms of what kind of society they are 
living in, or what kind of social order they want to realize by their actions. Following 
Rawls, I will call the first type of motive the consideration of ―rationality,‖ while the 
second, consideration of ―reasonableness.‖  
The interrelation between these two considerations can be generally stated as 
follows: as two types, they are independent, in the sense that neither one is derivable 
from the other; but when they work together, the consideration of reasonableness is a 
restriction entering over and above the consideration of rationality. Although the 
consideration of reasonableness can sometimes be regarded as for the sake of 
consideration of rationality, in the sense that, for example, good fame or credibility 
usually works for one‘s own interests, the consideration of reasonableness cannot be 
derived from the consideration of rationality. Indeed, considerations of reasonableness 
are usually guided by rules or norms set out, explicitly or inexplicitly, by communities 
of persons, not by individuals living alone. Since consideration of rationality usually 
produces too many options, consideration of reasonableness must be introduced to 
restrict these options so that a coherent set of decisions about how to carry out 
practical actions can be made for all the involved individuals.  
With regard to these two types of motivations, rationalism picks out 
consideration of rationality as the more important or more decisive one, while 
institutionalism believes that, although rational consideration is very important for 
people‘s practical actions, it is nevertheless restrained by certain normative rules of 
the society. For institutionalism, rationality is not an independent or sufficient reason 
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for human practical actions. People‘s rational choices give rise to too many options, 
many of which would bring people into conflict. What people ultimately choose 
therefore must be restrained by the institutional framework in which they are living. 
Sometimes people need to follow institutions even if it is against their rational interest 
to do so. In addition, institutionalism believes that people‘s rational deliberations are 
made within an institutional framework in the first place, which in turn partly 
determines the range of people‘s rational calculations and rational understandings 
from the start. Since our institutional framework is an evolving process rather than a 
determined structure, the concept of rationality, as framed by institutions, is also a 
historical concept that expands and shrinks as institutions develop, not a concept that 
―transcends‖ history.  
Some philosophers might still want to ask ―what motivates people to create, 
justify, and follow social norms.‖ The proposed answer is usually that consideration 
of rationality is the ultimate motivation for people to practice social norms. But if we 
ask ―why should we stop at rationality when we try to find the ultimate motivation,‖ 
these philosophers usually don‘t have sufficient answer. In fact, if we really want to 
find the ―ultimate‖ motivation for people‘s actions, we must admit that it is our 
biological instinct that ultimately motivates us into actions, not so-called ―rationality.‖ 
After all, no one can rationally choose what biological instinct she is to have. As 
MacCormick argues, ―the simplest possible type of reason for doing anything is 
obviously the desire to do that act for the sake of some satisfaction to be obtained in 
doing it or as a result of doing it. We could have no reason ever to do anything had we 
not such simple and particular purposes grounded in the ‗passions‘, ‗emotions‘, 
‗affections‘ or whatever.‖ Nonetheless, these instinctive motivators are in themselves 
―non-rational,‖ and ―one‘s life would be mere chaos if one simply responded to every 
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such prompting of desire as it arose; moreover, in some cases there would be 
inevitable conflicts if, for example, one had both natural appetites and also a desire for 
sociable co-existence with other human beings with similar appetites and desires.‖
58
  
Even if we do arrive at such an ―ultimate‖ motivation, nobody would claim 
that all of our biological instincts do in fact lead to the fulfillment of our rational 
interests. Acting from instincts very often lead to our own loss, just like what happens 
to a fish when it bites a fake worm on a hook. Worse, we cannot even prove that all 
our biological instincts are directed towards self-interest. As many biologists suggest, 
we do have a social instinct, which motivates us into actions that sometimes lead to 
self-sacrifice. In this respect, we are not more rational than those bees who attack the 
invaders of their honeycomb and die after a desperate sting. Besides, every biological 
instinct, and every physical mechanism that works as motivator for actions, is 
potentially self-destructive for us if it is in excessive or in other malfunctioned states. 
It lacks both logical and empirical reasons, therefore, to assert that consideration of 
rational interest is the ultimate human motivation.  
Even if we agree that the ultimate motivation for people‘s actions is really 
their perceived rational interests, the question ―what should we do‖ in different 
contexts is still not answered. ―What is rational‖ is always a contested issue, people‘s 
solutions to which can always turn out to be wrong, or to be against the ―real‖ rational 
interests that are supposed to be maximized. People in a disorganized society may be 
forced to interpret their rational interests in very narrow, very selfish, and socially 
very counterproductive ways, but according to this theory of ultimate motivation, 
these people are as rational as the people in a better organized, more just and more 
                                               
58 See MacCormick and Weinberger, An Institutional Theory of Law: New Approaches to Legal 
Positivism, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1986, p. 195.  
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efficient society. To prove that the ultimate motivation for human action is rationality, 
therefore, is off the point at best. Our major problem is always about how to promote 
our rational interests, individually and collectively. To harvest this benefit, we need to 
propose, justify, and implement normative solutions beyond mere appeals to what is 
―rational.‖  
To some extent, philosophers who try to reduce all motivations for human 
actions to rationality are motivated by the same intention that motivates those 
philosophers who want to reduce all human activities to physical or material activities 
of human body. Intuitively, since all we‘ve got is our body, and all of our actions are 
ultimately dependent upon the fact that we have a body, it is very tempting to explain 
human activity in a language simply referring to the human body. But what reductive 
materialism has proven is that at least in our own time, it is not really possible to 
describe, let alone to justify, all of our actions in terms of the physical movements in 
our body. Mental process, although it ultimately relies on our body, does constitute a 
new set of properties and causal chains, the explanation of which cannot be 
accomplished by simply referring to the states of the body.
59
 The effort to reduce all 
human motivations to rationality, in this sense, is similar to the dream of reductive 
materialism. It is intuitively attractive, but it is a mission impossible, at least at the 
current stage of our knowledge about human biological nature. It may never be 
accomplishable if we consider that our mental reactions to the natural and the social 
environments do have their own causal power and their own logic. A serious look at 
                                               
59 Here I don‘t have space to argue against reductive materialism. I will simply point out that causal 
dualism, as against Cartesian entity dualism, is still a live option for many contemporary philosophers. 
Here are three examples. David Hodgson argues for a ―dualism of causation‖ in The Mind Matters: 
Consciousness and Choice in a Quantum World, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. See especially 
chapter 19. David Chalmers develops a dualist theory of consciousness in The Conscious Mind: In 
Search of a Foundamental Theory, Oxford University Press, 1996. Paul M. Pietroski explains in detail 
how mental events can cause non-mental events in Causing Actions, Oxford University Press, 2000.  
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our biological and social instincts, as mentioned above, reveals both the impossibility 
and undesirability of such a ―motivation reduction.‖ Such a reduction, I contend, 
shares the same structural problem that afflicts reductive materialism.  
So far I have defined practical actions, and have justified the use of two 
primary motivations for practical actions. Now let‘s look at the other central concept 
of our institutionalism, namely, institution. In this essay, I define ―institution‖ in its 
broadest sense as rules or norms guiding and enabling human practical actions. 
Institutions therefore include both ―informal‖ rules, such as moral and social norms, 
and ―formal‖ rules, such as laws guiding political, economic, and social behaviors.
60
 
This broad sense for the concept ―institution‖ is necessary because we treat 
―institution‖ as a concept inextricably paired with that of ―practical actions‖; instead 
of being a dichotomy, these two concepts cover the same ground. That is, practical 
actions can only be understood if we have an institutional background in mind. This is 
not to say that every practical action is either a case of obedience to an institution or a 
case of violation of an institution. Gray zone actions do exist, and social norms 
usually leave a huge space for other motives to fit in, such as considerations out of 
rationality.
61
 Although social institutions define the structure of social positions, 
exactly which position you will take is usually up to your own choice, chances, and 
efforts. This is especially true in modern societies, where ideally social positions are 
                                               
60 This distinction has various consequences in different contexts. In a modern society, for example, 
social norms that of customary nature, such as common dresses for different times and contexts, are 
usually not up for legislation, while social norms that of legal nature can be effective only when 
specific laws and specific institutions are created for enforcing them. For another example, religious 
norms and other ideological norms usually mutate in different ways from customary and other types of 
social norms, namely, more slowly and more resistant to change. For the most time in this essay, using 
―institution‖ in its widest sense withough making these distinctions may prove to be the most 
manageable way, but these distinctions shall be put on the table whenever it is appropriate to do so.  
61 Jon Elster argues that human motivations for actions can be generally categorized into three kinds: 
rationality, emotions, and social norms. I intend to think that emotion as a motivation is a mixture of 
both rationality and reasonableness. See Jon Elster, ―Rationality, Emotions, and Social Norms,‖ in 
Synthesis, Vol. 98 (1994), pp. 21-49.  
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not inheritable and are largely up for anybody‘s grab. Institutionalism does not claim 
that human beings are puppets controlled by institutions, or that acting according to 
social norms (acting out of duty) is the only legitimate motive for practical actions (at 
least insofar as they have ―moral worth‖), as Kant might be interpreted to believe.
62
 In 
the end, what makes human practical actions different from mere actions is that 
human practical actions cannot be understood without a fair understanding of the 
related institutional background.  
This broad definition of institution, I believe, captures the major concern of 
institutionalism in the social sciences very well. Those social scientists that develop 
theories of institutionalism are mainly concerned with the limitation of the rationalist 
explanations of practical actions. For them, considerations out of rationality are far 
less than the whole story of human motives. In order to understand practical actions 
within a broader background against which practical decisions are made, many 
institutionalists in the social sciences define ―institution‖ as a normative constraint 
upon rational considerations. Douglass North, for example, writes that ―Institutions 
are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social 
interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, 
traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property 
rights).‖
63
 This broad definition of institutions, as well as the one listed in the previous 
section from John Commons, reflect the major concern of institutionalists in the social 
                                               
62 This view is expressed, of course, in Kant‘s famous categorical imperative: ―I ought never to act 
except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.‖ Acting 
from duty therefore is the central doctrine of Kantian ethics. See p. 57 of Immanuel Kant: Practical 
Philosophy, translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor, General Introduction by Allen Wood, Cambridge 
University Press, 1996. It might be an overstatement, though, to say that acting out of duty is the only 
legitimate motivation, for Kant might acknowledge other motivations as legitimate, such as those 
motivations that have no moral worth yet are not in opposition to what duty demands.  
63 See Douglass North, ―Institutions,‖ The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter 




 that is, individuals do not make their choices simply from their rational 
deliberation, but rather make their choices within an institutional background, which 
sets limits, and gives directions, to the possible rational options.  
Institutions in this broad sense create a realm of ―institutional facts,‖ which are 
different from ―brute facts‖ such as the existence of the moon.
65
 Institutional facts are 
those facts that cannot be understood without an understanding of the related 
institutions. The action of marrying someone, for example, cannot be recognized as a 
fact if one does not have a basic understanding of the related social institution called 
―marriage,‖ different as it is in different cultures.  
The concept of practical action in this sense is, as emphasized earlier, not 
necessarily the concept of individual action.
66
 Although individual persons are the 
natural units of agency to carry out non-practical actions, practical actions can be 
carried out either by individuals or by collective bodies of individuals. Indeed, social 
and political actions, such as rituals and customs, elections and wars, are usually 
carried out by collective bodies of individuals, and in the name of collective bodies of 
individuals. Even moral rules guiding individual actions cannot reside only within a 
single individual; they must reside within a moral community, so to speak.
67
 
                                               
64 Karl Popper also defines ―institutions‖ in broad terms: ―…we are inclined to speak of institutions 
wherever a (changing) body of people observe a set of norms or fulfill certain prima facie social 
functions (such as teaching, policing, or selling groceries) which serve certain prima facie social 
purposes (such as the propagation of knowledge, or protection from violence or starvation)…‖ See 
Popper (1962), Conjectures and Refutations: the Growth of Scientific Knowledge, New York: Harper & 
Row, 1968, p. 133.  
65 ―Brute facts‖ is a concept first conceived by G.E.M. Anscome. See ―On Brute Facts,‖ Analysis, Vol. 
18 (1958), pp. 69-72. John Searle systematically explores the realm of ―institutional facts‖ in Speech 
Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge University Press, 1969.  
66 For a recent discussion about the possibility of collective agency, see David Copp, ―On the Agency 
of Certain Collective Entities: An Argument from ‗Normative Autonomy‘,‖ Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy, Vol. xxx (2006), Blackwell, pp. 194-221.  
67 Wittgenstein presents a famous argument against the possibility of a private language, the gist of 
which is that rules cannot be followed privately. Despite of the various controversies this argument has 
stimulated, it is obviously valid when it is applied to moral rules. For Wittgenstein‘s private language 
argument and his arguments about rule-following, see Philosophical Investigations, 3rd edition, 
Blackwell, 1967, sections 142-315.  
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Individuals follow moral rules with the understanding, conscious or sub-conscious, 
that other people are watching, and they need to explain their actions in terms of 
moral rules when an explanation is called for. Indeed, moral rules are learned and 
internalized not through rational deliberation or introspection, but through a process 
of socialization. Little children usually act with no regards to even the most basic 
moral rules, yet with their parents‘ cultivation through persuasions, disciplines, and 
exemplars, they will gradually acquire these moral rules and internalize them as their 
own principles, to various degrees.
68
  
Neither are institutions in this broad sense necessarily ―restrictive‖ over 
people‘s freedom. As Commons nicely puts it in a previous quotation, institutions are 
about the ―control, liberation, and expansion of individual action.‖ Without normative 
rules guiding people‘s practical actions, people will unavoidably run into each other, 
therefore deprive everybody of reliable freedom. Modern economic and political 
institutions make it possible for a person to travel around the globe without owning a 
plane or worrying about being shot down randomly. Indeed, we can safely claim that 
institutions were created in the first place because those creators wanted to expedite 
their actions, at least for themselves, if not for everybody involved. Thus John Searle 
says, ―The essential role of human institutions and the purpose of having institutions 
is not to constrain people as such but, rather, to create new sorts of power 
relationships.  Human institutions are, above all, enabling, because they create power, 
but it is a special kind of power.  It is the power that is marked by such terms as: 
                                               
68 Rawls discusses moral education and moral socialization in Chapter VIII of TJ. Following Rawls, we 
are dealing with moral education and moral socialization not as an empirical study of any specific 
society, but as an analysis of ―the general facts of moral psychology.‖ (p. 405)   
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Even with this clarification regarding the liberating effect of institutions, 
however, there may still be a legitimate concern about whether this institutional 
understanding of human beings would make us mere puppets of institutions. Our 
presentation of institutionalism so far may alarm some readers to the worry that 
although at first we did create and comply to institutions in order to avoid conflicts 
and to facilitate cooperation, we nevertheless end up being strangled by institutions.  
To ease this worry, we need to look at the justification of social institutions. 
The justification of institutions is needed in all contexts of human institutional 
practice: the creation of new institutions, the implementation of institutions, and the 
revision of institutions. When we propose certain social norms to our co-community 
members, we need to explain to them why such norms are necessary, and what 
projected benefits these institutions can bring to us. When a social norm is already in 
existence, perhaps as a part of the inheritance from our ancestors, we need to justify 
them in order to make sure that the norm does enjoy compliance from the relevant 
community members. Compliance can also be secured by sheer force, and in many 
cases enforcement of social institutions does require coercive means. Nevertheless, 
even the coercive enforcement of institutions requires acceptable justifications, if it is 
to be sustainable in the long run. Finally, when we find some social norms no longer 
convenient in most circumstances, we need to engage with each other in public 
deliberation, and justify to each other some alternative social norms. In all these 
situations, the need for justification testifies to the active roles of human beings with 
                                               
69 John Searle, ―What is an Institution,‖ Journal of Institutional Economics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2005), pp. 1-
22, p. 10.  
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regard to their relationship with institutions. Even though sometimes people need to 
internalize the norms of their societies to the extent that institutions become social 
habits, people nevertheless can always deliberate or even challenge the merits of any 
social institution. Social institutions do not work as programs, the running of which 
only requires arithmetical or mechanical compliance.  
In the institutionalism we are about to present, we give institutions as defined 
above a certain priority over rationality. This is not to disregard rationality as a 
legitimate motivation for practical actions, but rather to recognize the fact that 
rationality alone doesn‘t constitute sufficient motivation for practical actions. 
Correspondingly, we give social order a certain priority over individual and collective 
rational deliberations. This is so because we take the central task of moral and 
political philosophy as constructing and justifying moral and political orders. 
Individual and collective rational deliberations may take the relevant rational interests 
as the primary targets, but before these deliberations bear fruits in practical actions, a 
certain moral and political order needs to be secured so that these practical actions can 
be appropriately carried out. This internal connection between practical actions and 
institutions will in turn have a profound influence on our rational deliberation, or for 
that matter, even enhance our capability for rational deliberation. In the long run, I 
will argue, more complex and more reliable institutions make it possible for us to 
deliberate over and carry through more complex and more fruitful practical actions, 
both at the individual level and at different collective levels. Free will, interpreted as 
the human capability for rational deliberation, is not about whether we have such a 
capability, but about the expansion of human rational capabilities through the building 
of institutions. In other words, we are responsible for our actions not because we have 
free will; rather, our free will expands when we can lay more and more 
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responsibilities upon ourselves and upon each other through institutions. Generally 
speaking, this means that people who have grown up in an overindulgent environment 
will experience more difficulties in carrying out ―free‖ deliberations and ―free‖ 
actions, and are more easily trapped in habits and addictions, whereas cultures with 
less experiences or exposures to advanced institutions are less susceptible to such 
effects of modernization.  
These clarifications regarding practical actions and institutions, supplement 
with our comparison between rationalism and institutionalism, lead us to the end of 
this first and preliminary chapter. We now can positively present institutionalism as a 
normative theory, which, as I will argue, ultimately supports a political development 
towards liberalization and democratization.  
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Chapter II Institutionalism as a Theory 
 
In this chapter, I will present institutionalism as a theory of agency formation 
and institution building. Institutionalism centers its understanding of human moral 
and political order on the practical actions carried out by individuals and collective 
bodies of individuals, and the rules and norms guiding, and in part constituting, these 
actions. As a consequence of this shift of emphasis from individuals and their society 
to practical actions and the regulating institutions, human persons are now to be 
understood in institutionalism as agents carrying out practical actions at individual 
and different collective levels, guided by corresponding institutions. Cultural 
differences, for institutionalism, are only different ways of carrying out practical 
actions, or different ways of agency construction.
70
 Institutionalism, in this sense, is a 
culturally neutral theory about human practical actions and human institution building.  
This theory of institutionalism will be presented step by step. In the first 
section, I present the theory of agency with the help of the theories of alienation, as 
developed by Hegel and Marx, although our conception of alienation is different from 
theirs. Here institutions are understood as the alienation of rational deliberation, in the 
sense that people rely on social norms rather than on rational deliberation to interact 
with each other, so that a social order can be achieved and stabilized. In the second 
section, this theory of agency will be further illustrated as a culturally neutral 
explanation of human practical actions, both at the individual level and at different 
                                               
70 ―Culture‖ is a broader concept than ―institution.‖ As E. B. Tylor defines, ―Culture or civilization, 
taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, 
morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.‖ 
This effectively includes every aspect of human activities that is not determined by our physical nature. 
Institutions, on the other hand, only refer to rules guiding human practical actions, as defined in the 
previous chapter. For Tylor‘s famous definition, see his Primitive Culture: Researches into the 
Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art, and Custom, Harper and Row, 1958 
(first edition in 1871), p. 1.  
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collective levels. Our conception of alienation will be expanded into an agency 
formation process as a process of externalization and internalization of social 
institutions, understood as social norms in the broadest sense. In the third section, we 
will use this theory of agency, with the help of reflection on our historical experience 
with religion and politics, to explain how a political society is possible through 
agency formation: it is possible because a conception of collective agency can be 
constructed and implemented by the membership agents, through a system of rules 
governing the relationship among membership agents and the relationship between 
the collective agency of the political society and its membership agents.  
 
Agency Formation as a Process of Alienation 
In the previous chapter, we have argued that our study of moral and political 
order should shift its focus to the study of practical actions and the institutions guiding 
these actions. Correspondingly, when we now talk about persons, we use the concept 
―agents,‖ understood as individuals and different levels of collective bodies of 
individuals capable of carrying out practical actions according to social norms. Agents 
carry out practical actions, while practical actions constitute social realities. In this 
section, we look at how the agencies of these agents are constructed in the process of 
human social evolution.  
Our theory of agency can be developed with the help of the conceptions of 
alienation, as explored by Hegel and Marx. According to them, alienation, and the 
overcoming of alienation, is the dominant dynamic behind human history. Human 
beings, in order to conquer the world and make themselves feel at home inside the 
world, project their own nature to the outside world, through cognitive activities or 
practical labors; when they finally achieve consciousness that what they have found in 
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the outside world is indeed their own creation, they overcome the alienation and reach 
a stage of self-realization. In this section, I will explore this conception of alienation, 
and utilize this conception of alienation to develop my own theory of agency 
construction. Hegel‘s and Marx‘s conceptions of alienation are limited, however, in 
that they presuppose a pre-determined human nature, or a pre-determined content of 
reason, and therefore claim that there is an ultimate overcoming of all forms of 
alienation.  
According to Hegel, the whole history of human beings, and even the whole 
history of the universe, is mobilized by the self-realization or the self-actualization of 
Reason. Reason in Hegel‘s system therefore means the internal logic of all realities, 
not just the nature of human beings. Reason realizes itself by alienating or 
externalizing itself into reality. This process of the self-realization of Reason is what 
really happened, is happening, and will happen in this world; it runs from the earliest 
stage of the universe to the ultimate realization of Reason in human beings. Inside this 
process, the self-realization of human subjective reason is also a process of alienation 
and the overcoming of alienation. Human beings have Reason as their ultimate human 
nature, but they cannot understand their nature without externalizing their essence to 
the outside world, to an imagined otherness, a mirror image of themselves. Hegel 
believes that Christianity is one important step within such a process of alienation, 
that is, human beings project their essence of spirituality to an unearthly being. Hegel 
also believes that the Lutheran Reformation overcame this alienation and gave the 
essence of spirituality back to human agents, preparing the way for the self-
actualization of reason within human beings. Their nature is thus realized, and so is 
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Young Marx applies this conception of alienation to labors in the capitalist 
society. He claims that the essence of human beings as a ―species-being‖ is their 
creative labor, yet capitalism alienates this essence of the workers to a process of 
industrial production and capital accumulation. According to Marx, this process of 
alienation is necessary for the realization of human nature, but once workers realize 
this alienation, perhaps with the help of Marx‘s own theory, they will overcome this 
alienation in a revolution towards communism, in which they enjoy, literally, their 
species life as creative laborers.
72
  
In a wider context, Hegel did not invent the concept of alienation anew, but 
rather synthesized similar observations of his predecessors into this concept. We can 
say, for example, that Hume was close to this concept of alienation when he 
demonstrated that causal relationships are projected into the world by our own 
understanding. Kant, following Hume, came much closer to the concept of alienation 
when he argued that not just causal relationships, but also our intuitions of space and 
time, and all of our cognitive concepts, are not internal to the world in itself, but are 
creations of our reason. Rousseau came even closer to the concept of alienation when 
he argued that people living in civil society, by reflecting themselves in light of 
others‘ view of them, create another self-image of themselves that is different from 
                                               
71 See Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller, Oxford University Press, 1977, especially 
Chapters IV, VI B and VII C, where Hegel presents his conception of alienation. For a systematic 
exposition of Hegel‘s moral philosophy, see Allen Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought, Cambridge 
University Press, 1990.  
72 See Marx, ―Estranged Labor,‖ in Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, collected in Collected 
Works, Lawrence & Wishart, from 1975 and on, volume 3. See also Allen Wood, Karl Marx, 2nd 
edition, Routledge, 2004, Part One, where Marxian conception of alienation is explored in detail. 
Rawls discusses Marx‘s theory of alienation in PP, pp. 362-364.  
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their true selves in the state of nature.
73
 From these philosophers, Hegel went one step 
further, and claimed that reality is nothing but reason, or the alienation and 
actualization of reason.  
The historical background of the concept of alienation indicates that there are 
reasonable elements in this concept, and they can be helpful for our understanding of 
human cognitive and practical activities, and more generally, human social evolution. 
Our task here is to abstract these elements from this tradition. But it is important to 
notice that by presenting Hegel‘s and early Marx‘s theories of alienation, I am not 
endorsing their conceptions of alienation per se. It is obvious, from our abstractions of 
their theories, that both Hegel and Marx presuppose a rationalist understanding of 
human nature. For them, alienation means deviations from human nature, while 
overcoming of alienation means returning to the true nature. The institutionalist 
conception of alienation cannot assume such a human nature. But still, as a way to 
philosophize about human social psychology, the concept of alienation can be 
rendered as a plausible explanation of the process of human agency formation and 
institution building.  
Using the concept of alienation, we can express the basic idea of 
institutionalism in this way: to solve the problem of cooperation and coordination, or 
to secure peaceful coexistence, a group of people alienate their separate rational 
deliberations to a shared common understanding, or a set of publicly endorsed rules. 
Separate rational deliberations give rise to almost infinite choices, many of which lead 
to distrust and conflict rather than to trust and cooperation. To secure a peaceful social 
                                               
73 Rousseau develops this idea in his Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. For a recent discussion of 
this idea, see Julia Simon-Ingram, ―Alienation, Individuation, and Enlightenment in Rousseau‘s Social 
Theory,‖ in Eighteenth-Century Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Spring 1991).  
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Here I condense the process of alienation into a simplified story. Suppose two 
adults, Jim and John, confront each other as strangers, and they don‘t know how to 
treat each other. This brings a lot of anxieties and tensions in their minds, and a lot of 
uncertainties and instabilities to their relationship. Disturbed feelings lead them to 
look for a shared understanding about how they should get along with each other, 
without worrying about the possible threat to their own safety from the other side. 
Since every adult person was raised by adults, they must already have some moral 
sentiments and moral principles about how to live with other people. But suppose they 
have different principles, and cannot agree with each other on what principles are 
appropriate for guiding their interactions. Now from their own rational considerations, 
their relationship could be dealt with in so many ways. They may both want to gain 
from the other side as much as possible, using force or threat of force if necessary; 
they might also want to act as freely as possible, without regarding the concerns of the 
other side.
75
 Individual rational deliberation leads them to too many possibilities, and 
many of these possibilities lead them to conflict rather than to harmony. Of course, in 
                                               
74 This may ring a bell in the minds of people who are familiar with the history of western political 
thought. Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant, perhaps among others, all alluded to the need to rely on a 
certain public reason or general will to secure social order. In this sense institutionalism is not a new 
idea; many political philosophers since Hobbes can be labeled as ―institutionalists,‖ at least partly, if 
not wholeheartedly. My contention is only that the ideas of institutionalism in their writings are usually 
not thorough, and they are usually distracted by rationalist temptations. This is especially true in the 
cases of Hegel and Marx, as illustrated above. For a survey of some of these philosophers‘ opinions on 
public reason, see Duncan Ivison, ―The Secret History of Public Reason: Hobbes to Rawls,‖ in History 
of Political Thought, Vol. XVIII, No. 1 (Spring 1997).  
75 Conflict of interests between these two persons can happen without any side being willing to deprive 
interests from the other side, since many actions taken by one side will have ―externalities‖ on the other 
side. For example, during certain period of time, there are only a limited number of sources of food in 
their shared space of living, and if one side decides to harvest or hunt all or most of these sources, the 
other side might be threatened by hunger. ―Externality‖ here simply means that one party‘s actions may 
have positive or negative effects to the other party, even though the first party may have no intention to 
bring about those effects. For a discussion of the relationship between externalities of actions and the 
necessity of social norms, see James Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory, Harvard University Press, 
1990, Chapter 10, section 3.  
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their rational deliberations, they may both know that if the intention of hurting the 
other is perceived by the other, the same intention will be reciprocated; in other words, 
the intention of hurting has a problem of backfire, and therefore can put the subject 
holding that intention in danger. These rational considerations may provide enough 
motivation for them to cooperate, but exactly on what terms they are to cooperate is 
still unknown. So basically they try to learn how to treat each other in practice, only 
with certain vague ideas or intentions at the beginning. Nevertheless, after they get 
along for a while, sometimes bargaining with each other with threats,
76
 they will both 
gain clearer ideas about how to treat each other. That is, they explicitly or implicitly 
share a common understanding about their relationship. This is the ―principle‖ they 
will hold on to. In the long run, there is no guarantee that this principle will not 
change in light of new circumstances, but there can be a tacit or explicit agreement 
between them, and they can both recognize this understanding as a moral principle.
77
  
In the sense that they are now relying on a principle that they mutually agreed 
to in the past rather than on their own free use of reason, this process of reaching 
agreement can be called a process of alienation. That is, they alienate the guarantee of 
their peaceful coexistence to certain artificially established rules or conventions, 
which are all to be called ―institutions‖ in institutionalism. To see why this is so, we 
look further into the process of the formation of agreements between these two 
hypothetical individuals.  
                                               
76 Threat was argued as a useful strategy of bargaining to reach ―enforceable agreement,‖ for example, 
in John Nash, ―Two-Person Cooperative Games,‖ Economitrica, Vol. 21, No. 1 (January 1953).  
77 I do not claim that this is how morality was created in the first place. The evolution of human 
morality is a very complex and contested topic, to which this essay does not offer systematic answers. 
Neither is the story above meant to describe the real process of the formation of any institutional 
structure. The main point of this story is to show the necessity of building up common understandings, 
or public institutions, in order to secure peaceful human coexistence.  
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There are two processes of agency formation on the way to forming a shared 
understanding. The first process concerns how to form a collective agency or 
collective identity between these two persons, that is, how they could form a common 
goal and share the understanding of that goal in their cooperation. This common goal 
could be dealing with common issues facing them in the natural environment, or 
common human enemies outside their union, or common problems involved with 
their cooperation. Either way, once a collective agency is created among them, they 
are no longer separate individuals, since this common agency is, to repeat Aristotle, a 
whole that is bigger than the simple aggregation of its parts. This collective agency 
binds them together; no collective actions between these two persons can be carried 
out without resorting to this ideal agency. In this sense, this overarching agency is the 
guidance for these two persons as a ―society.‖ In a much bigger social union, this 
collective agency will be represented by an institutional structure called ―the state,‖ 
which claims authority over all the people living inside in the name of the collective 
agency of this society.  
To clarify an important point, the formation of a collective agency is not 
totally defined against the external environment; it also defines the internal structure 
of the ―society‖ under such a collective agency. Exactly in this sense, it enjoys a 
certain priority with regard to how such a ―society‖ is to be structured. The collective 
agency of a society might at first be formed in light of external threats; it might be 
formed because collective actions, such as military self-protection or economic 
mutual assistance in face of flooding or famine, need to be carried out in order to deal 
with these threats. Evidences abound in human history about how effective the 
mechanism of interpreting or creating an outside enemy, either in terms of other 
people or in terms of environmental challenges, is in generating and sustaining social 
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solidarity. Even today, people around the globe are still defined by, and therefore 
separated by, different national, ethnic, religious, and other cultural identities. We can 
even suppose that without a common external threat to be addressed, such as global 
environmental disasters, global pandemics, or invasion from outer space, it would be 
almost impossible for us to break these barriers and bring all human beings under the 
same social order. But once a collective agency is created, more common problems 
will be identified, and more institutions will be created under such a collective agency 
to address these problems. The public goods provided by a collective agency tend to 
grow as time goes by; after all, a social whole is bigger than its parts combined.  
This leads to the second process of agency formation on the way of our two 
hypothetical individuals to forming a common understanding. This concerns how to 
form their separate conceptions of their individual agencies, or how each person is to 
understand the status of himself and the status of the other side, as against their 
collective agency. To be sure, even if they have formed a common collective agency 
with regard to their working together, they are still separate persons, with identifiable 
separate interests and concerns. Practical actions of their common agency or their 
community can only be carried out through their separate agencies. The problem now 
is how to make sure that they share a common understanding of each other‘s roles or 
identities within the collective agency. If they both agree, for instance, that Jim should 
be the boss and John should be the one receiving orders, their cooperation can be 
smooth enough; if they cannot agree over who is in charge of the common business, 
they will sooner or later run into each other. So even when it comes to the 
understanding of their separate agencies, agreement is still necessary for the 
cooperation to remain stable in the long run.  
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Now after emphasizing the necessity of agreement between the two parties of 
this simple union, we should keep in mind that this agreement is never absolutely 
stable. Due to their different personal characters and experiences, due to the changing 
environment of their co-existence, it is highly unlikely that, after they reach 
agreements about the terms of their co-existence, they will stick to those particular 
terms forever. Different ideas about their social relations are bound to arise, and these 
differences may demand a new round of the process of dialogue and convergence. 
The intensity of this process depends on the particular situation at hand.  
To connect this very simplified story to the concept of alienation, we can see 
that in this story, the construction of the collective agency and their separate agencies 
is a process of alienation. More specifically, we can distinguish two elements of 
alienation in this process. The first element of alienation concerns communicating and 
reciprocating their intentions. At the beginning, each side has both the intention to 
cooperate and to assault in the fear of the other side being hostile. Which intention 
will become the dominant strategy is largely dependent on the perception of the 
intention from the other side. Usually the expressed intention on one side will cause 
the same expressed intention on the other. This is what we usually call ―reciprocity‖ 
or ―the golden rule.‖
78
 In reality, the side that deems himself as stronger usually 
chooses the strategy of hostility, while the side that deems himself as weaker would 
                                               
78 ―Reciprocity‖ can refer to either reciprocity of intentions or reciprocity of goods, or both. Connected 
with ―the golden rule,‖ reciprocity has been recognized by many philosophers as an essential idea for 
social cooperation. Rawls takes reciprocity as a fundamental idea in his theory of justice: ―all who are 
engaged in cooperation and who do their part as the rules and procedures require are to benefit in an 
appropriate way as assessed by a suitable benchmark of comparison. The two principles of justice, 
including the difference principle with its implicit reference to equal division as a benchmark, 
formulate an idea of reciprocity between citizens.‖ (JF, p. 49, footnote.) Levi-Strauss also takes 
reciprocity as the basic principle underlying all forms of social exchange, among which exogamy as an 
exchange of women is the ―archetypal form of exchange.‖ See his The Elementary Structures of 
Kinship, translated by J.H. Bell, J.R. von Sturmer and R. Needham, Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1969, 
―Introduction.‖ ―Golden rule‖ was perhaps originally formulated in the Bible. Hobbes restates it as 
―Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to them.‖ See Liviathan, chapter XV, 
paragraph 35.  
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choose the strategy of cooperation. As Nietzsche puts it in a radical form, morality is 
the invention of the weaker for the purpose of containing the stronger.
79
 Nevertheless, 
what happens oftentimes is that they both choose to get along with each other after 
trying in vain to control the other side. Whatever is the case, neither side decides the 
rule independently of the intention and the effort of the other side. A common 
understanding of their relationship cannot be reached without ―alienating‖ or 
―projecting‖ one‘s own intention to the other side, or reading the mind of the other 
before making up one‘s own mind. That is, unless each side is sure that he can safely 
assume that the other side is willing to get along peacefully, he cannot stick to the 
same strategy of cooperation in confidence. This is the first element of alienation in 
the construction of their common agency; by assuring each other of their good will, 
they see in each other no longer a sheer ―otherness,‖ but only an ―alienated‖ self, or 
their own images. To put it more poetically, they have found in each other their soul 
mates. This in no sense means that they happen to be good for each other; the truth is 
rather that they contribute to each other‘s agency or ego construction.
80
  
The importance of this mutual influence on each other‘s agency formation will 
be more clearly illuminated if we consider that human group living usually consists of 
more than two individuals. Living within a larger group, individuals are required to 
perceive, understand, and remember more personal characteristics of other people. 
Higher capabilities of ―alienating‖ one‘s own intentions and thoughts into others‘ 
                                               
79 Nietzsche makes this point in many places. For an example, see The Will to Power, translated by W. 
Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale, Vintage, 1968, section 345, where he claims that the ―chief means‖ by 
which the ―weak and mediocre…weaken and pull down the stronger‖ is ―the moral judgment.‖ To be 
sure, Nietzsche was not the first philosopher to play with this game of connecting morality with the 
weak. In Gorgias (483b-d), Plato explores this idea, through Callicles‘ mouth, saying that ―the makers 
of laws are the majority who are weak; and they make laws and distribute praises and censures with a 
view to themselves and to their own interests‖ (Benjamin Jowett‘s translation).  
80 I think this is what Martin Buber wants to affirm when he famously explores the importance of the 
―I-Thou‖ relations in the construction of our self-consciousness. See Buber, I and Thou, translated by 
W. Kaufman, New York: Charles Scribner‘s Sons, 1970.  
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minds will be developed in the more complex social interaction. In fact, group living 
has been shaping human cognitive capabilities, human brains, and the course of 
human evolution to such a significant degree that many anthropologists believe that 
―social intelligence‖ is a major key for human evolution.
81
 Our capability of reflecting 
on and evaluating our own thoughts and intentions, for example, has been well 
developed perhaps largely because of the environmental requirement that we express 
our intentions and thoughts to other people in order to facilitate peaceful 
coexistence.
82
 Or to put it in terms of our theory of alienation, we can reflect on and 
evaluate our own thoughts and intentions largely because we have developed a more 
and more complex mechanism for expressing and alienating our thoughts and 
intentions to other people, who, by living together with us, would put pressure on us 
for this alienation and reflection.  
The first element of alienation, then, concerned the need for communication 
and reciprocation of intentions. The second element of alienation concerns the rules or 
the norms guiding the relationship between our two hypothetical individuals, or the 
constitutive and regulating rules for their collective agency and their separate 
agencies.
83
 The cooperation rules need not be put into explicit words, but they must 
                                               
81 For a discussion of the importance of group living for human evolution, see Todd Tremlin, Minds 
and God: The Cognitive Foundations of Religion, Oxford University Press, 2006, first chapter, 
especially pp. 32-7. To be sure, the evolution of human beings as a species is only of marginal 
relevance to the arguments in this essay. We need only to know that biologically, all human beings 
around our globe are at the same level of evolution, and every normal human being can in principle 
understand the highest cultural achievement of mankind. What we are dealing with in this essay is 
evolution of human societies, or more specifically, the direction of individuation and liberalization of 
social evolution through agency formation and institution building.  
82 Harry Frankfurt makes a distinction between ―first-order desires‖ and ―second-order desires,‖ and he 
argues that ―no animal other than man…appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that 
is manifested in the formation of second-order desires.‖ See Frankfurt, ―Freedom of the Will and the 
Conception of a Person,‖ Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 67, No. 1 (January 1971), pp. 5-20.  
83 The distinction between ―constitutive rules‖ and ―regulative rules‖ was first made by John Searle. 
Constitutive rules are rules that create the possibility for certain actions, such as the rules of football 
game; regulative rules are rules that regulate the existing actions, such as rules of driving cars. This 
distinction can get tricky when we further categorize rules according to it, for many social norms, such 
as rules for property, are both constitutive and regulative. In this essay, I take the meanings of these 
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form a common understanding on both sides. This common understanding, after it has 
taken shape, might be interpreted by both sides as the natural result of their common 
reason when they look back into the history of their encounter, but what really 
happened is that they tried very hard, with huge risks and dangers, to reach that 
common understanding in their practice. Now with the newly gained common 
understanding, they can reduce the ―transaction cost‖
84
 of their relationship to the 
minimum, and remain comfortable with each other. In this sense, the common 
understanding between them with regard to their relationship is another kind of 
―alienation‖ of their own rational deliberation. Indeed, with the convenience of such a 
common understanding finally achieved, they don‘t need to do much rational 
deliberation when it comes to dealing with each other. Separate rational deliberations 
can drive them apart, while institutions unite them into a cooperation system. 
Institutions capture their past successful experiences of engaging with each other; 
based on these institutions they plan their future actions. Institutions, in this sense, are 
like convenient tools, the using of which liberates and extends our hands. Without 
relying on tools and institutions, without alienating our natural capabilities to these 
extensions, we wouldn‘t have been able to overcome our natural limits.  
Obviously, the second element of alienation is more important and more 
central to our conception of agency formation. For the most part, we will only talk 
about this element of alienation when we deal with agency formation. This in no 
sense devaluates the importance of the communication and mutual configuration 
                                                                                                                                      
two terms as intuitively clear, and use them to name all institutional rules as rules for social 
cooperation. For Searle‘s distinction, see Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, 
Cambridge University Press, 1969.  
84 ―Transaction Cost‖ or ―Social Cost‖ is a very important concept put forward, in the name of ―social 
cost,‖ by the economist Ronald H. Coase, in ―The Problem of Social Cost,‖ Journal of Law and 
Economics, October 1960. I suppose that this widely used concept has an intuitive meaning that is clear 
for the current discussion. In fact, institutions are created to take care of the uncertainties in social 
transaction or interaction, and therefore to reduce the transaction cost.  
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between these two persons. Without perceiving the other as an understandable and 
acceptable agent, without imagining and expressing himself as a meaningful agent in 
the other‘s eyes, there is no way for either of them to remain comfortable with the 
other. The common understanding on which they rely for further communication and 
interaction is indeed only the result of their initial communications. In this sense, the 
second element of alienation is based on the first element of alienation in their mutual 
relationship. But from now on, our theory of institutionalism will center directly on 
the second element of alienation, namely, the alienation of our rational deliberation to 
social institutions as common understanding of our social relation to each other, and 
therefore as the basis of expectation in our practical actions and interactions.  
Now what constitutes the overcoming of alienation in this process? After they 
have formed a common understanding and rely on this ―institutional structure‖ to 
guide their practical actions and interactions (transactions), individuals may 
peacefully cooperate with each other for a comfortable period, but as new situations 
come up now and then, they will sooner or later find their institutions cumbersome in 
dealing with new challenges. As they struggle to live up to the established social 
institutions, they will also consider the possibility of revising these institutions so that 
new social practice can be accommodated. This is an opportunity to overcome the 
alienation represented in social institutions, at least to a certain extent. But here the 
aim is not to abolish all the institutions governing them, but to construct new 
institutions, or a new form of alienation. Overcoming of alienation is thus not the self-
realization or self-actualization of the rational nature of the individuals in question, in 
such a way as to remove all future alienations; it doesn‘t lead to the end of the history 
of alienation in any sense, let alone the end of history altogether. The common 
understanding between these two persons will never reach a foreclosure; it will 
 68 
change as times goes by, or when another person with different perspectives joins this 
―moral community.‖ Moreover, the newer common understandings will be more or 
less based on the older common understandings; institutions develop in a cumulative 
way, or to use a word from the new institutional economics, institutions move forward 
―path dependently.‖
85
 The exact changes that will be introduced into the common 
understanding are not predictable in the long run, just as they were not certain at the 
beginning what common understanding of their relationship would be adopted. In 
other words, the priority of practice over principles is not eliminable, and the process 
of alienation and overcoming of alienation is an open and irreversible process. By 
contrast, rationalist conceptions of alienation, such as the Hegelian and the Marxian, 
take the overcoming of alienation as the final realization of a pre-institutional human 
nature, therefore suppose that there will be a final overcoming of all alienations. This 
passion for the end of history is not shared in institutionalism.  
Agency formation and institution building are two aspects of the same process, 
since agency formation is facilitated by common understandings or institutions. After 
the two persons, in our hypothetical example, have gained a common understanding 
of their relationship, they have successfully constructed out of themselves three moral 
agents: the two persons as two agents in a community of cooperation, and their 
community as a collective agent capable of carrying out collective actions in the name 
of both parties. The agencies of these two persons may not be the same; they can both 
agree that one party is more intelligent and should normally be the decider, while the 
other party should normally be the follower, etc. The division of labor between them 
                                               
85 ―Path dependence‖ simply means that history matters, and what people used to do will be more or 
less carried into the future. Our rational deliberation about the future is, in this sense, configured by our 
past experience with institutions. As a result, history is an irreversible evolution process, not a design 
with a rational plan. For a more theoretical discussion of this concept, see Paul A. David, ―Path 
Dependence, its Critics and the Quest for ‗Historical Economics‘,‖ in Garrouste and Loannides eds., 
Evolution and Path Dependence in Economic Ideas: Past and Present, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2000.  
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usually makes them two different agents, with different roles to play. The common 
understanding also gives rise to a new and artificial agent, their community as a 
collective agent. This collective agent acts in the name of the community as a whole, 
not only in front of agents outside this community, but also in front of the 
membership agents of this community. The idea of such a collective agent has 
overarching influence over how the two separate membership agents are to be defined. 
In a small community, the collective agency usually does not exist independently or in 
a perceivable way, but in a big enough community, this collective agency evolves into 
the form of the state or the government. All of these three agencies are capable of 
carrying out practical actions; they are moral agents because they are all defined by 
rules or institutions commonly understood by the involved parties. The collective 
agent of a society, for example, is not only capable of taking practical actions within 
the society, but also capable of dealing with other collective agents from other 
societies in a wider context among different societies, such as what we have now 
among the nation states around the world. In such contexts, collective agents can treat 
each other as membership agents of a bigger collective agency, and build relations 
around certain ―higher-order‖ institutional structures, just as their membership agents 
can within a domestic society. Agents are therefore ―moral persons‖ or ―artificial 
persons,‖ not ―natural‖ persons deprived of any cultural or institutional commitment.  
It is important to see that our conception of alienation is different from 
Hegelian and Marxian conceptions of alienation in a very meaningful way. Hegel, and 
Marx following him, believes that there is a logically pre-existing essence of human 
beings, and alienation is an externalization of this essence. Autonomy, if Hegel or 
Marx is willing to use this concept, is the overcoming of this alienation. Our 
conception of agency, on the other hand, does not assume such a pre-existing essence. 
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Instead, our conception of agency takes alienation and autonomy as ideals of agency: 
we build up ourselves and achieve autonomy by projecting our own rational 
deliberations to a ―public space,‖ where a common understanding of the rules of 
interaction and the roles every agent is to play is formed, and then stick to this 
common understanding as the guidance of actions and the assurance of social order. 
Since our conception of alienation is not based on a pre-institutional human nature, 
our process of agency formation and institution building can be plural in the 
―realization‖ forms, and be open to the future. Hegelian and Marxian conceptions of 
alienation, on the other hand, presuppose a pre-existing essence of human beings, 
therefore require a singular realization of that essence in its ultimate form. This 
difference in conceptions of alienation can have totally different political impacts: 
while an open and pluralist process of overcoming alienation encourage diverse forms 
in realizing human freedom of institution building, a closed and singular process of 
overcoming alienation can justify authoritarian methods in the name of Reason or 
history.  
To compare these two conceptions of alienation within our framework of 
rationalism versus institutionalism, we see that in the institutionalist conception of 
alienation, human beings make themselves through their practice of institution 
building. In this process, there is no pre-existing human nature to be relied upon, nor 
is there any pre-existing moral order acting as the direction of our self construction. 
Under this challenging condition, we develop moral and political orders among 
ourselves, and make ourselves what we are along the way. To borrow a metaphor 




 By contrast, rationalist conceptions of alienation, such as those developed 
by Hegel and Marx, take human nature as given or pre-determined, therefore point to 
certain sense of the end of human history.
87
  
So far in this section, we have articulated institutionalism as a theory of 
agency formation and of the construction of institutions through alienation. This 
section concentrated on a simplified story, and the theory of institutionalism was 
constructed in concrete examples. In the next section, we will articulate this theory of 
institutionalism in a more theoretical fashion, as a process of externalization and 
internalization.  
 
Institution Building as Externalization and Internalization 
Rationalism tries to capture a pre-institutional conception of human nature and 
apply it to the pursuit of moral, social and political order. For rationalism, history 
doesn‘t count, except as an unwrapping process of a given rational plan, a belief held 
by Hegel and Marx,
88
 among other rationalists. By contrast, institutionalism 
emphasizes that moral, social and political order can only be achieved inside history, 
                                               
86 ―We are like sailors who have to rebuild their ship on the open sea, without ever being able to 
dismantle it in dry-dock and reconstruct it from its best components.‖ See Otto Neurath, Philosophical 
Papers 1913–1946, ed. R.S. Cohen and M. Neurath, Reidel, 1983, p. 92.  
87 Most recently, liberal democracy has been claimed by many people as ―the end of history.‖ This 
belief is perhaps the foundation of American Neo-Conservative approach to radical exportation of 
democracy, and other similar approaches. Francis Fukuyama, one of the representative Neo-
Conservatives, explicitly endorses this rationalist conception of liberal democracy. For these 
rationalists, cultural dialogue is ultimately only a monologue delivered from the west. See Fukuyama, 
―The End of History?‖ The National Interest, Summer 1989, in which he says that ―What we may be 
witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, 
but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind‘s ideological evolution and the 
universalization of Western Liberal Democracy as the final form of human government.‖ For his 
involvement in Neo-conservatism, see Fukuyama, ―The Neoconservative Moment,‖ in The National 
Interest, July 2004.  
88 Marx can also be interpreted as an anti-rationalist, for his major theory of history is supposed to turn 
Hegelian idealism totally upside down, and to give priority to social practice over theoretical concern. 
But overall, Marx‘s theory of human history is still modeled on Hegelian logic. See Marx‘s ―Preface‖ 
to ―A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy‖ for his classic statement of his historical 
materialism, in Selected Writings , ed. D. McLellan, Oxford University Press, 2000.  
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in our internal construction and development of institutional relations with each other. 
This means two things: that our historical experience, or our tradition of institutional 
life, does count in our current and future efforts of building institutions, and that 
practice has a priority over theoretical considerations. The importance of history for 
institutionalism can be demonstrated straightforwardly in the fact that we are always 
carrying the internalized social norms with us whenever we try to rationally reflect 
and revise our institutions. That is, our practice of institution building is always 
―historically conditioned.‖
89
 Correspondingly, the rationalist understanding of the 
relationship between practice and principle is reversed in institutionalism: we don‘t 
first rationally deliberate and decide the principles and then apply them in practice; 
we practice social life, and then abstract principles from our tested and successful 
practice. Human social practice is not a product of pure rational design.  
Simply put, institutionalism believes that rationality alone is not sufficient for 
our pursuit of moral and political order, and as a strategy, we create and rely on 
different institutions to create and stabilize our moral and political order. Institutions 
are the externalized solutions to the problem of cooperation; they become necessary 
and therefore are created because a common solution is needed to maintain 
cooperation among different individual agents; this cooperation, according to 
institutionalism, could not be automatically generated as a result of the involved 
parties‘ separate rational deliberations. Here ―institutions,‖ in its widest sense, means 
whatever social practices with rules or norms. The process of creation, adoption, and 
                                               
89 As Charles Larmore says, ―If even our most fundamental concepts and forms of understanding 
follow the vicissitudes of experience, then only by attending to why we have inherited the patterns of 
belief and experience we have, can we see clearly how we are to go on from there. We need, that is, a 
conception of philosophy that recognizes the historically conditioned character both of the problems it 
confronts and of the knowledge it can acquire.‖ See his The Morals of Modernity, Cambridge 
University Press, 1996, pp. 9-10.  
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revising institutions is a process of externalization and internalization, which can be 
very briefly described, unavoidably with simplifications and idealizations, as follows.  
At the beginning, individual persons, because of their different situations and 
different viewpoints, encounter problems of coordination or cooperation that they 
cannot solve independently. They express
90
 their concerns and their envisioned 
solutions to people living close to them, and together they reach an agreement or an 
externalized solution. This solution may deviate from any party‘s original intentions 
or deepest convictions, but since it is the object of agreement, and since the original 
problem could not be solved without such agreements, they might all agree to 
implement the consented solution, and to internalize this solution as a norm in their 
later actions. Given the structural need for a unified solution to the problems of 
coordination and cooperation, this process of externalization and internalization will 
be carried out by force if no expressed consent is attainable; in many cases, such as in 
a big community with limited means of communication, force might be even 
unavoidable. Nevertheless, since they implement the norm with different 
understandings, and perhaps even from their different rational calculations, the norm 
will depart from its original form as time goes by. Also, in practice, with new 
problems arising now and then, the norm will produce inconveniences to its various 
practitioners, even though these inconveniences may not immediately lead to 
revisions of the norm. Besides, the enforcing of the norm is not always smooth, and 
coercion may be in order in many cases; as more and more new situations contradict 
                                               
90 The word ―express‖ is important here because one of the central differences between rationalism and 
institutionalism is that in the ideal case of rationalism, communication between community members is 
not even necessary if social order is to be achieved among them. Rationalism in moral and political 
philosophy, just as Cartesian rationalism in epistemology, is ultimately individualistic: a person 
thinking alone is enough to establish truth, since reason alone is the decider. By contrast, 
institutionalism recognizes the full importance of communication in the pursuit for social order, since it 
takes agreement as essential for social order. Of course, linguistic communication, and other forms of 
communication, are all implied here when we talk about communication. The role of communication in 
our theory of institutionalism will get more clarifications as time goes by.  
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the norm, more and more coercive enforcements are called into place, until in the end, 
the norm cannot stand any more. Revisions and innovations then become necessary, 
and the community of norm practitioners gathers again, roughly to start another round 
of externalization and internalization.  
This is still a simplified articulation of the process of institution building, and 
to lay out its specific meanings, ten clarifications of this general statement will be 
presented in order in the following paragraphs.  
First, the involved agents are not necessarily individual persons. Although 
ultimately social norms are to be embodied in the actions of individual persons, and 
are to be internalized by individual agents, social cooperation can happen at different 
levels, with different units of collective bodies of individuals. Families, for example, 
are perhaps natural cooperation units, since there are anthropological, historical, and 
psychological evidences indicating that family is the primary social unit of human 
society.
91
 Cooperation terms between families are usually worked out by the heads of 
families, not by individual persons insensitive to familial concerns. Indeed, more 
dependent members of a family usually internalize social institutions through the 
monitoring of the family head. There can also be cooperation between local 
communities, religious communities, and nations, etc. In each of these cases, relevant 
agents are collective bodies of persons.  
Second, just as social cooperation can be carried out at different levels of 
collectivity, social norms also have different layers. Familial norms are different from 
village norms, which in turn are different from national norms, etc. Since different 
                                               
91 To be clear, family is always a social institution, and what form of family a society adopts usually 
reflects, and very often determines, the institutional structure of that society. In no sense this essay 
would argue that some family structure, such as a patriarchal one, is determined by nature rather than 
by institutions. I use family as an example here only because family is normally the most basic unit of 
social organization.  
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levels of social norms are ultimately to be carried out by individual persons, usually 
one person needs to play different roles in different contexts. To avoid conflicts 
between these different levels of social norms, there is also a pressure for integrating 
these levels into unified systems. As a result, different levels of social norms will exist 
in certain hierarchal structure, with overriding norms and subordinate norms, etc.  
Third, the above description of the process of externalization and 
internalization is not a social contract theory based on hypothetical or actual consent. 
When I say agents ―gather together,‖ I don‘t mean to say that there is an actual or 
hypothetical convention attended by every agent to whom the concluded norms are to 
apply. Some kind of convention might be involved when establishing norms, but 
conventions with all relevant parties attending are rarely held, and sometimes a social 
norm can be established without any convention being called upon, or any explicit 
procedure of establishment being carried out.
92
 The social norm of hetero-sexual 
marriage, for example, was deemed in most human societies as a natural norm, and 
was not developed from any sense of establishment procedure. Most social norms are 
established through long histories of trial and error, as part of human social evolution. 
As Hume vividly puts it,  
Two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do it by an agreement or convention, tho' 
they have never given promises to each other. Nor is the rule concerning the 
stability of possession the less deriv'd from human conventions, that it arises 
gradually, and acquires force by a slow progression, and by our repeated 
experience of the inconveniences of transgressing it. On the contrary, this 
experience assures us still more, that the sense of interest has become common 
to all our fellows, and gives us a confidence of the future regularity of their 
conduct: And `tis only on the expectation of this, that our moderation and 
abstinence are founded. In like manner are languages gradually establish'd by 
human conventions without any promise. In like manner do gold and silver 
                                               
92 I believe that Rawls‘s contractarian device of ―the original position‖ should be understood in the 
same spirit.  
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become the common measures of exchange, and are esteem'd sufficient payment 




Nevertheless, I choose to say that agents ―gather together‖ to establish a norm because 
ideally, a norm can effectively come into existence only when there is a relatively 
universal internalization and compliance among involved agents, so that there is an 
equilibrium
94
 that holds the norm through time and across the society. Real universal 
compliance is, of course, rarely secured, and thus our process of externalization and 
internalization of social norms is an open process. It is still true, though, that a social 
norm will be more stable when universal compliance is more secured.  
The fourth clarification regarding this process of externalization and 
internalization of social norms is that for institutionalism there is no pre-institutional 
guidance to be followed in our practice of establishing social norms. To be sure, 
different people, when they are forced to live together by outside environment, may 
have what Rawls calls a ―natural duty‖ to treat each other with benign or even 
friendly intention, so that cooperative social norms can be worked out among them. 
After just social norms are established, people may also have a natural ―duty of 
justice‖ to comply with these norms, and to ―further just social arrangements not yet 
established.‖
95
 But these natural duties are only motivations for people to live 
peacefully with each other under social norms; they say nothing about what social 
norms should be established or what social institutions are just. In this sense 
                                               
93 See Section II, Part II, Book III of David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to 
introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects, reprinted, edited by L.A. Selby-
Bigge and P.H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. 
94 I use the word ―equilibrium‖ in its standard meaning in game theory. An ―equilibrium‖ is reached 
when every party in an interaction process has chosen strategies that constitute the best responses for 
herself to the strategies adopted by the other parties. It is obvious that in human societies, social 
institutions are the locus of the equilibria of social cooperation. Indeed, social institutions are created in 
the first place to maintain such kind of equilibria of social cooperation. The concept of equilibrium in 
game theory was first presented by John Nash, in ―Noncooperative Games,‖ Annals of Mathematics 
Vol. 54, pp. 289–95. For a philosophical presentation of game theory, see Cristina Bicchieri, 
Rationality and Coordination, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.  
95 See TJ, section 19.  
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institutionalism is different from rationalism, which claims that social norms are 
established and complied with because they suit certain pre-institutional natural 
tendencies of the involved parties.  
The fifth clarification is also relevant to the difference between 
institutionalism and rationalism: human nature, according to institutionalism, is not 
pre-determined, but is endlessly molded in the process of externalizing and 
internalizing social norms. People living under certain social norms, whether 
consenting to these norms or not, are required to follow these norms by different 
kinds of social pressures. As a result, they grow up internalizing these social norms to 
different degrees. When they move to another community with different norms, they 
will find themselves more or less culturally shocked, for people there seem to have 
different a ―human nature.‖ This is what we now call cultural differences among 
human beings. These differences in no sense imply, of course, that people from 
different cultures cannot cooperate under the same norm. Indeed, one of the major 
advantages of institutionalism over rationalism is that it endorses no rigid conception 
of human nature, therefore leaves huge space for trans-cultural communication and 
trans-cultural influence. When people with different internalized social norms come 
together, they can establish new norms, or they can learn each other‘s norms, or both. 
In some cases, they may resort to ―our common human nature,‖ and view different 
cultures as different instantiations of the same, higher set of norms for human beings. 
But these are only rhetorical or analogical terms; when another still different culture 
shows up, the ―common human nature‖ may need to be revised yet again.  
The sixth clarification concerns the enforcement of social norms. Social norms 
need to be enforced to secure certain levels of universal compliance, but there is no 
pre-institutional or ideal way to enforce social norms. In other words, the ways to 
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enforce social norms are also dependent upon the process of externalization and 
internalization of norms. Since for a society to stay in order, a coherent system of 
social norms needs to be implemented all across the society, enforcement of social 
norms in larger societies usually requires more powerful coercive institutions. In real 
history, especially during periods of rapid enlargement of a society, blunt force plus 
indoctrination was widely used as effective strategy to enforce new social norms, 
especially norms pertinent to political compliance. But even here, cultural differences 
can have significant consequences. Some cultures encourage yielding to power; some 
cultures are more difficult to tame by force. Some people are more willing to 
internalize new social norms; some people are hard to convince. The colonization of 
the whole world by different Western countries gave us plenty of examples of how 
cultural differences influence the enforcement of new social norms. Compared with 
the Japanese, the English were less willing to use military force to realize their 
imperial goal; compared with India, African countries were more difficult to rule over, 
due to their lack of political traditions.
96
  
Following this, the seventh point I want to make is that social norms usually 
engender powers, and therefore power structures. This is so mainly because of two 
reasons. The first reason is that since most social norms need enforcement, people in 
the positions to enforce social norms would need the appropriate levels of power to do 
their job. Even in a radical democracy that distributes public offices by lot, different 
people still have different powers at any particular moment. The second reason is that 
social norms, as we clarified before, not only regulate, but also constitute. A legal 
system that guarantees several rights to its subjects, for example, empowers its 
                                               
96 For a recent discussion of colonialism, see N. Thomas, Colonialism’s Culture: Anthropology, Travel 
and Government, Polity Press, 1994.  
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subjects through its social institutions, so that they can own property, can freely 
express their opinions, can cast votes, etc. By ―power,‖ therefore, I do not mean 
general power to realize one‘s will, but power that is particularly engendered by 
systems of social norms. This is what Joseph Raz calls ―normative power,‖ or ―the 
ability to perform a normative act.‖
97
  
Furthermore, social norms within a society need to be generally coherent in 
order to secure social order, and they need to be formed into a structured system. This 
makes the normative powers engendered by social norms also structural: different 
people are endowed with different powers, and these powers form a hierarchal system. 
Without such a hierarchal system of normative powers, practical actions and 
interactions among members of a society would fall into constant conflict. In light of 
this power structure, an important problem to be addressed by any political 
philosophy, including institutionalism, is how to make the unavoidable power 
structure in any society not detrimental to its social order, or the sustainability thereof. 
More specifically, institutionalism believes that various normative powers need to be 
balanced within an institutional structure so that no particular power is in a dominant 
position allowing it to manipulate other powers. Without such a balance, a dominant 
normative power, or an alliance of dominant powers, will take advantage of their 
positions and harm people in inferior positions, therefore ultimately destabilize the 
order of the whole society. This point will be discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter when we get to the ideal of liberal democracy and the problem of political 
development.  
                                               
97 See Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, Oxford University Press, p. 98. Raz defines power in 
general as ―the possibility of realizing one‘s wishes.‖  
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The eighth clarification regarding this process of externalization and 
internalization is about how these communal or societal rules or norms came into 
being in the first place. This question is hard to answer, since every generation of 
human beings find themselves already living under certain social norms,
98
 and the 
social norms, in their historical development, are always in a process of accumulation. 
Current social norms always emerge above layers of past social norms; it is not as if 
rational deliberators, facing the inconvenience of not having any social norm in the 
state of nature, work out together a rational and consensual set of social norms and 
stick to them once and for all, as Hobbes and some other traditional social contract 
theorists suggested. It is more in line with Rawls‘s story, in which a thought 
experiment referring to an ―original position‖ can always be called upon when 
fundamental moral and political issues are in dispute, yet the original position in 
question is always based on the current consensual social norms. Rationality plays an 
essential role in reflecting on old institutions and creating and justifying new 
institutions, but it plays this role only within this institutional background.  
The ninth clarification of our description of the process of externalization and 
internalization of social institutions is about the momentum of innovations. As 
explained before, social norms cannot take shape without compliance from norm 
practitioners or agents, and ultimately, social norms are to be followed by individual 
persons. Nevertheless, due to their different circumstances and different backgrounds, 
individual persons will unavoidably follow social norms according to their different 
understandings, or even different manipulations. No social norm is absolutely stable 
in the process of internalization by individual persons—even the most successful 
                                               
98 As Rawls says, ―no society can, of course, be a scheme of cooperation which men enter voluntarily 
in a literal sense; each person finds himself placed at birth in some particular position in some 
particular society, and the nature of this position materially affects his life prospects.‖ See TJ, p. 12.  
 81 
indoctrination has limits in its reach to different human minds. It is here we see the 
momentum of social innovations: individual agents are bound to understand, 
implement, and even manipulate the social institutions according to their own 
experiences and their own rational deliberations, and by making the institutional 
structure not absolutely stable, this individual effort leads to institutional innovation.
99
 
Again, the stability of social norms in the process of internalization is subject to the 
influence of the whole historical process. Some people, such as the Chinese and the 
Japanese, due to their historical experience with coercive institutions, are more 
willing to submit to unified social norms; some people, such as people of the Western 
European tradition, have more independent minds when they face the pressure of 
socialization, perhaps due to their less oppressive historical experience with 
institutions. Nevertheless, the stability and innovation of social norms are everywhere 
ultimately dependent upon individual agents, since they are the ultimate carriers of 
practical actions, and the ultimate residences of social norms.  
The tenth, and the last, clarification regarding this process concerns the 
expansion of institutional structures. Social institutions, by peacefully solving 
coordination and cooperation problems among relevant agents, unite people into their 
cherished communities. With favorable outside social and natural environment, a 
society thus united will expand, and people within this society will have more chances 
to interact with people outside this society, individually or as collectivities. These 
additional interactions will in turn require further social norms and institutions to 
                                               
99 Bertrand Russell has a similar observation on this issue. According to Russell, the major problem for 
political philosophy is how to provide a sense of social order without suffocating individual creativity. 
He believes that defining political philosophy in this way will expose the merit of liberalism as a 
political philosophy, since liberalism provides the best solution to this major problem: ―The essence of 
liberalism is an attempt to secure a social order not based on irrational dogma, and insuring stability 
without involving more restraints than are necessary for the preservation of the community.‖ See 
Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, Simon and Schuster, 1945, p. xxiii.  
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regulate and to empower. If the two societies in discussion both have their own 
separate yet systematic structures of social norms, they will have difficulties 
integrating with each other. The more systematic they are, the two structures of social 
institutions will have more difficulties in getting along with each other peacefully 
under the same mutual understandings. Ethnic, linguistic, religious and other cultural 
differences all contribute to the price two societies need to pay for a peaceful 
coexistence or even a possible integration. Two institutional systems, once 
communications and interactions between them reach a certain level, will unavoidably 
have influences upon each other, sometimes causing changes in each other, 
sometimes making one even more affirmative of its own characteristics. In most 
occasions, however, one system will have more influence over the other; two systems 
of social institutions rarely recognize each other as absolutely equal and learn equally 
from each other. Whatever is the case, once two social systems are brought together in 
constant engagement, their social institutions tend to accommodate each other, and 
gain more and more similarities. This development is motivated by the same need on 
both sides for common understanding or common social norms in practical 
interactions.  
The last three clarifications testify that institutionalism is not the same as 
conventionalism or cultural relativism. Conventionalism and cultural relativism may 
share our view about rationalism in claiming that social norms are not determined by 
any pre-institutional directions, but they both take systems of social institutions as 
closed ones in another direction: they believe that social institutions are arbitrary 
regulations that happen to bind certain people in certain society, and there is no point 
to seek for mutual understanding or mutual influence among different societies. 
Institutionalism, on the other hand, provides a universal framework to understand the 
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reasons why certain people accept and internalize certain norms and values, and thus a 
universal framework to promote mutual understandings among different institutional 
systems. In addition, institutionalism believes that the internalization of social norms 
by individual agents is never a process of defining or determining human nature by 
social institutions or conventions. Individual agents can always use their rational 
deliberation and judgment when they internalize the current social norms; indeed, for 
the process of internalization to get through, individual agents are required to use their 
brains, at least for the sake of understanding and memorization. Since individual 
persons are in no way ―defined‖ or determined by any social institutions or cultural 
customs, the only problem is not about recognizing different peoples as what they are, 
but about how to promote mutual understanding among them, and how to proceed 
with mutual influences and cultural innovations.  
In this section, we presented our theory of institutionalism as a process of 
externalization and internalization of social norms, and made ten clarifications 
regarding this process so that the implications of institutionalism are laid out in more 
details. This is the second step in the presentation of our theory of institutionalism. To 
further understand the agency construction in this process of institutional evolution of 
human history, we will, in the next section, look at the agency formation process at 
work, with examples of our historical experiences with religion and politics. This 
analysis will pave the way for our theory of political development in terms of our 
theory of the human construction of institutions.  
 
Agency Formation through Religion and Politics 
In this section, we discuss the formation of human agency at both the 
individual level and different collective levels. To carry out practical actions at 
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different levels, people need to endow two elements into different levels of human 
agency: the will-power of the agency and the rules for actions to be carried through. I 
will call these two elements two motivations for practical actions: the will-power of 
the agency gives agents a rational motivation to carry out certain practical actions, and 
the social rules for actions give agents a motivation of reasonableness to carry out 
practical actions with other people‘s foreseeable reactions in minds.  
The will-power of the agency might be interpreted as rational desires or goals, 
while the rules for actions can be understood as the meanings of actions, meanings 
perceived by the agents who carry out the actions and by the co-community members. 
In other words, agents carry out certain actions not just because they want such 
actions to be done, but also because they believe they can explain these actions to 
their community, or in some cases, they believe that some members, if not all of the 
members, of their community are expecting them to do so. Brutus conspires to murder 
Caesar not just because he wants to protect the interest of the Senate, but also because 
he believes that this would save Roman Republic from devolving into an empire. In 
actions like these, rational motivations and motivations out of considerations of 
reasonableness are both present, and are closely intertwined.  
Without a certain understanding of will-power, a human agent cannot 
implement any practical action. Nevertheless, will-power alone does not constitute the 
whole point of a practical action. A practical action concerns the realization of certain 
goals to be perceived in a community, and to generally make sure a future action will 
bring about a desired future state of affairs, people need to believe in advance that 
certain rules are there to guarantee the causal relationship between the practical action 
they are about to implement and the desired results. This is especially true when the 
desired goal of a practical action is a desired reaction from other co-community 
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members. Without knowing a shared set of social norms, people cannot make 
reasonable predictions about the future reactions from other people, therefore cannot 
act in a way that guarantees a peaceful coexistence with a minimum level of mutual 
confidence.  
The necessity of will-power for practical actions is not just true for practical 
actions at the individual level, but even truer for practical actions at collective levels. 
Individual actions usually require a minimum level of desires, intentions and personal 
plans; to make and to stick to long term personal plans, a higher level of will-power is 
required; people trapped in extremely negative situations, such as drug addictions, 
usually find themselves incapable of bettering their situation by their own actions 
without believing in a higher being with higher power, who can help them to relieve 
pains and realize higher goals. Similarly, to carry out collective actions, a collective 
intention needs to be formed, and it requires a higher level of will-power formation. 
The same comparison of intensity can be made with regard to the rules for practical 
actions. More complex actions require more complex rules, since they involve more 
practical agents and more complex levels of coordination and cooperation.  
Understanding human agency as being consisted of these two elements will 
prove to be very helpful in the development of our theory of institutionalism, and the 
more specific meanings of these two elements will become clear in an illustration of 
our historical experiences with religion and politics.  
Reflection on our historical experience with religion is instrumental for our 
reflection on the social evolution of agency formation and institution building. 
Religion is arguably the most universal phenomenon in ancient societies, and any 
theory about human social evolution needs to account for this fact. We may not totally 
agree with Durkheim‘s definition of religion as ―a unified system of beliefs and 
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practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—
beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, 
all those who adhere to them,‖
100
 but it seems undeniable that religion does play a 
very important role in facilitating social organization, especially in ancient times. Our 
reflection on religion will therefore concentrate on the social function of religion, and 
will steer away from other aspects of religion for the sake of simplifying our task.
101
  
Religions are helpful, and in ancient times are even necessary, in facilitating 
the formation of agency at both the individual level and collective levels. 
Anthropology has provided enormous evidence about how, in pre-historical times, 
primitive human beings originally constructed their agencies through tribal identities 
and totem worship.
102
 Totems can be identified with individuals and with collective 
bodies of individuals, such as clans and tribes. The formation of individual agency 
and the formation of collective agency are always mixed up, in the sense that the 
formation of certain collective agencies requires the formation of certain types of 
individual agencies. When one tribe identifies itself as a wolf, for example, it‘s likely 
that the members of this tribe are all identified as wolves. But in the sense that totem 
worship could only be established by a clan or a community of people, the 
                                               
100 See Emile Durkheim (1912), The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, translated by Karen E. Fields, 
The Free Press, 1995, p. 44. For a recent exploration of the relationship between religion and 
community cohesion, see Keith Ward, Religion and Community, Clarendon Press, 2000, which is based 
on a comparative study of five major world religions: Buddhism, Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam.  
101 For a review of recently influential theories of religion, see Stewart E. Guthrie, ―Religion: What is 
it?‖ Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 35, No. 4 (December 1996), in which Guthrie 
categorizes these theories into three groups: wishful thinking theories (taking comforting as the major 
motivation for people to seek religion, such as Hume‘s), symbolist theories (taking social cohesion as 
the major function of religion, such as Durkheim‘s), and intellectualist theories (concentrating on the 
cognitive functions, such as the explanation and control of the world, as the most important reasons for 
religion, such as animism). I believe that all three schools have reasonable elements in their theories, 
and will feel free to use anyone of these elements as I see fit for my own theory of agency formation 
and institution building.  
102 Durkheim and Levi-Strauss, among others, emphasize the role of totem warship in the construction 
of tribal identities. See Durkheim 1912 and Claude Levi-Strauss, Totemism, Boston, Mass.: Beacon 
Press, 1962. For a recent study on totemism, see Morten A. Pedersen, ―Totemism, Animism, and North 
Asian Indigenous Ontologies,‖ Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute, 2001, pp. 411-427.  
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construction of collective agency through totem worship has some priority over the 
construction of individual agency through totem worship. As Durkheim says,  
the totem expresses and symbolizes two different kinds of things. From one 
point of view, it is the outward and visible form of what I have called the 
totemic principle or god; and from another, it is also the symbol of a particular 
society that is called the clan…if the totem is the symbol of both the god and the 




The construction of totem systems in ancient societies, therefore, should be 
understood as an effort by our ancestors to construct the identities of their societies, 
and the identities of themselves. Religion is, in this sense, a very fundamental method 
of agency formation.  
The process of agency formation through religion can illustrate very well the 
two elements of agency formation, the formation of will-power and the formation of 
rules. Here we will examine these two central elements of agency formation by 
looking into two types of religious experiences. In addition, the persistence of agency, 
or the consistency of the identity of an agent, is also an important element of agency 
formation, which is facilitated by religious belief in life after death. This belief is 
almost universal in all religions;
104
 it reassures the believers that their culturally 
constructed identities will not be lost after they die. This belief makes believers feel 
much more comfortable and more confident in building up their own cultural 
identities.  
We can roughly differentiate two types of agency formation through religions. 
One type of agency formation runs like this. Some ancient religions, and to some 
extent even some modern religions, construct a conception of a being (a god) with 
                                               
103 See Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, p. 208. This book by Durkheim had not 
been taken seriously by scholars for a long time before a resurged interest in it in late 1990s. For a 
general appraisal of this book, see Ken Morrison‘s review, in Social Forces, Vol. 82, No. 1 (September 
2003), pp. 399-404.  
104 Even a Buddhist would hold that some elements of our cultural identities, such as our moral 
standings or moral characteristics, will survive the death and the incarnation.  
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higher or ultimate power, who demands his believers to do certain things, observes his 
believers‘ actions, and distributes rewards and punishments accordingly. As a result, 
the believers reflect and monitor their own actions in light of an ideal of agency, in 
almost its literal meaning, namely, an ideal in which they themselves are agents of the 
god, fulfilling god‘s will and staying responsible to god as his loyal agents. In this 
case, the god is the representation of the collective agency of this society. So long as 
the belief in this god is well maintained among the population, the sense of 
community and the sense of moral order are safely guaranteed. A typical example of 
this conception of god is, of course, the Judaic God in the Old Testament, who is said 
to be the protector and law giver of the people of Israel.  
Another type of agency formation through religion can be seen in different 
kinds of witchcraft, in which the believers claim that they can gain superior power by 
performing as the gods or the demons they worship. Generally speaking, this type of 
religion constructs an agent higher than the believer‘s self, therefore helps the believer 
to form a conception of herself as a copy or incarnation of the agent, with will and 
power. This type is perhaps more primitive than the first type, and it has certain 
residues in the first type, such as prayers and other rituals helping believers to gain 
power and peace. 
The first type of agency formation through religion illustrates the reasonable 
motivation for practical actions, while the second type testifies very well the rational 
motivation for practical actions. The first type shows that there is an internal 
connection between the formation of agency and the formation of norms. An agency 
is constructed when certain rules are put into place to guide and to constrain the 
practical actions carried out by the relevant persons. Actions unavoidably have 
consequences, and in order to make sense of these consequences, and to foresee these 
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consequences, people need to understand them in terms of norms or rules. Also, since 
actions from different agents are bound to conflict, norms are necessary to maintain 
order. People with certain religious beliefs, ancient or modern, act in the self-
understanding that they are following the rules set up by god; they pray to god in the 
understanding that since they are following God‘s rules, God will protect and bless 
them in the future—if not in this life, then in the after life. This brings certainties to 
the unavoidably consequential and conflicting practical actions. The relationship 
between believers and their god is, so to speak, a relationship of contract, only here 
the terms are supposedly set up by god‘s commandments unilaterally.
105
 When 
believers of god discover any discrepancies between the rules and what happens in 
reality, they suppose that god has his own plan, and what they perceive as 
discrepancies are only the lack of understanding of god‘s will on their own part. With 
these sometimes very complex self-adjusting mechanisms, people construct their 
agency through various religious norms.  
Another element of the concept of agency, as shown in the second type of 
formation of agency through religion, is the awareness of the will-power in human 
actions. Most ancient cultures externalize human intentionality to other living beings; 
in some cases, even inanimate beings, such as mountains and the heaven, are deemed 
as intentional beings with will-power. To solve the problems in their lives, such as 
collecting food, curing illnesses, getting rid of the fear for death, they seek help from 
the good will of these inanimate beings by various rituals, including sacrifices, 
prayers, and even curses. Anthropologists call this instilment of will-power into all 
kinds of natural things ―animism.‖ In some forms, animism as a way of thinking can 
                                               
105 Most major religious traditions of the world, such as Judaism, Hinduism, Confucianism, Christianity, 
and Islam, had their legal practice originated from religious authorities. This is especially true in the 
three monotheist traditions, where laws are explicitly ordained in their holy scriptures.  
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also be found in children.
106
 This type of agency formation through witchcraft also 
works as a process of externalization and internalization: people feel their own actions 
as intentionally motivated; they then suppose that other beings are also motivated by 
intentions, and therefore can be pleased by good intentions from human beings. In 
witchcraft, people externalize their own intentionality to other beings, and then 
internalize that intentionality to gain will power for themselves.  
The relationship between rules or norms, on the one hand, and will and power, 
on the other hand, can be very tricky. In our modern understanding, normative rules 
are different from ―rules‖ governing nature: norms presuppose that people have free 
will to obey and to violate; natural rules, if they are genuine laws of nature, are not up 
for violation. Ancient people, however, might not necessarily understand social norms 
and natural laws as different in kind. As Kelsen says,  
in the Christian Era, at least until Hume, the idea of causality was considered 
merely as a norm, since it was felt to be the expression of the divine will. God is 
not only the absolute moral authority determining by his will the norms of social 
life; he is also the creator of the universe, its prima causa; and if natural events 





In many primitive religions discovered by anthropologists, will and power in natural 
things can be negotiated or steered into the direction in favor of human beings, 
through rule-governed rituals. It‘s likely that in their understandings, the actions of 
non-human natural beings are also governed by norms. As Kelsen illustrates,  
in primitive societies the behaviour of animals, plants, and even inanimate 
things is regulated by the legal order in the same way as that of human beings. 
                                               
106 ―Animism‖ is a concept first created by E.B. Tylor, in Primitive Culture: Researches into the 
Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art, and Custom, first edition in 1871. 
For a recent discussion of animism, see a roundtable discussion of this topic by a group of 
anthropologists, ―‗Animism‘ Revisited: Personhood, Environment, and Relational Epistemology,‖ in 
Current Anthropology, Vol. 40, Supplement (February 1999). For a discussion of animism in children, 
see Gareth Matthews, ―Conceiving Childhood: ‗Child Animism‘,‖ Nous, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1982).  
107 Hans Kelsen, Society and Nature: A Sociological Inquiry, The University of Chicago Press, 1943, p. 
260. Here we can also see that a theocracy understands social norms as nothing but the divine will, or 
to use John Austin‘s theory, laws are commands issued by the sovereign ruler.  
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Thus we read in the Bible that an ox which has killed a human being is to be 
killed (clearly as a punishment)…This norm-content, absurd according to 
present-day views, must be attributed to the animistic idea that not only human 
beings but also animals and inanimate objects have a ‗soul‘, and so there is no 




In this sense, Judaism contains elements of animism. More generally, the 
intentionality of actions and the normativity of actions (in the sense that actions are 
governed by norms) are two interconnected dimensions of human actions and human 
agencies.  
This interconnection between norms of action and will-power of action can be 
further illustrated as follows. Here we can make a distinction between demons that 
supposedly control us, and demons that control other things. Dealing with different 
types of demons may require different methods, but as both demons, they represent 
the same elements of agencies, that is, the will-power element and the rule-following 
element. As we saw above, to deal with the demons supposedly controlling us, we 
need to submit ourselves to god, who is supposed to be the ideal ―demon,‖ so to speak, 
who controls us. In other words, ideally we are the agents of god, and we submit our 
will to god‘s will as presented in his orders and norms. Our free will, which more 
genuinely belongs to us, is sometimes viewed as a sign of evil, or original sin, that is 
nevertheless alien to our own agency, or to use another religious term, is viewed as 
controlled by Satan. The hope of our redemption lies in our yielding to god‘s will, 
which means nothing but following moral norms set up by god. To deal with the 
demons supposedly controlling the things outside of ourselves, we used to resort to 
different means. Primitive people dedicated a lot of their energy to trying to control 
these demons, through their practice of witchcraft, so that these demons can work for 
                                               
108 See Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms, translated by Michael Hartney, Clarendon Press, 1991, 
p. 89.  
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human good. The practice of witchcraft is possible, however, only when the wills and 
powers of the demons are understood as following some rules or norms. These rules 
are not understood in modern mechanistic terms, of course; the demons can be 
satisfied, comforted, used, or scared away by prayers, dances, music, sacrifices, or 
threats. In any event, the wills and powers of the demons can be dealt with in terms of 
rules and norms. These rules and norms are then captured by different taboos and 
rituals, which are only the primitive forms of moral norms. Analyzed in this way, the 
building up of intentionality and normativity of practical actions and agencies through 
religion is an integrated process.  
Besides the adoption of norms and understanding of will-power, another 
important element in agency formation is to maintain the identity or the persistence of 
the agency, which was also facilitated by religions. Religion, understood in its widest 
sense, is an effort by human beings to make sense of the mishaps in their life, 
especially their death. As Hume observes, ―every disastrous accident alarms us…And 
the mind, sunk into diffidence, terror, and melancholy, has recourse to every method 
of appeasing those secret intelligent powers.‖ One possible origin of religion in the 
human mind, therefore, lies in the fact that people cannot accept the death of their 
beloved ones, as well as their own mishaps and their foreseeable death; or as Hume 
insists, ―the primary religion of mankind arises chiefly from an anxious fear.‖
109
 They 
construct a conception of god, or an everlasting life, to make sure that death and other 
mishaps do have meanings beyond the destruction of their lives. With this help from 
                                               
109 See David Hume (1757), The Natural History of Religion, edited by H.E. Root, Stanford University 
Press, 1957, pp. 30 and 65, respectively. Hume also traces this theory that fear is the major reason for 
human beings to resort to religion back to ancient Greek. See the same book, p. 31. Hobbes has the 
same observation when he says, ―this feare of things invisible, is the natural seed of that, which every 
one in himself calleth Religion.‖ See Hobbes (1651), Leviathan, or the Matter, Form and Power of 
Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil, edited by R. Tuck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991, chapter 11, penultimate paragraph.  
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religious belief, people construct themselves as immortal agents or souls, so that even 
after the death of their biological bodies, they are still there to take actions, and to 
accept responsibilities in terms of reward and punishment. This factor of immortality 
of the agents has played an important role in the formation and evolution of human 
morality; Kant even claims, in The Critique of Practical Reason, that our moral 
conduct cannot be conceived without the practical presupposition of the immortality 
of the soul: ―the highest good is practically possible only on the presupposition of the 
immortality of the soul, so that this, as inseparably connected with the moral law, is a 
postulate of pure practical reason.‖
110
  
This analysis of our historical experience with religion can shed new light on 
the relationship between politics and agency formation. Politics is always about 
collective actions, and as such it is always involved with construction of collective 
agencies, which can carry out collective actions, realize collective goals and take 
collective responsibilities.  
In the case of the construction of the identity of a political community, we can 
see that religion plays an essential role in human political actions, especially in 
ancient times. We are told that in primitive societies, each tribe has its own god or 
totem, which unites the tribe into a collective agent, empowers the tribe to act as one 
body, and protects the tribe from above. Even the Judaic god is believed to protect 
only his chosen people; Even the Christian god has long been said to protect only 
those who believe in him.
111
 In Homer‘s epics, human political actions are understood 
as wars of gods, who, in their characters and emotions, if not in their higher 
                                               
110 See Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor, General 
Introduction by Allen Wood, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 238.  
111 Rawls lost his Christian faith exactly because his realization of this arbitrariness of Christian god‘s 
love. See Thomas Pogge, John Rawls: His Life and Theory of Justice, p. 14, translated by Michelle 
Kosch, Oxford University Press, 2006.    
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capabilities, are only images of real human beings. Ancient Chinese tribes were under 
different totems‘ protection; after they were united into a much bigger ―Chinese‖ 
body politic, they were under the protection of a unified totem, the dragon, which is 
not a real species of animals, but only an imagined powerful animal with combined 
features such as pig‘s mouth, snake‘s body figure and deer‘s horns.
112
 For over two 
thousand years, Chinese emperors had been claiming, and had usually been 
recognized, as the incarnations of the dragon, and therefore as having the power over 
the whole nation of China.  
In light of this understanding, we can see that collective action, just like 
individual action, is guided by an ideal of agency—only here the agency is a 
collective one. A tribe acts as a united body under the ideal of the agency of its totem; 
a nation state acts as a united body politic under the ideal of a collective national 
agency or identity. Modern societies attribute the power of actions and the 
responsibilities for actions and inactions to different levels of corporate bodies, such 
as schools, firms, parties, governments, and countries. This is how political actions, 
and understanding of political actions, are carried out.  
The construction of the state is perhaps the most important step in the 
evolution of human society, but the origin of the state is a highly contested topic, 
largely due to the lack of historical evidence.
113
 Just saying that the state was created 
because a coercive political power is necessary for maintaining social order among 
individuals with contested interest claims, as Hobbes and other traditional social 
contract theorists have said, is not a good enough answer to the question regarding the 
                                               
112 For a recent study on the dragon as a totem, see Margaret Sleeboom, ―The Power of National 
Symbols: The Credibility of a Dragon‘s Efficacy,‖ in Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 8 (2002), No. 3, 
pp. 299-313.  
113 For a general survey of the dominant theories about the origin of the state, see Stephen K. Sanderson, 
Social Transformations: A General Theory of Historical Development, Blackwell, 1995, section 3 of 
Chapter 3.  
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origin of the state, for what we want to know is how it was possible to construct a 
collective agency on such a big scale and with such a coercive power.
114
 Recent 
studies in anthropology tend to suggest that the first state was created under a then 
newly founded belief in a common god, or a common system of gods, for a group of 
people.
115
 The logic behind this conjecture is that no matter how important the 
economic and sociological conditions were for the emergence of the first states, 
without such a common faith in such a common god, it would be hard to organize 
such a big political society and to legitimize such a coercive political power as a state. 
This conjecture, even if it is not necessarily correct on the issue of the first state, can 
still be confirmed by the states in history generally. In recorded history, rulers of 
states in different parts of the world have been accustomed to justifying the state with 
recourses to divine sanction.
116
  
So far this is our rather simplified account of agency formation at both the 
individual level and collective levels. We have seen that agency formation is a process 
of institution building, which involves both the construction of will-power and the 
construction of social norms. It is still not clear how this analysis of agency formation 
and institution building is relevant to our central thesis concerning liberalization and 
                                               
114 City states, such as the ancient Greek cities, and nation states, such as ancient Chinese states, might 
be different in their scales and their levels of coercion, therefore require different treatments. But here I 
will only emphasize on their similarities.  
115 Leften Stavrianos endorses this idea when he talks about the origin of the first city state in ancient 
Mesopotamia. See his A General History: From Prehistory to 21st Century, 7th edition, Prentice Hall, 
1998. Norman Yoffee also takes a common belief system as the necessary condition for the emergence 
of archaic city states, although he emphasizes on the naturalness of such an emergence after thousands 
of years of the development of agricultural and sedentary lives. See Yoffee, Myths of the Archaic State: 
Evolution of the Earliest Cities, States, and Civilizations, Cambridge University Press, 2005.  
116 For an example, see Richard Baum, ―Ritual and Rationality: Religious Roots of the Bureaucratic 
State in Ancient China,‖ in The Early State, Its Alternatives and Analogues, edited by Grinin, Carneiro, 
Bondarenko, Kradin, and Korotayev, ―Uchitel‖ Publishing House, 2004. After demonstrating the 
―intimate and powerful connection in ancient China between ritual leadership and the emergence of the 
institution of kingship,‖ the author concludes that in no sense ―was China particularly unique in the 
ancient world‖ compared with ―other patrimonial theocracies.‖ See pp. 211-2.  
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democratization. To establish this connection, we turn to the next chapter, where the 
element of political development of our theory of institutionalism will finally flesh out.  
 
Transitional Remarks 
This chapter develops the theory of institutionalism in three steps: the 
necessity of relying on common or public social institutions to establish and to 
stabilize social order was first presented as a theory of alienation, then as a theory of 
externalization and internalization, and then as a theory of agency formation and 
institution building. All these three steps are necessary to distinguishing 
institutionalism from rationalism, and to presenting institutionalism in its basic 
elements.  
The process of the evolution
117
 of human practical actions is the process of 
agency formation and institution building. This process will lead, as I will argue in the 
next chapter, to two separate yet connected processes: the process of liberalization of 
individual agents and the process of democratization of the way societies establish, 
justify, and modify their institutions.
118
 The process of liberalization, which will 
                                               
117 Yes, ―evolution‖ is the right world here, since social development process can be largely understood 
as a process of adaptation to natural and especially social changes. By using this word, however, I am 
not endorsing any sense of direct application of evolutionary theory about natural world to human 
social world, nor am I trying to found my theory of social development on our evolutionarily shaped 
human nature. With this disclaimer, I can develop a theory about social evolution without borrowing 
any insight from Darwinian theory of natural evolution; social evolution has its own logic, so to speak. 
Social Darwinism in the 19th century and sociobiology in the 20th century, on the other hand, do rely on 
essential concepts of theory of natural evolution such as ―gene‖ and ―selection.‖ For a peek on the 
currently very popular subject named ―sociobiology,‖ see E.O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New 
Synthesis, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976; R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 1989.  
118 Liberalism and democracy are sometimes viewed as two conflicting ideals: liberal rights need to be 
secured within a democracy because, according to some philosophers, these individual rights need to 
be put beyond the reach of democratic (or majoritarian) decision procedures. No matter how delicate 
such an argument would be, liberalism and democracy, in real history, have actually been 
complimentary rather than contradictory. In institutionalism, liberalism and democracy both demand 
coherent system of institutional guarantees, and as such they are complimentary. For a critical 
assessment of the conflicting thesis, see Joan McGregor, ―Liberalism and Democracy,‖ Philosophy 
East and West, Vol. 38, No. 3 (July 1988). For an argument for the positive connection between 
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sometimes be called the process of individualization,
119
 means that more primitive 
societies usually realize collective social actions with more unified institutions and 
less regard for individual concerns, but as more practical actions become possible 
within more complex human social systems, individual members of societies will be 
assigned with more practical roles as agents, which demands higher levels of self-
consciousness of themselves as independent individuals. The process of 
democratization means that as individual agents are burdened with more duties by 
more complex social institutions, they will participate more actively in the creation, 
implementation, and justification of social institutions, and as a result gain more rights 
in determining their own fate.  
In this essay, ―liberal democracy‖ will be understood not as the automatic end 
of this development, but as the ultimate ideal of these two processes. That is, liberal 
democracy will be better justified with the presentation of these two processes not 
because these two processes will automatically and ultimately lead to the 
establishment of a political order called liberal democracy; rather, liberal democracy 
will be better justified in light of these two processes because people who recognize 
these processes will be normatively committed to the justification and realization of a 
liberal democratic political order. People do this from an internal point of view, that is, 
                                                                                                                                      
majority rule and minority protection, see Anthony McGann, The Logic of Democracy: Reconciling 
Equality, Deliberation, and Minority Protection, The University of Michigan Press, 2006.  
119 We can also use ―individuation‖ or ―individualization‖ to represent the process of liberalization. The 
individuation tendency of modern society is nowadays seldom addressed in philosophical literature. 
Existentialism, especially in Sartre, used to make a big deal out of the individualization tendency of 
modernity, along with their emphasis that individual human beings have no pre-determined essence. In 
addition, Sartre believes that individualization process gives us ultimate freedom to make ourselves. 
These points, I believe, can fit well into our institutionalism. For an update exploration of 
existentialism, see C. Guignon ed., The Existentialists: Critical Essays on Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, 
Heidegger, and Sartre, Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. For a recent discussion of the topic of 
individualization, see Ulrich Becker and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim, Individualization: 
Institutionalized Individualism and its Social and Political Consequences, Sage Publications, 2002.  
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from their own various efforts of institution building.
120
 Ultimately, the ideal of liberal 
democracy is nothing but the ideal that political institutions of a society cannot be 
legitimate and stable unless it is justifiable to all individual agents that are to be 
regulated by those institutions.  










                                               
120 On the point that democracy is a problem of quantity (degrees) instead of quality (either democracy 
or not), there is a solid literature since Robert Dahl‘s Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (Yale 
University Press, 1972). For a recent study, see Thomas Carothers, ―The End of the Transition 
Paradigm,‖ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 1 (January 2002).  
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Chapter III Institutionalism and Political Development 
 
This chapter will unwrap the dimension of political development of our theory 
of institutionalism. I will argue that institutionalism implies that for any established 
political order to be stable in the long run, a political development towards 
liberalization and democratization is normatively required. A political order that fails 
to develop in this direction will collapse sooner or later, no matter how hard people 
try to save it. This argument will establish liberal democracy as the ultimate ideal of 
human institution building. That is, liberal democracy will not be treated in this essay 
as an actual set of institutions that is to be realized in any actual body politic, but 
rather as an ideal for human pursuit of political order. This implies two things. First, 
every society, under any kind of political regime, needs to be liberalized and 
democratized in the long run if it is to stabilize its social and political order. Second, 
all societies, given enough time, will develop into an institutional structure similar to 
those societies we now call ―liberal democracies,‖ even though the actual institutions 
can be very diverse.  
To explain briefly why a political development towards liberalization and 
democratization is normatively demanded, we observe that whenever a political order 
is established among certain people, the need to regulate the possible practical actions 
of these people with a coherent and unified system of social institutions usually 
requires a strong hand over the making and enforcing of these institutions. As a result, 
social power will be concentrated in the hands of a few people, and the bigger the 
population of this body politic is, the more obvious the need for such a concentration 
of power would be. In the sense that such a concentration of power is necessary to 
establish political order, those few people in power actually represent not just 
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themselves, but also the collective agency of the body politic; indeed it is a common 
strategy that they claim power in the very name of the collective agency of this 
society. This need for power concentration gives priority to the establishment of 
collective agencies; such a priority is present in any situation where social order needs 
to be established in the first place. This way the effective surveillance over the 
majority‘s behavior is established, and social order is achieved as a result of the 
majority‘s compliance to a unified system of institutions. The rulers of such a society, 
however, are always the minority in numbers, and the ruled people who are supposed 
to obey the social institutions established by the former are always the majority. As 
time goes by, compliance with the social institutions, the very condition for 
maintaining social order, becomes more and more dependent on the majority‘s actions. 
The rulers can always play the game of ―divide and conquer‖ over the majority of the 
people, but the imbalance between the minority‘s surveillance over the majority and 
the majority‘s surveillance over the majority is structurally unstable. In the long run, 
the minority in power will unavoidably corrupt: either they establish more social 
institutions in favor of their own interests, or they manage not to obey the same 
institutions to which they demand the majority‘s obedience. All these benefits, of 
course, are possible only with sacrifices on the majority‘s side. In the long term, the 
majority will be cornered to smaller and smaller living space. The majority cannot act 
against their own fundamental interests forever, and as their sense of justice has been 
violated constantly, they have fewer and fewer incentive or motivation to obey the 
established institutions. In their arsenal, they can choose either passive disobedience 
or positive revolt. Either way the established social institutions will be violated more 
and more regularly. The social order maintained by those institutions will be eroded 
away, slowly at the beginning, but then rapidly near the end.  
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To avoid such a process of erosion, a social order, after it is established, needs 
to develop in the direction of liberalization and democratization. By ―liberalization,‖ I 
mean that voluntary consent from the ruled becomes more and more important for the 
legitimacy of the established institutional structure. At the beginning the majority may 
be forced, or in any case have little choice, to obey the newly established institutional 
structure. But while such an institutional structure, for the sake of being 
communicated and maintained throughout the whole society, is usually very 
restrictive and very simple, as the possible practical actions within this society 
increase, the system of the institutions will become more complex. Correspondingly, 
the power structure that enforces these institutions will also become more complex 
and more decentralized. Individual agents of this society will have more institutions to 
internalize and more roles to play in this process. As they gain more and more duties, 
they will also gain more and more rights—or so I will argue in the first section. This 
process we call the process of liberalization or individualization. By 
―democratization,‖ I mean the ruled majority need to be involved more in the making, 
justifying, and revising of social institutions with which they are required to comply. 
This process also concerns the genuine legitimacy of the institutional structure; in this 
essay, we define legitimacy in terms of the majority‘s acceptance and internalization 
of the prevailing institutions. Legitimacy defined in this way is not equal to blind 
obedience. People would not simply internalize whatever institutions issued by the 
rulers; they must be able to digest the institutions with reference to their own 
understandings of justice. People need good reasons, besides the fear for punishment, 
to persuade themselves to internalize and comply with the established institutions, and 
when they do, the institutional structure has genuine legitimacy in the eyes of the 
majority. False consciousness may work well in deceiving the majority in some 
 102 
circumstances, but it cannot work in the long run, for the majority‘s sense of 
rationality, and their sense of justice, cannot be violated for long. The legitimacy of 
the institutional structure in the eyes of the ruled is essential for the degree of the 
obedience the structure is to receive. For this reason the ruled, the majority of the 
population, need to form and reveal their own opinions about the acceptability of the 
institutions to people in authority. In the end, the more complex an institutional 
structure becomes, the more participation from the majority in the legitimization of 
this structure is required to avoid the erosion of social order in the long term.  
Obviously, liberalization and democratization, defined as above, are the two 
faces of the same process of political development; they are separate only in the sense 
that they can be realized to different degrees: sometimes more liberalization doesn‘t 
immediately lead to more democratization, and vice versa. Usually a despotic regime 
will be liberalized first, and then be democratized, if the circumstances are fortunate. 
Any institutional structure, if it is rigid at the beginning, usually chooses to 
accommodate the majority‘s need for more flexible living space before it actually lets 
the majority have bigger roles in discussing, proposing revisions, and designing major 
social institutions. Liberalization and democratization may differ in such manners. In 
the end, however, our arguments for a political development towards liberalization 
and democratization resort to the same assumption, namely, social order is always 
based on institutions, and to have a social order stabilized in the long run, the 
majority‘s voluntary internalization of, and therefore voluntary obedience to, the 
established institutional structure are more and more essential. Such a normative 
demand for political development towards liberalization and democratization is both 
for the purpose of avoiding the tendency of corruption of the social order and for the 
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purpose of accommodating more and more complex practical actions as they are made 
possible by a social order and normal technological innovations.  
By arguing for such a normative political development towards liberalization 
and democratization, this chapter will provide a culturally neutral justification of 
liberal democracy as a political ideal. Rationalism has claimed to offer such a 
culturally neutral justification, but as exposed in the previous chapters, this claim is 
founded on a false belief in the self-sufficiency and universality of human reason, or a 
pre-institutional human nature. Our institutionalism distances itself from any 
rationalistic conception of universal and unchanging human nature, but it manages to 
remain a version of universalism, as a universal explanation of every type of political 
order. In this effort institutionalism also distances itself from any version of cultural 
relativism, such as postmodernism.
121
  
To carry the major points captured above, this chapter proceeds in this order. 
In the first section, we develop an institutionalist conception of liberties or rights, by 
connecting the concept of liberty to the concept of responsibility. This will prepare 
our way for the argument regarding liberalization. This section will specifically 
analyze the concept of liberty in light of our theory of agency formation as developed 
in the second chapter. In the second section, an institutionalist theory of power will be 
sorted out, and liberal democracy will be understood as the ideal of power balance 
between the government and the people, and power balance between different 
branches and levels of public power. This discussion of power paves further ground 
for a theory of political development pointing at liberalization and democratization. In 
                                               
121 Hilary Putnam asserts, and I largely agree, that Richard Rorty, as well as Michel Foucault and 
Jacques Derrida, slip unfortunately into cultural relativism after correctly criticizing rationalism, or to 
use Putnam‘s words, ―metaphysical realism.‖ See his ―Why Reason Can‘t be Naturalized,‖ in Realism 
and Reason, Cambridge University Press, 1983; see also his Realism with a Human Face, Harvard 
University Press, 1990, pp. 18-26. I will deal with relativism later in this essay.   
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the third section, this theory of normative political development will be fleshed out 
within our theory of institutionalism. I will argue that the process of agency formation 
and institution building, if it is to secure social order in the long run, is directed by, 
and is under the pressure of, the ideal of liberalization and democratization. This 
argument is established through the analysis of the relationship between agents and 
institutions, which shows that as practical actions become more and more complex, 
social institutions regulating these actions can be internalized only when higher level 
of individuation of the social agents is realized. This leads us to the fourth and the last 
section of this chapter, which argues that more duties and rights are to be assigned to 
the individual agents of a more complex institutional structure, and more participation 
from the majority will be required in maintaining, justifying, and revising established 
institutions. In the long run, I argue, these two processes of liberalization and 
democratization confirm our ideal of liberal democracy, and constitute a culturally 
neutral justification of such an ideal.  
 
Liberty and Responsibility 
In this section we develop an institutionalist conception of freedom. Based on 
the theoretical grounds established in previous chapters, this section prepares further 
foundation for our theory of institutional development towards liberalization and 
democratization.  
The concept of freedom is one of philosophers‘ favorite concepts, which 
understandably makes it a very controversial one.
122
 A non-controversial definition of 
freedom, however, is still available. To abstract a minimal definition of freedom from 
                                               
122 For a selection of different views on freedom, see David Miller ed., Liberty, Oxford University 
Press, 1991.  
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different theories of freedom, we can see that freedom usually means that an agent is 
capable of carrying out certain actions in spite of certain restrictions.
123
  
Now the previous discussions have given us some ideas regarding agents and 
actions. Regarding the restrictions on human actions, we can generally divide them 
into two categories: things we cannot do and things we think we shouldn‘t do. More 
specifically, there are technological restrictions, such as restrictions on our physical 
capabilities, and there are normative restrictions, such as things we restrict ourselves 
from doing because of social norms.
124
 It is interesting to notice that, regarding 
technological restrictions, we have a natural desire to overcome them, while regarding 
normative restrictions, we actually try to restrict ourselves from overcoming them. 
The irony of freedom here is that regarding physical restrictions, our freedom lies in 
overcoming them, while regarding the normative restrictions, our freedom may lie in 
our capability of establishing these restrictions in our society.
125
 This irony is very 
real in the sense that especially in our own time, we do need to restrict ourselves from 
―freely‖ using our physical capabilities. For example, we are now perfectly capable of 
destroying the whole biosphere of the earth, including ourselves, by nuclear wars or 
by pollution; it is in the normative restrictions on ourselves that lies the hope of our 
survival and prosperity, and our liberty as well. In this sense, our normative freedom 
can only exist with social order supported by social norms. On this front we totally 
agree with Edmund Burke when he says, ―The only liberty I mean is a liberty 
connected with order, that not only exists along with order and virtue, but which 
                                               
123 Here I am strictly following Rawls‘s definition of liberty. See section 32 of TJ.  
124 Rousseau makes a similar distinction when he talks about ―natural liberty‖ and ―moral liberty.‖ See 
Book I, section 8 of The Social Contract, in “The Social Contract” and Other Later Political Writings, 
Gourevitch ed., Cambridge University Press, 1997.  
125 This might be what Rousseau means when he says that we are forced to be free, or we force 
ourselves to be free. Autonomy, for Rousseau, means we restrain ourselves with the social norms we 
design by ourselves and for ourselves. See Steven G. Affeldt, ―The Force of Freedom: Rousseau on 
Forcing to Be Free,‖ in Political Theory, Vol. 27, No. 3 (June 1999).  
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cannot exist at all without them.‖
126
 We create social order by restricting ourselves 
with institutions; this way we achieve our freedom.  
The irony of freedom, therefore, lies in this dilemma: curiosity and 
intelligence provide incentives and means to make it possible for us to have more and 
more capabilities, therefore to be able to carry out practical actions with higher and 
higher levels of complexity and collectivity, yet meanwhile we need to deliberate and 
implement normative restrictions at corresponding levels on ourselves so that our 
improved capabilities would not end up harming ourselves and our society. Refraining 
from using our technological skills to destroy the biosphere, as mentioned above, is 
only one side of our freedom. Another, more important and more pertinent, side of 
freedom concerns how to avoid using our now much higher skills of social 
organization to destroy ourselves. Totalitarianism, in its various forms, is such a 
danger posed by higher organization skills. Hitler and Stalin, using modern skills of 
ideology and propaganda, organized and mobilized their societies in such an 
unprecedented and ruthless way, so that the potential of self-destruction of human 
societies emerged as even a stronger threat to our freedom and our very survival. For 
our own good, we need to implement appropriate social institutions to guide and to 
restrict our social organization skills, and the public powers made possible by such 
skills.  
My position is exactly based on this irony of freedom: in moral and political 
terms, our freedom lies in our capabilities of normatively restricting ourselves. But the 
smell of irony will go away if we realize that social norms are not only restrictive, but 
also constitutive and enabling. Remember that according to our institutionalism, 
                                               
126 See The Portable Edmund Burke, edited by Isaac Kramnick, Penguin, 1999, p. 155.  
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answers to questions like ―who we are‖ and ―what we want to do‖ are not pre-
determined. You may want to be a real American, but before America becomes an 
independent country, you are not free to do so. Yet ―independent country‖ is a 
normative concept established by modern social norms; without these norms, you are 
not free to have any identity in relation to nation states, let alone wanting what that 
identity wants. I hope that so far in this essay, we have made this point clear enough.  
Our moral and political freedom lies in our capability of deliberating and 
implementing normative restrictions on our own actions. Here the concept of 
autonomy is essential: we can be free in this sense only if we deliberately restrict 
ourselves by certain social norms. This view of freedom as autonomy means two 
things: on the one hand, we cannot be so ―free‖ that we don‘t need any social norm to 
restrict our actions; on the other hand, the social norms restricting our actions must be 
those norms that we can voluntarily endorse and accept. The first point establishes, 
almost by definition, that our moral and political freedom has an internal connection 
with our capability of restricting our actions with social norms. The second point 
leads us to the problem of agency construction: Who am I? Who are we? How are we 
to understand ourselves? How are we to carry out actions according to our self 
understandings?  
In the previous sections, we had a good look at how we construct our agencies 
or identities, both individually and collectively, through social norms. To capture this 
theory of institutionalism in a nutshell, we say that the need to create and maintain 
social order among certain people, when felt by these people, incurs the activities of 
contriving and implementing certain social norms, which, after being accepted and 
internalized by these people, define the collective identity of this community and the 
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individual identities of the membership agents. Individual agencies and collective 
agencies are thus constructed.  
This restatement of institutionalism paves the road toward an institutionalist 
theory of freedom. Moving one step further, I now define freedom, in moral and 
political terms, as our capability of self-construction through understanding, reflecting, 
and revising social norms. Compared to animals and insects, human beings are free 
because we are capable of understanding ourselves according to moral and political 
ideals expressed in different social norms, and carrying out actions accordingly. 
Moreover, our freedom doesn‘t just lie in the following of social norms, but also lies 
in our understanding, reflecting, and revising these normative restrictions we put on 
ourselves. Just following rules does not make us freer than ants; what gives us more 
freedom is our capabilities of understanding the reasons for social norms, and 
reasoning with each other about the reasonableness of these norms. Simply put, 
freedom lies in our self-incurred responsibilities.  
This logical connection between liberty and responsibility may sound ironic, 
especially if we are talking about ―feeling freedom.‖ In our daily life, ―feeling‖ 
responsible is usually different from ―feeling‖ free. The feeling of being free usually 
means that one is not bound by any responsibility. Yet this is not a complete 
understanding of liberty if we understand it from an inter-personal perspective: I am 
free because other people are bound by social norms, in the name of responsibility, 
not to interfere with my freedom; I am feeling free because others are feeling 
responsibilities. This tricky connection between liberty and responsibility also gives 
us a direct feeling of being free when we can freely travel around within a rule 
governed society, doing business with money all parties accept, making friends 
according to the same moral laws, etc. You may not feel as free in China as you feel 
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in America, but nobody is free in a society torn by endless civil wars; in such societies, 
even people with guns and armies are not free from the fear for their own security.  
When Rawls claims that his political liberalism is a ―liberalism of freedom,‖ 
he is actually endorsing such an institutionalist conception of freedom. For example, 
when Rawls interprets Hegel‘s theory of rights as a liberalism of freedom, he lists 
with sympathy four things that are entailed by Hegel‘s thesis that the free will wills 
itself as the free will:  
First, that the free will wills a system of political and social institutions within 
which the free will can be free…Second, that the free will wills the ends of this 
system of political and social institutions, and it wills these ends as its own. 
Third, that the free will is educated to the concept of itself as a free will by 
various public features of this system of institutions. Fourth, that these various 
public features that thus educate the free will are themselves features that fully 




We will further look into Rawls‘s institutionalism in the next chapter; in this chapter, 
we systematically develop our theory of institutionalism, and only point out 
similarities or connections between Rawls and our institutionalism when occasions 
arise.  
To understand the relationship between liberty and responsibility at a more 
general level, we can see that the concept of liberty is internally connected with the 
concept of responsibility. To say someone is responsible for her actions presupposes 
that she is at liberty to carry out her actions.
128
 In other words, an agent can be 
                                               
127 See MP, pp. 349-50.  
128 Philip Pettit analyzes the concept of ―freedom‖ into three domains: ―the first is that the agent can be 
rightly held responsible for what he or she did…the second is that the action freely chosen is one that 
the agent can own…the third is that the agent‘s choice was not fully determined by at least certain sorts 
of antecedents.‖ Pettit further believes that the responsibility domain is the central one, which entails 
the ownership domain and the under-determination domain. I agree with his analysis. See Pettit, A 
Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency, Oxford University Press, 2001, 
Chapter 1. The connection between liberty and responsibility was perhaps first established by Peter 
Strawson. See especially his Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays, London: Methuen, 1974. In 
recent decades, John Martin Fischer has been promoting this connection, and his works broadly present 
alternative views and arguments on this issue as well. For examples, see Fischer and Mark Ravizza, 
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, Cambridge University Press, 1998; 
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justifiably held responsible for her actions because it is assumed that she has certain 
level of control over what she does. In modern legal practice, this internal connection 
between liberty and responsibility has been widely used and misused in insanity 
defenses. The internal connection between these two concepts means that to 
understand the concept of liberty, we need also to understand the concept of 
responsibility.  
Responsibility is a fundamental concept necessary for any serious moral 
practice anywhere around the world. People must be able to make responsibility 
attributions to each other before they can interact with each other in a moral order. It 
would make any sense of social order impossible if we suppose that whatever happens 
in this world is merely happening by accident or by mere causal determinism, not by 
actions initiated by some agents who are to be held responsible for them. In terms of 
mechanics, every event or action is both a cause and an effect, and the causation of 
any effect can in principle be traced to infinite events or actions in the past. This 
perhaps explains why a criminal suspect is always able to blame external factors 
instead of himself for his negative actions. To attribute causation of practical actions 
to their subjects, to hold these subjects ultimately responsible for their actions, is in 
this sense a very impressive achievement, if not a totally arbitrary practice. It is called 
into place not because there do exist souls or selves, who are the ultimate causes of all 
of the actions attributed to them yet are not caused by anything, but mainly because 
out of practical necessity, we must stop somewhere in the endless causal chain. That 
somewhere, of course, needs to be able to respond to such norms of responsibility. 
Before a person is told that she is responsible for her actions, she needs, at the 
                                                                                                                                      
Fischer, My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility, Oxford University Press, 2006. David Norton 
grounds rights in responsibilities, he claims, perhaps with certain validity, that old liberals (I suppose 
he is talking about libertarians here) took rights as presupposed rather than as in need of justification. 
See Norton, Democracy and Moral Development, University of California Press, 1991, chapter 5.  
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minimum, to be able to use her consciousness and self-consciousness to control her 
own behavior. But in any case, without being able to attribute responsibilities for 
actions to their actors or agents, who are nothing but the supposedly ultimate 
causations of those actions, no definite causal relationship between actions and 
consequences can be constructed. Without being able to construct a definite causal 
relationship, no rules or norms can be established to regulate practical actions, and 
people will simply run into each other in random emotional or habitual reactions.  
This practice of responsibility attribution is not totally arbitrary because it 
leads to the concept of freedom. To take a person as a responsible agent, we need to 
assume that she is aware of the consequences of her actions, and knows that she 
would be held responsible for her actions. This requires that she has not only the 
necessary knowledge about causal relations among common practical actions, but also 
the necessary knowledge about the related social norms. Gaining enough of these 
kinds of knowledge makes it possible for her to be ―free‖ in controlling her own 
actions. For this reason, a reasonable legal system would not charge persons with 
serious responsibilities before they reach a mature age, be it normally 16 or 18. Before 
this age, they need to be taught with the knowledge mentioned above. After this 
period of education, they can no longer legitimately blame something else, such as 
their social background, as the element ultimately responsible for their own 
misbehavior. In this sense, people learn to be free so that they can take responsibility 
for their own actions. The practice of responsibility attribution is thus not arbitrary at 
all; it is supported by a whole system of institutional life forms and moral education.  
The construction of agencies of actions is required by the need for tracing the 
ultimate causation and attributing responsibilities, which in turn is called for by the 
need for social order and social control of actions. In other words, to have social order 
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among certain people, the practical actions of these people need to be regulated by 
certain social rules, which specify who under what circumstances is responsible for 
what actions. If these people accept these rules, forced or voluntarily, they will 
internalize these rules and control their own actions accordingly. If social rules say 
that a person can own what she earns as her property, for example, no one else should 
―steal‖ or ―rob‖ her of that property without worrying about punishment. Social rules 
thus help people understand the consequences of their actions, therefore can control 
what they are about to do. Responsibility attribution is, in this sense, a precondition 
for human institutional practice. It is the way, and perhaps the only way, we establish 
social order among human beings with consciousness and learning capabilities.  
Here again we see the internal connection between causal relations and social 
norms. Human beings need food and security to survive, and they need to obtain these 
goods from the natural environment and from their social companions. For this 
purpose, they need to know in advance how to make their next move successful. Their 
past experience can help them in this effort, but past experience is useful only because 
it points to certain causal relations, or regularities based on which successful 
predictions can be made. Knowledge about natural causal relations is one way to do 
the trick; knowledge about social norms is the other. Social norms are presented in the 
form of causal relations: if you do action x, retribution y would ensue, which punishes 
or rewards you according to the institutionally defined moral merits of action x. Social 
institutions specify meanings for x and y; by the same logic, social norms give ―you‖ 
a rule-governed identity: if ―you‖ are an American citizen beyond 18, for example, 
you can vote in American elections. More generally, people are institutional agents, 
with institutional statuses. Even the concept of soul or person is somehow invented 
through such a process of institution building, just as the concept of gods or demons 
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are created for the convenience of controlling the world through pleasing gods. Just 
like gods and demons, human persons are also creations of human minds, for the 
purpose of simplifying and controlling causal relations among practical actions.
129
 
With this convenient device of attributing ―souls‖ to everything meaningful in their 
lives, people in primitive societies were able to construct order both in the natural 
world and in their own human world.
130
 In our modern days, we have learned to 
understand causal relations in the natural world through the natural sciences, but gods 
and souls, at least in some places, are still deemed as useful in our institutional 
practice of social life.  
If responsibility attribution presupposes that the relevant agents have free will 
in making their decisions, the old problem about free will would be unavoidable in 
any moral theory (here I assume that no moral theory can be developed if 
responsibility attribution is an illegitimate practice). This old problem can be simply 
stated as this question: how could there be an entity, which is capable of causing yet is 
not caused by anything? From our modern scientific point of view, the idea that such 
an entity exists seems to be a sheer absurdity, yet what the practice of responsibility 
attribution presupposes, therefore any moral practice presupposes, is exactly the 
existence of such kind of entities.  
                                               
129 For a discussion of the connection between minds and gods, see Todd Tremlin, Minds and God: The 
Cognitive Foundations of Religion, Oxford University Press, 2006, especially chapter 3.  
130 It is fair to ask at this point: does this practice of responsibility attribution at least presuppose that 
human beings are capable of being such agents? This is a fair question because obviously we cannot 
make mice responsible agents by assigning them responsibilities. In order to be treated as responsible 
agents, therefore, human beings need to be able to understand the related social norms, and the related 
causal relations between the actions to be regulated and the consequences of those actions. So far only 
human beings have reached such a level of intelligence, and several of our relatives in primate world 
may have some rudimentary elements of such a high level of social intelligence. For examples of 
primate moral instincts, see Frans de Waal, ―Morality and the Social Instincts: Continuity with the 
Other Primates,‖ The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, delivered at Princeton in 2003, now available 
online at http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/volume25/deWaal_2005.pdf . 
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This theoretically formidable problem about free will is solved in our 
epistemic and moral practice by a very simple manipulation: to reverse the one-
dimensional timeline by knowing the consequences of actions beforehand. This 
manipulation is the root for both our epistemic effort of knowing the causal relations 
between natural things and our moral effort of regulating practical actions. By 
knowing causal relations, we know how to make a desirable effect happen by 
introducing its tested causes; by knowing social norms, we know how to avoid 
punishment or how to secure positive benefits by following rules of actions. Both our 
epistemic effort of surviving in nature and our moral practice of maintaining social 
order, therefore, are based on a cognitive foundation of knowing or predicating 
consequences of actions in advance. From hindsight, only such a manipulation of 
―reversing‖ the timeline can bring certainties and orders to our life. Without such a 




Now with this understanding in mind, we can see that responsibility attribution 
is a legitimate practice not because agents are really ultimate causes that are not 
caused by anything else, but because agents are capable of understanding causal 
relations and social norms, therefore are capable of foreseeing the consequences of 
their actions—if not all of their actions, at least most socially meaningful practical 
actions. This in turn means that those who lack the knowledge and capability of 
foreseeing the consequences of their actions should not be held responsible for their 
corresponding actions. In other words, to say that freedom exists does not mean that 
there is a realm of ―freedom‖ ―outside‖ the causal chain of events in this world; 
                                               
131 For this reason, human knowledge could not be all based on sense data, or more broadly, on past 
experience. We must have some innate knowledge or anticipation. A new born baby ―knows‖ that if he 
sucks the stuff in his mouth, he will get food. If a baby needs to learn this from experience, he cannot 
survive in the first place. Here we are not going to discuss this epistemic issue in any further detail.  
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―freedom‖ lies in knowledge about causal relations and social norms (you shall know 
the truth, and the truth shall set you free).  
A classical puzzle for philosophers is whether our human life is as 
deterministic as the natural world, or whether we do have some privileged elbow 
room called free will. Our common intuition seems to confirm that we do possess the 
capability of deliberating and choosing between different options about our future life, 
but our scientific understanding of the world seems to suggest that nothing can exist 
―outside‖ of the loop of the causal chain. This puzzle concerns moral philosophers 
because they need to make sense to our normative practice of responsibility 
attribution: if no human society can function without attributing responsibility of 
actions to their subjects, how could we justify this practice if we don‘t have real 
control over our future actions?  
In institutionalism, we claim that this metaphysical dilemma can be solved in 
practical philosophy in this way: we can have free will exactly because this world is 
to some extent determined by causal relations, and freedom lies in knowing these 
causal relations, both in terms of scientific laws and in terms of social laws.
132
 We are 
free from harm and are free to secure positive effects for ourselves, as long as we 
know how to avoid the former and bring about the latter by causal laws. We can lay 
responsibilities on persons, so long as they can understand the social norms we give to 
them in advance.
133
 Foreknowledge about social norms is the key to moral 
                                               
132 I do not, however, claim that these problems are ultimately solved. Problems like determinism, free 
will, and compatibilism will definitely intrigue philosophical minds in future generations. In fact, 
philosophical investigations in recent decades have made huge progress in clarifying these 
metaphysical problems, if not ultimately solving them. For a comprehensive presentation of the 
progress on this front, see Robert Kane ed., The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Oxford University 
Press, 2002, in which different theories and approaches to these problems are well represented.  
133 Many philosophers argued recently that our moral practice of responsibility attribution is not 
threatened by determinism. For example, John Martin Fischer argues that ―even if there is just one 
available path into the future—I may be held accountable for how I walk down this path.‖ See Fischer, 




 We can hold people responsible after we told them the related social 
norms because all social norms are put in the form of hypothetical imperative: if you 
do x, then y should happen to you.
135
 This general form of social norms can help us 
avoid the dilemma between free will and determinism because it lays out clearly the 
consequence of practical actions in advance, not in terms of prediction, but in terms of 
stipulation. Once you can understand such a stipulation, you cannot absolve yourself 
of the responsibility of acting against such a stipulation.  
In more general words, social norms stipulate a virtual world with moral order, 
therefore can maintain social order if general compliance is maintained. In creating, 
justifying, and maintaining social institutions, we fight a winnable war against the 
uncertainty of the future, and create a world with the order we envision. Our moral 
and political freedom, if we can say it does exist, lies in our capability of maintaining 
social orders through institutions. We can enhance our freedom by contriving a better 
virtual world of order, justifying that ideal to our co-community members, and work 
together with them to make that ideal set of social norms the laws of our community. 
Alternatively, we can also gain more freedom by understanding the rules of the life-
                                                                                                                                      
philosophers‘ research, however, confirms an old worry that if determinism is true, there is a high price 
to pay in the moral appraisability. For examples, see Ishtiyaque Haji, Moral Appraisability: Puzzles, 
Proposals, and Perplexities, Oxford University Press, 1998; Deontic Morality and Control, Cambridge 
University Press, 2002. In this essay, I do not claim any credit for solving this puzzling controversy.   
134 Many philosophers recognize the connection between our normative social engagement and our 
freedom and responsibility. Carlos J. Moya, for example, says, ―against a profoundly individualistic 
view of human beings, our approach instead stresses their social nature and their participation in 
normative systems as enabling conditions for their freedom and moral responsibility.‖ See p. 220 of 
Moya, Moral Responsibility: The Ways of Scepticism, London and New York: Routledge, 2006.  
135 Hans Kelsen argues that all social norms are hypothetical imperatives, in the sense that they are 
normative only under certain conditions. For his arguments, and his critique of Kant‘s effort of taking 
categorical imperative as the formula of universal moral law, see his General Theory of Norms, 
translated by Michael Hartney, Clarendon Press, 1991, sections 3-5. Jiwei Ci points out that all norms 
of justice are conditional in another sense, namely, people are motivated to follow norms on the 
condition that other co-community members will also comply with the same norms. Ci further argues 
that even norms of justice are usually expressed in categorical terms, in the sense that the fact that other 
people also steal does not and cannot justify my stealing, the implementation of justice principles is 
still dependent upon its conditional form. The conditional face of justice, therefore, constitutes the 
single most important moral psychology for theories of justice, and justifies the creation and existence 
of the state as a coercive institution. For Ci‘s rather elegant arguments, see his Two Faces of Justice, 
Harvard University Press, 2006.  
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game of our society and utilizing them for our own benefit. Either way, freedom does 
not lie in our personal mind or personal will, but in our normative engagement with 
social institutions.  
The advantage of adopting this institutional understanding of freedom will 
become crystal clear if we compare it with the rationalist conception of freedom and 
personality. In all versions of rationalism, freedom is attributed to a subjective ―self‖ 
as its rational power, whether the subjective ―self‖ is the transcendental self in the 
Kantian sense or the empirical self in the common sense, whether it is the self in an 
individual person or the self in a society as a collective body. To say such a ―self‖ is 
free, in rationalism, is to say that this ―self‖ is a rational agent capable of making 
decisions and pursuing goals by her own will. The fundamental logic of this 
rationalistic conception of agency is that agents exist prior to the social practice with 
which these agents are about to engage. Our institutional conception of agency, by 
contrast, understands ―self‖ as ideals of agencies that are socially constructed through 
the normative engagement with social norms. Such a ―self,‖ or institutional agency, 
does not exist prior to the institutional practice of community members, but are ideals 
specified by social institutions, ideals that are to be realized by people in different 
social roles.  
The above paragraph demands further explanation. At first sight, our 
institutional conception of agency is harder to digest, while the rationalist conception 
of agency is easier to imagine. In our daily life, we tend to attach agencies to real 
people, whose existence is the condition for social engagement. Rationalism thus 
appeals to our intuition in a more ―natural‖ way. After a further reflection, however, 
the institutional conception of agency makes more sense. For example, the 
institutional view claims that we cannot understand our ―real‖ self if we have no idea 
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of what we are supposed to do or to become according to the moral norms of our 
society that we have internalized. This makes more sense than the rationalist view 
because the socialization process in our childhood provides the basic material 
foundation for our agencies, in the sense that our self-understanding starts from here, 
and borrows momentum and motivation from this foundation. And what we get from 
this foundation is precisely an initial sense of what we are supposed to do or to 
become according to the moral norms of our society. The influence of social 
institutions on our self-understanding is so delicate that it is almost invisible to us, yet 
it is these norms and values that give meanings to our actions, and more radically, 
give meanings to our lives. It is always a temptation to us to imagine that persons 
exist before societies can function, or that our metaphysical existence is logically 
prior to our social life, but the truth is on the opposite side.  
Many joys and tragedies in our life owe their origins to our social norms. 
Soldiers feel proud in their sacrifice, even when their injuries may shed long shadows 
over their life expectation. Young girls commit suicide because they have lost their 
innocence in socially reproachable ways, while their physical lives may stay 
unharmed and bear a bright future. These cases abound, and their existence is only 
meaningful when we understand the specific social norms involved. Although 
physically we may share a genome pool as members of Homo sapiens, our life stories 
are nevertheless divided by different institutional practices in which we were raised 
and are living.  
If the above reasoning is sound, then the more knowledge about causal 
relations and social norms we have, the freer we will be in deliberating and carrying 
out actions. The construction of agency is not a once-and-for-all achievement, but an 
endless process. With more knowledge about causal relations and social norms, our 
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agencies will become thicker and stronger, and we will be more capable of 
successfully carrying out actions according to our own needs and interests, save that 
social expectations to us through various institutions are already fulfilled.  
Now it is undeniable that our knowledge about causal relations, in both the 
natural world and in our cultural world, has been increased monumentally since the 
scientific revolution in the 17
th
 century, or for that matter, since the beginning of 
human civilization. It is likely to increase in the foreseeable future. This guarantees 
that one aspect of our freedom has been, and will continue to be, in a process of 
growth. But what about our freedom in conceiving and realizing our own rational 
good within society, our liberty in the moral and political sense? Is it, or will it be, 
also on the rise?  
Before we address this question, however, we need to lay one more brick for 
the ground. In the next section, we further develop an institutionalist theory of power, 
which will prove to be a concept closely connected with the concept of freedom we 
clarify in this section. This theory of power will finally lead to a theory of political 
development towards liberalization and democratization in the section after the next 
one.  
 
Freedom and Power 
In this section I develop a theory of power within our institutionalism, by 
connecting the concept of power to the institutionalist conception of freedom laid out 
in the previous section. This theory of power will work for our institutionalist 




 The institutional theory of power will also lay ground for our 
argument for a political development towards liberalization and democratization. Any 
power structure, once created, will form a pyramid, in which power holders at the top 
levels are always the minority, while the people that are supposed to obey the powers 
are always the majority. To secure obedience, a power structure usually devolves in 
the direction of decentralization, so that people at the lower levels will gain more and 
more rights in participating in the decision making of this structure. I call this 
tendency the political development towards liberalization and democratization, and 
will elaborate more fully on it in the next section.  
We analyze the concept of freedom as meaning that an agent is capable of 
carrying out certain actions in spite of certain restrictions. This definition of 
―freedom‖ rings a bell: can‘t we also define ―power‖ as an agent‘s capabilities of 
carrying out certain actions in spite of certain restrictions?
137
 Are we ready to claim 
that freedom and power are the same concept, or two closely connected concepts?  
To be sure, in our ordinary vocabulary, ―freedom‖ and ―power‖ do carry 
different meanings. Wanting freedom usually is deemed as a good or even a noble 
desire, while wanting power is usually not such a morally admirable motivation, 
especially when a person wants power only for the sake of having power. Even worse, 
historical evidences show that power, when it is in the wrong hands, can work against 
the freedom of the people who is at the receiving end of power. So at least on the 
                                               
136 On this score we follow Montesquieu, Joseph Schumpeter, and Robert Dahl, among others. See 
especially Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, Yale University Press, 1971.  
137 To define power in this way is not controversial. Indeed most scholars who have offered a definition 
of power follow this line. Weber defines power as ―the probability that one actor within a social 
relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on 
which this probability rests.‖ (See p. 53 of Economy and Society, vol. 1., ed. G. Roth and C. Wittich, 
New York: Bedminster Press, 1968.)  
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semantic surface, it should be recognized that there are significant differences 
between these two words.  
All of the mentioned differences, however, come from a specific 
understanding of the concept of freedom. If we follow Isaiah Berlin and emphasize 
the importance of ―negative liberty,‖ that is, the liberty of being left alone without 
intentional obstructions from other human beings, then freedom and power are two 
radically different, if not contradictory, concepts: to be free is to be FREE FROM 
outside interference, yet to be powerful is to be FREE TO bring about intended effects 
in the outside world, be it other people or the outside environment in general. In the 
context of what Benjamin Constant calls ―liberty of the moderns,‖ freedom is also 
understood as to be FREE FROM the coercion of state power.
138
 By contrast, positive 
liberties, or liberties of the ancients, sound like something closer to power. In political 
terms, positive liberties are the liberties to do some positive things, such as to vote or 
to organize political movements, which are only possible with empowering 
institutions. Thus while it sounds appropriate to call positive liberties ―powers,‖ it is 
not appropriate to call negative liberties ―powers.‖  
Yet the distinction between positive liberties and negative liberties reveals a 
very narrow understanding of the concept of freedom. To look at liberties from a 
historical point of view, we can see that it usually took hard efforts, sometimes even 
big sacrifices, to get the so-called negative liberties; doing nothing, or totally getting 
rid of the government, would not automatically bring about negative liberties, such as 
freedom of speech and freedom of conscience. Even when some people happen to 
have such liberties already in hand, certain social institutions still need to be built up 
                                               
138 See Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969; Constant, ―The Liberty of the 
Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns,‖ in Constant: Political Writings, edited and translated by 
Biancamaria Fontana, Cambridge University Press, 1988.  
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so that these liberties will be guaranteed in the future. In this sense, negative liberties 
are not so different from positive liberties. They may both be ―naturally‖ desirable, 
but none of them can exist without institutional guarantees.  
In institutionalism, we largely neglect the distinction between positive liberties 
and negative liberties, and define all liberties, in moral and political terms, as ranges 
of practical actions permitted and guaranteed by social norms and institutions to 
practical agents, including individual agents and different levels of collective agents. 
Under this definition, the ―individual‖ rights or liberties guaranteed to individual 
citizens by a constitutional democracy is only one type of institutional freedom. 
Another type of institutional freedom is the different levels of collective power, such 
as presidential power and congressional power, defined and secured by constitutions 
and other social and political institutions. Understood as such, institutional freedom 
and institutional power are closely connected, if not completely convergent. Indeed, 
liberties of the moderns in terms of individual rights can be better appreciated if we 
take them as institutional powers secured to the people (or the civil society), as 
against the powers of the public officials (or the state). Both forms of power need to 
be secured with certain social institutions; their opposition forms a balance of power 
for a stable modern democracy.  
In institutionalism, therefore, power, like freedom, is viewed as a structural 
relationship based on social norms or institutions. To say that power and freedom are 
structural relationships, I mean they are not simply capabilities. People with power 
and freedom are in some sense capable, but how capable they are is dependent upon 
the larger framework of social institutions in which they live. Bill Gates would be 
powerless in a country that doesn‘t respect intellectual property rights; Hitler 
wouldn‘t become a dictator if he were born in the United States, where a strong 
 123 
tradition of power balance and human rights protection would have prevented any 
potential dictator from materializing. In more general terms, social institutions define 
the scope of the power and freedom agents can have; these available powers and 
freedoms will then be distributed to, or grasped by, individuals, according to their 
talents and lucks. An individual person‘s possible power and freedom are created and 
defined by an institutional structure, in which she lives as an institutional agent. 
Through her personal endeavor, she may manage to have more freedom or power than 
her compatriots, or she may use her freedom and power more wisely for her own 
benefit, but without such an institutional structure, she would have no secured 
freedom or power at all.  
Institutionalism is concerned with freedom and power mainly for the sake of 
evaluating and designing social institutions. Institutionalism doesn‘t provide any 
advice to any individual about how to improve one‘s odds with respect to freedom or 
power. Instead it asks how to construct people‘s institutional relationships so that 
people‘s chances of getting freedom and power would be defined to the effect that 
social order and justice can be maintained in the long run.  
From this basic understanding of the concept of power, we move one step 
forward, and propose that democracy as a good social order relies on a delicate 
balance between different forms of powers. Power can be embodied in different forms, 
such as political power, military power, ideological power, economic power,
139
 etc. 
                                               
139 Economic power may deserve special discussions. Although wealth cannot exist without 
institutional protection of property rights, economic power usually is not deemed as a form of public 
power, except the economic power of the government, such as taxation and budget spending. In a non-
socialist system, people accumulate wealth through legal yet ―private‖ avenues, and after paying taxes, 
people can usually administer their own wealth, or their economic power, according to their own 
flavors. This non-public appearance of economic power, however, is only a false perception. Just like 
other forms of social powers, economic power is also based on a wider background of social 
institutions (in the cases mentioned above, a capitalist system of social institutions). Unlike libertarians, 
I take people‘s property rights, especially the rights to own capitals, as institutional rights, not ―natural‖ 
rights. There are different ways to define property rights. Capitalist system is only one way to define 
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These forms of power may be generated and may work in different ways, but they are 
all made possible by social institutions. In other words, they are all the results of 
social cooperation made possible by social institutions. As such, these forms of power 
need to be regulated so that every person of a society can benefit from their being 
exercised, or to say the least, these power will not be abused in favor of some as 
against others. When social powers are manipulated to the benefits of some groups as 
against others‘, we have different forms of corruption, and the social system 
supporting those powers cannot be just or stable in the long run. On the other hand, 
social powers are always unequally located in people‘s hands, due to the necessity of 
the division of social labor and the asymmetry of talents, luck, and information among 
people. The tendency to abuse and misuse social powers is inherent in such an 
imbalanced distribution of social powers. In light of this consideration, democracy, as 
any other political system, is a method of generating, distributing and regulating 
social powers. What is special about democracy is that it engenders and regulates its 
public powers in such a balanced way that in the long run, no power holders can 
dominate the public powers for their own private gains.  
More specifically, a democracy maintains power balance through two main 
avenues. First, by giving its citizens universal and equal political rights to vote and to 
be elected, and other rights to be free from state interferences, such as freedom of 
speech and freedom of association, a democracy maintains a power balance between 
the rulers (the actual power holders) and the ruled (people who do not occupy any 
public office besides their citizenship). The regular elections held in a democracy 
make sure that the rulers are monitored consistently by the ruled, so that any 
                                                                                                                                      
property rights, not the ―natural‖ way, neither necessarily the best way. This perspective is in line with 
Rawls‘s consistent comment that ―property owning democracy‖ and ―liberal socialist democracy‖ can 
both be compatible with his theory of justice.  
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systematic misuse or abuse of public power will be punished in elections. Second, by 
establishing different branches (executive, legislative, judiciary, etc.) and levels 
(federal, gubernatorial, municipal, etc.) of public offices, a democracy maintains a 
balance between different public powers. This is to make sure that different public 
offices, with their different powers and different interests, and the same need to seek 
approval from the public, will not collaborate together to exploit the public.  
In the sense that citizenship, due to the positive and negative rights installed 
within it, is also a public office with public power, the two avenues for a democracy 
to maintain power balance are very closely connected: they are both means to 
maintain balance between different forms of powers made possible by social 
institutions. But a meaningful difference between them is worth mentioning because 
within a democratic society, public officers and citizens are different by many 
measures. For one thing, they exist in different numbers, with citizens being always 
the majority while the public officers always the minority. It‘s also much easier to 
transfer one‘s identity from a public officer to a private citizen, since a public officer 
usually still keeps all her rights of being a private citizen. Due to this difference 
between public officers and private citizens, the power balance between office holders 
and the public is usually easier to maintain, while the power balance between different 
public offices requires higher level of political wisdom in institutional design. Perhaps 
for this reason, the literature about the power balance effect of democracy usually 
emphasizes the power balance between different branches and levels of public offices, 
while in fact the power balance between the rulers and the ruled is much more 
important, and much more essential for a democracy to worth the name in the first 
place. Without making sure that the public officers are largely accountable to the 
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public, in the sense that misuse and abuse of public power will be punished in 
elections, no democracy can exist in a real sense.  
This leads us to an even more important question to which democracy and 
non-democratic regimes give radically different answers. This question is about how 
people come into power, or to trace it to the real root, how a power structure gets 
created among a group of people. Every type of social organization, to the extent that 
it has any mechanism through which its members coordinate or cooperatively focus 
their efforts into a structured enterprise, has a power structure. This we can be sure of 
by logic. What the empirical processes contribute concerns how such a power 
structure is created, and who will occupy the powerful positions thus created. In most 
times of our recorded history, power structures of different social organizations were 
created by violence, and people came into power through violent conquest, or 
inheritance of the effects of such a violent conquest. Even in many forms of families, 
power structures were created and maintained by the superior physical strength of the 
male against the female. Within such power structures, people in inferior positions 
choose to follow their superiors out of fear, not out of willing compliance. In the long 
run, they may form a habit of obedience, or even a habit of respect, towards their 
rulers, but the main point is that even if they happen to lose such a habit, they still 
know they are bound by violence, or threat of violence, to obey. The rulers within 
such power structures, on the other hand, can feel their power being safely enjoyable 
only when they control the means of their power, namely, violence. Within such 
societies, ideologies that promote the morality of obedience to the ruled and the 
morality of benevolence to the rulers are only parasitical ―super-structures‖ (as Marx 
would say) of the power structures maintained by violence.  
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As a principle of social organization, democracy is a revolutionary idea 
against this historical background. It says that power structures should be created and 
maintained on the basis of voluntary consent. In its most radical meaning, the 
principle of democracy says that a power relationship can be created and applied only 
when all the relevant parties to such a relationship, all the parties whose interests are 
influenced by such a relationship, voluntarily agree to it.
140
 From such an idea of 
democracy, we can also deduce that within a real democracy, people in powerful 
positions should get their jobs from the consent of the people who are subject to such 
powers, and their exercise of the powers should be under the scrutiny of those 
subjects.  
Of course these basic ideas of democracy are not as simple as they appear to 
be. They indeed produce many complex consequences. For example, in saying that 
the creation and the maintenance of any power structure should be based on the 
voluntary consent of the relevant parties, we cannot literally mean that whoever 
disagree with the power structure, or with the people that are in power, can choose not 
to comply whenever she feels like it. To endow people with that kind of ―freedom‖ 
would make any sense of social order collapse, since people might choose non-
compliance for their own convenience, such as free riding. To solve this problem, 
people need to be charged with the duty to stay consistent with their commitment to 
                                               
140 Modern democracies embodied in the form of nation states are not democratic enough in this sense. 
As Rawls also admits, a democratic nation is not a voluntary association because in most cases, people 
do not choose to which nation they would like to belong. Considering human beings‘ growth cycle, no 
one can choose in which nation she would like to grow up, and since whoever grow up in a nation has 
benefited from the social order of that nation, there seems to be a bona fide duty for her to stay loyal to 
that nation. This is a plain matter of fact in our world of nation states, and in some cases, it poses moral 
dilemmas. For example, if a person grew up in a dictatorship chooses to flee her own country, or even 
to help other nations to overthrow her own national government, she might be charged with treason. 
Since in our world, competition between different nations also exists as a matter of fact, such a treason 
charge is not totally senseless, at least not in some circumstances. Overthrowing a dictatorship can 
sometimes weaken that nation, and other nations helping you to overthrow your national government 
usually have perceived national advantages to gain. All these dilemmas are real, and ultimately their 
being possible relies on the fact that we usually do not choose our own citizenship.  
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social institutions; they cannot demand that others follow the rules without themselves 
also being subject to the same rules. Another solution to this problem is majority rule: 
when a group of people needs to create and maintain a power structure (backed by a 
set of norms or institutions) to guarantee the common interests of the whole group, 
and when the majority of this group agree to such an arrangement, the power structure 
should be created and maintained according to the majority opinion. Usually the 
minority chooses to stay in the group because their interests are contingent on the 
common interests of the group, or because they perceive that it is possible that on 
some issues they can be part of the majority, or both. In any case, the basic ideas of 
democracy can have very complex consequences in the real world.  
Before we end the discussion of power, several cautions are in order. To be 
sure, there are complex factors of power that we cannot discuss here. For example, 
power can be held by different agents, such as individuals, collective bodies of 
individuals, and institutions, in different forms, such as military power, political 
power, economic power, etc. Obviously the different characteristics of these power 
holders and power forms will bring meaningful differences to the corresponding 
power relationships. Military power, for example, usually demands absolute 
obedience, due to the life and death situations it handles; this character is not shared 
by economic power, or most other forms of power. In this essay, however, we will 
leave these differences largely aside, and concentrate mainly on power relationship in 
general. Another complexity regarding power is that under some circumstances, 
power relationships can exist without institutional arrangements. A person with 
stronger physical strength, for example, can have power over a weaker one, if he 
chooses to do so, by threat of violence or by actual use of violence. When a person 
happens to love another one, due to whatever reasons, the beloved one can have a 
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certain level of power over the loving one. Some philosophers, such as Michel 
Foucault, even claims that power exists in every kind of human relationship. In the 
sense that a power relationship relies highly on people‘s perceptions, these 
philosophers do have a good point. A beautiful lady has power because people 
perceive her as attractive or personable; a president has power because people 
perceive the presidency as a powerful post. Social institutions, in this sense, are only 
one way to set up perceptions behind power relationships. Those personal power 
relationships with no institutional backup, however, cannot be addressed in our theory 
of institutionalism.  
Still another complexity regarding power is that a power relationship can be, 
as Steven Lukes famously pointed out,
141
 three dimensional: A can have power P over 
B. This three-dimensional characteristic can sometimes bring about very complex 
power relationships among different agents. Many American citizens, for example, 
can travel around the world very freely, due to the economic, monetary, technological, 
or even military advantages the United States as a country enjoys. In the same way, 
developed countries in the west can do many more things in the international world 
than underdeveloped countries can. This kind of power relationship in the 
international arena, however, will not be dealt with systematically in this essay. What 
we are concerned with here is only domestic power relationships within a sovereign 
country. This is not to say that power relationships on the global stage are not based 
on institutional structures. In fact many trans-national institutions, including the very 
institution of national sovereignty, have been put into place to secure international 
power relationships. Yet this essay leaves this topic aside due to the limited space. We 
                                               
141 See Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 2nd edition, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. In this edition, 
Lukes admits that ―power over‖ as a three dimensional relationship is actually a form of the two 
dimensional relationship of ―power to.‖  
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can end this essay at ease in this respect because, once we have reached an 
institutionalist theory regarding basic concepts such as freedom and power, other 
related issues will have a much better chance to get solutions.  
So far we have established the internal connection between the concept of 
freedom and the concept of power, and presented democracy as a special way to 
engender and to regulate power relationships. Before we end this section, I want to 
say a few words about these two concepts regarding the topic of political development. 
This will lead us to the next section of this chapter: a political development towards 
liberalization and democratization.  
To look at this connection between freedom and power from a perspective of 
political development, a historical tendency towards more equal power distribution 
among co-patriots of a society seems to be salient. This tendency reveals itself in the 
gradual process of expanding franchise in western democracies. As Dennis Wrong 
argues, together with other political scientists such as Seymour Martin Lipset, ―there 
is an unmistakable leftward drift inherent in the functioning over time of democratic 
politics.‖
142
 This is due to the structural majority of the poor within the electorate of a 
democracy. The middle and upper classes can manage to maintain their political and 
economic power by their superior ideological influence, such as the recourse to 
patriotism, or by the political apathy of the poor. But in the long run, the advantage of 
numbers on the side of the poor will gain more and more favorable political and 
economic redistribution for the poor.
143
 As a result, the social powers will move 
towards more equal distribution among the people.  
                                               
142 See Dennis Hume Wrong, Power: Its Forms, Bases and Uses, 2nd edition, The University of 
Chicago Press, 1988, p. 210. 
143 See Wrong, Power, p. 201ff.  
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The poor can achieve this, of course, because they are empowered in a 
democracy with voting rights and other related rights. As we have argued, these rights 
are also forms of power. With these institutionally guaranteed powers, no wonder the 
majority people in a democracy can gain more and more advantages for themselves as 
time goes by. What about those poor or powerless living in a non-democratic society? 
Without legal rights of participating in the political decision process, can they get 
more and more equal share of social powers in the long run?  
A positive answer to this question can be secured by an argument from 
legitimacy. The main point of this argument is that since social powers rely on social 
institutions for their existence and fulfillment, whether a system of social powers can 
sustain itself in the long run depends on how it can secure compliance with its 
supporting institutions. The non-office holders, as always the majority, have a very 
big say in such a process. When the majority of a people have certain political rights 
and civil rights, they can express their will in elections and other public forums, and 
use the peaceful means available to them to gain more power and justice; when there 
are no peaceful or legal ways for them to express their will and register their 
dissatisfaction, they will choose the strategy of non-compliance, which includes both 
passive inaction and positive actions. For this reason, most empires in history 
collapsed from inside. When the majority of the people of an empire recognized that 
their chances to benefit from the common enterprise had been constantly diminished, 
or had not been improved as quickly as the chances of the elites, they began to 
withdraw their compliance. As a result, the empire could no longer hold itself together 
in face of internal and external challenges, and began its process of decline.  
The developing cycle of dynasties in Chinese history testifies to this tendency 
with its own idiosyncrasies. Usually when a new dynasty is established, the founding 
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emperor, with his long history of fighting with the people, enjoys wide support from 
the people, and high authority over his ministers. Such a founder is usually able to 
establish institutions with justice to the people; the power his ministers and local 
officials have, coming from his authorization, is usually well regulated and monitored 
from above. As a dynasty develops generations forward, however, ministers and local 
officials, as the majority within the power structure as compared to the emperor, will 
gain more and more independent power, even though nominally they are still 
surrogates of the emperor, in the sense that their power ultimately comes from the 
emperor, not from the people. Because of this indirect power relationship between 
officials and the people (through the emperor‘s sovereignty), these officials actually 
have less motivation than the emperor to be benevolent to the people. Thus corruption 
among officials will also grow as their use of power is less and less responsive to the 
emperor‘s orders. In the end, such corruption will force the people to rise up, as they 
no longer feel the ―protection‖ from the emperor. Since the power structure of a 
dynasty is based on the sovereignty of the emperor, there is no way a dynasty can 
incrementally liberalize and democratize itself so that long-term stability of the 
political order can be maintained or revived. In the end, the ultimate decline and 
demise of a dynasty is always unavoidable, no matter how hard those later generations 
of emperors would try to reform and reinvigorate it.  
Such rejuvenation is possible only in a democracy, where regular elections 
give officials both the motivation to be benevolent to the people and the refreshed 
mandate and authority to carry out reforms. Within a democracy, the sovereignty 
belongs to the people. This sovereignty is embodied, first and foremost, in regular 
general elections, but it is also embodied in other institutions, such as the independent 
judiciary and the relatively independent local governments, etc. The process of 
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liberalization and democratization, without which no power structure can maintain 
itself in the long run, can proceed indefinitely in a democracy, although it does not 
necessarily lead to equal power for everybody. A democracy, as different from an 
anarchy, still needs a power structure and actual inequality of power between the 
officials and the public. But a democracy can be infinitely liberalized and 
democratized, since its power structure is based on the sovereignty of the people. In 
brief, the different power structures in democracies and dynasties lead to different 
trajectories of political development, although they are both under the same pressure 
of liberalization and democratization.  
To put this theory of power under our institutionalism as a theory of agency 
formation, we see that the popular sovereignty of a democracy, as an ideal way to 
legitimize public power, fully fulfils our theory of agency. To define power as an 
institutional relationship, we in effect attribute power to different agencies, including 
individual agencies and different levels of collective agencies. Individual liberties 
within a democracy give individual citizens, as individual agents, different powers; 
different levels of collective agencies, such as cities and states, are given different 
levels of public power by democratic institutions. The principle of popular 
sovereignty requires that different levels of public power belong to the corresponding 
levels of collective agencies, or more accurately, to the collective body of the people 
of which such agencies consist. Public power doesn‘t belong to royal families, or any 
group of private individuals; it belongs to all the members of the corresponding body 
politic. To take popular sovereignty as its primary principle, to embody this principle 
in its basic institutions, and to incrementally fulfill this principle to its fullest 
implication, a democracy poses as the ultimate goal of human agency formation and 
institution building.  
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The political development towards liberalization and democratization, as we 
will elaborate in the next section, is therefore not a descriptive tendency, but a 
normative tendency. It says that in order to maintain a political order in the long run, 
or to maintain its stability in the long run, the power structure within this society 
needs to be continually democratized, and its basic institutions need to give more and 
more rights and powers, as presented in different forms of institutionally guaranteed 
benefits, to the majority of its people. This is the road towards stability and growth of 
a political order. Without following this trend, a political order will develop towards 
the opposite direction, namely, destabilization and decline, with the ultimate end 
being collapse of the political order, and the grievous sufferings of its people.  
 
Agency Formation and Institutional Development 
Time is ripe, after the systematic presentation of institutionalism as a theory of 
agency formation and institution building, for giving some general consideration to 
the development of human social organization. In this section, I will argue that 
liberalization and democratization is the general normative direction of the evolution 
of human societies. This will be done by utilizing the theory of institutionalism we 
have developed so far.  
In institutionalism, we analyze a human society into the practical actions 
performed by the society as a collective agency, and by its membership agencies, both 
at the individual level and at different collective levels. For these practical actions and 
interactions to be coordinated, a common system of constitutive and regulative rules 
or institutions need to be put into place, so that individual agents and different levels 
of collective agents within such a society will act according to these institutions, not 
in destructive conflict against each other. The organization of a society, according to 
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our institutionalism, is therefore essentially dependent upon how the involved people 
can successfully live and cooperate with each other through a unified system of social 
institutions, and how successfully this society can communicate its institutional rules 
to its membership agents so that a common understanding of these rules is achieved 
among them. In other words, before a social system can come into being, the people 
involved in this society need to internalize a unified and coherent system of 
institutional rules and comply with these rules in their actions and interactions, so that 
problems of coordination and cooperation can be solved and social order be achieved 
among them. Without such a common system of social institutions, conflict rather 
than cooperation will prevail among these people.  
This central doctrine of institutionalism is not a totally new doctrine. We can 
find similar ideas in Hobbes‘s concepts of the state of nature and the sovereign, in 
Rousseau‘s idea of general will, and in many other political philosophies. What is 
new in our institutionalism is, again, that we don‘t take human individual minds or 
rationality as given, and human social order as a result of following such a human 
nature; rather, we claim that human beings, in order to achieve social order among 
them, build social institutions and create societies among them, and in this process 
change and improve their own rational power—including their moral power of being 
rational in pursuing their own goods and their moral power of being reasonable in 
dealing with other people. Equally important, our institutionalism claims that in this 
process of institution building, human beings create and improve themselves as 
institutionally defined moral agents, and therefore create themselves according to 
their own ideals of human beings. It is in this process of self creation, not in anything 
else, that lies our much treasured freedom.  
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Understood in this way, institutionalism is not a political theory about any 
particular social order, but a political theory about any form of social order. Moreover, 
it is internally a theory about political development of human societies, universally 
applicable to any human society. As such a theory, it is unavoidably very general; no 
one would unrealistically hope that institutionalism can solve all political problems, or 
even all problems in political philosophy. Nevertheless, institutionalism does provide 
a very useful tool for us to understand the huge varieties among different forms of 
social order, and the general trend of the evolution of human social organization. 
Negatively, institutionalism provides an antidote to various forms of cultural 
relativism,
144
 which claims to be able to reconcile or respect cultural differences 
among different societies.  
To see how institutionalism can explain the history of human societies, we 
begin with an easy recognition. Human societies around the globe and across history 
did have a tendency to become more complex: the number of people a society can 
accommodate, and the territory an institutional structure can cover, do pose as an 
expansion process, although not devoid of retreats and withdrawals from time to time; 
the interactions between different societies have also increased as different societies 
have expanded, first motivated by technological innovations and population growth, 
but then by people‘s capabilities of dealing with each other by building up mutual 
understandings. Through such a long process of expansion and integration, we now 
have a global world with more than 200 ―nation states‖ peacefully living together—
not in lack of conflicts at different levels, yet still hanging together. Among these 
nations, several large ones are particularly impressive in terms of nation building and 
                                               
144 T.M. Scanlon discusses relativism in detail in the last section of What We Owe to Each Other, 
Harvard University Press, 1998. His analysis and refutation are much more sophisticated than what we 
can do here.  
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social integration. It is also impressive that these big countries nowadays usually do 
not pursue the goal of occupying the smaller ones—they actually follow certain peace 
terms in dealing with international relations. If we are lucky enough, a global society 
of human beings would not be a fantasy, but a realizable dream. This history of 
human societies, in its general trend, testifies to how human beings can establish 
social order through institution building, and how can they define and improve their 
rational power as social animals, therefore define their own identities and fate.  
This all looks sound and coherent, but how are we to argue that a political 
development towards liberalization and democratization is also warranted by our 
theory of institutionalism?  
In fact, this same process of human societies, and interactions between 
societies, getting more complex implies a political development towards 
individualization and liberalization. The general idea is simple: the complexity of 
human societies is based on the complexity of social institutions, and as social 
institutions become more complex, the people involved will be required to internalize 
more complex social norms and to take more social responsibilities. In this process, 
individuals, as the ultimate residence of social institutions, will become more 
individualized as practical agents, with more complex identities; as they internalize 
more social institutions, they lay more responsibilities on themselves. If their 
responsibilities to other members of the society and to the state are balanced by the 
responsibilities from the latter to respect them, they will gain more liberties, as the 
logical relationship between responsibility and liberty argued before shows.  
Here we elaborate on this process of political development with a sketch of the 
history of human social evolution. In early stages of human societies, the construction 
of the collective agency of a society usually required severe restrictions over the 
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practical actions of its individual membership agents and constituent collective 
membership agents, such as families and local communities. The means of social 
communication in these societies are very underdeveloped and limited. To organize 
the whole society with a coherent system of rules, and to generally communicate these 
rules all across the whole society, these societies, or their membership agents, have to 
rely largely on vague yet strong rules. Morality is especially important, partly because 
practical actions in these societies are more or less limited to familial and local 
activities, dealing with acquaintances rather than strangers, but mainly because moral 
rules are relatively easier to be generalized (such as ―you shall never lie‖). In 
particular, moral rules were oftentimes represented in very transmissible religious 
stories and doctrines, which made moral rules easily understandable (gods‘ 
appearances and thinking are always human-like), memorable (popular religions are 
more about stories than about theories), and acceptable (because gods issue direct and 
commanding orders).
145
 As a result, these societies are usually overflowing with 
moralism, their laws being general moral rules rather than specific legalities.  
Another dimension of traditional moralism is its emphasis on the absoluteness 
or transcendence of moral principles. This dimension works very well in convincing 
people to comply, and spreading the norms all across a society, thus proves to be very 
instrumental in maintaining social order through institutional rules endorsed by the 
majority of the population of a society, if not by all of them. In addition, a set of 
immutable social norms, as backed by the transcendence of morality, also fits well 
with a usually very stable traditional society, the practical actions supported by such a 
society being limited in scope and type, and relatively changeless across time. To use 
                                               
145 For the transmissibility of religions, see Stewart Guthrie, Faces in the Clouds: A New Theory of 
Religion, Oxford University Press, 1993. Guthrie develops animism and personalism into a more 
sophisticated theory called ―anthropomorphism,‖ which stresses the importance of gods being human-
like and therefore being easily acceptable to believers.  
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Rawls‘s words, such traditional societies usually are founded on some system of 
―comprehensive‖ doctrines, be it moral, such as Confucianism, or religious, such as 
Christianity and Islam.  
By contrast, modern societies tend to make distinctions between morality and 
law to accommodate the more advanced and more complicated systems of practical 
actions and interactions. As commerce and industries develop, more and more people 
move from their cherished local communities into unfamiliar cities, change their 
lifetime career as farmers to busier and more complicated jobs. Commuter 
transportation loaded with strangers moves people around, carrying different 
information across regions. When people from different localities meet in cities, they 
realize that the general and vague moral laws they previously learned are not so useful, 
just like their different accents. To share common understandings about how to carry 
out practical actions and interactions, they now try to develop more explicit norms, as 
well as more ―standard‖ dialect. Indeed, they find themselves in need of specific rules 
for their own protection, since they can no longer rely on ―simple principles‖ they 
used to take for granted when dealing with family members and co-villagers. 
Different walks of life requires different rules, different businesses follow different 
ethics.  
As such a ―comprehensive‖ system of morality breaks down, the method for 
justifying social norms also changes. As analyzed above, social norms of a traditional 
society are usually justified by a transcendent source, such as god or heaven. Now 
since social norms of a modern society become more diverse and more mutable, 
another method of justification needs to be introduced. Laws and legislation become 
more and more important for maintaining common social institutions, and to be 
accepted by the membership agents, social norms are now required to be under the 
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scrutiny of the norm practitioners. For any society, social norms are justified for, and 
therefore applicable to, membership agents only if these agents are willing to submit 
to them. In traditional societies, due to the comprehensiveness and immutability of 
their social norms, the justification or legitimization of social norms is usually backed 
by an absolute source, which transcends and stays above the society. This doesn‘t 
mean that whoever controls the ideology would be able to control the people in 
whatever way he wants, since when the majority of a society is in extreme suffering, 
no ideology would be able to establish social order. Indeed, dominant ideology in any 
society is subject to different interpretations, and no interpretation can sustain its force 
when it is in direct conflict with the majority‘s survival. Nevertheless, traditional 
societies do rely on general and immutable ideologies to maintain social order. When 
social norms become more diverse and more mutable in a modern society, however, 
the membership agents of this society are given more say in the justification and 
legitimization of social norms. This change in method of justification seems to be an 
inevitable strategy shift. Trying to justify social norms with a transcendent source, and 
therefore trying to establish theocracies in modern societies, are doomed to fail, since 
in a modern society, social norms can be effective in regulating practical actions and 
maintaining social order only when they are adapted to people‘s diverse and quickly 
changing practices.  
From another angle, this general development from moralism to legalism can 
also be understood as a development from a social relationship guided by social 
statuses to a social relationship guided by social contracts, or as a development ―from 
status to contract,‖ as Henry Maine observes.
146
 Ancient societies, due to their limited 
means of communication and their limited ranges of social actions, founded their 
                                               
146 Henry Maine (1861), Ancient Law, London: Murray, 1861, p. 170.  
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social orders on strict systems of social statuses. People were bound with different 
social positions, each one of them carrying out the same social function for his or her 
whole life; in most cases, social positions are even inherited by generation after 
generation. As the possibilities of wider and more flexible social actions grow, 
however, binding every member of the society with the same social status for the 
whole life become less feasible and less desirable. Social relationship among people 
must be constantly redefined, not according to their born statuses, but according to 
what kind of socially useful actions they can perform. This development doesn‘t 
automatically lead to equal status for all, but it makes restricting people to unchanging 
statuses less and less doable. As a result, legal rules must recognize, through an 
incremental process, the equal status of every citizen of a society, or at least the 
potentiality of such an equality of status. By contrast, a comprehensive and immutable 
system of moral rules usually results in a hierarchal system of social statuses. The 
logic behind this connection is that since social norms are absolute and are sometimes 
even deemed as from a transcendent source, arguing with each other about the 
meanings of these norms is not likely necessary, and whoever has more knowledge 
about these norms will naturally have more authority in enforcing these norms.
147
  
As legality replaces morality as the common guidance for practical actions, as 
regulating rules become more rather than less, people feel, ironically, that they are 
much freer than before. Although they may complain about the cumbersome legal 
rules, they nevertheless discover that so long as they follow these ―stupid‖ rules, they 
can enjoy their ―private space‖ according to their own flavors and styles. They will 
not be prosecuted simply because they are different. Of course, some societies tried 
                                               
147 Thus we see that although Islam is highly egalitarian in terms of the brotherhood of believers, and 
although Qur‘an doesn‘t promote any hierarchal church system, Muslim societies in most places are 
still not susceptible to liberal democracy. For an analysis of this internal momentum, see Keith Ward, 
Religion and Community, Clarendon Press, chapter 2.  
 142 
totalitarianism on their way towards modernization, sticking to simple and oppressive 
rules in a cosmopolitan era. But as social practices diversify, there is no way to 
demolish differences among people anyway, at least not in the long run. In modern 
cities, people physically living together are always separated by their diverse 
enterprises, and the rate of change typical of modern life makes it impossible to frame 
the minds of neighbors into the same model. In a modern society, people gain 
solidarity among themselves by following the same laws, not by sharing the same 
moral sentiments, so to speak. The collective agency of a society now consists of 
clearer and more formal rules; as the society cuts its lines more elegantly, more space 
is created for individuals. Membership agents of a society are no longer restricted 
within vague circles, afraid of offending the sacrosanct social taboos every step 
forward. They can even boldly challenge social norms and argue with the authority 
about the reasonableness of rules. A totalitarian regime that refuses to let this 
challenge happen would sooner or later find themselves hated by everybody, and 
therefore cannot sustain their government any longer.  
In his late works, Rawls devotes a lot of energy to proving how people 
committed to different comprehensive doctrines can nevertheless endorse the same 
political principles, therefore can legitimize their political order with their overlapping 
consensus. Our analysis here shows that the fact of pluralism can be more or less 
neutralized, as Rawls has argued, by another fact of modern societies, namely, the fact 
that a modern society cannot make its members commit to the same comprehensive 
moral system without using oppressive means.
148
 Maintaining a peaceful social order 
without resorting to common belief in comprehensive doctrines is a new contribution 
                                               
148 This Rawls calls ―the fact of oppression.‖ For a relative concentrated discussion of the five ―general 
facts of political sociology and human psychology,‖ see section 11 of JF.  
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of modern civilization to human life. As Rawls vividly illustrated, people at the 
beginning of modernity tried very hard to maintain the unity of ideology, with 
religious wars and prosecutions; it‘s only after they realized that this goal is no longer 
achievable that they started to accept the fact of pluralism, and to work out more 
sophisticated and more diverse ways to maintain social solidarity.  
As a result of this modern achievement, people living in modern societies, 
when they look back to their more compassionate past, usually feel lonely, homeless, 
or even alienated. They can no longer commit much sentiment in their engagement 
with others; friendship becomes rarer, human relationship more formal and more 
detached. If we really look seriously back into human history, however, we will find 
that this feeling of alienation is nothing new; in fact, it has been an unavoidable 
accompaniment of human civilization. Whenever more strangers are brought together 
by the advancement in human social organization, people experience this sense of loss 
in attachment. At the beginning of almost every civilization, for example, literature 
and history were invented to honor the immemorial past, when people cared for each 
other and lived together peacefully in love. The journey of human civilization is the 
journey of remembering the lost; this way we say farewell to our past and adapt our 
human nature to the new ways of life.  
This journey is nothing but the process of externalization and internalization 
of more and more complex social norms. As social organization becomes more 
complex, people become more dependent on institutional rules rather than on their 
personal feelings or moral beliefs they socialized in their younger years in dealing 
with each other. The sense of alienation ensues, but sooner or later, people will 
develop new sentiments in accordance with the new social realities. Their hearts will 
be more open to strangers, for example, and their sense of justice will become more 
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abstract and more neutral, with less trails of familial, tribal or local biases. Meanwhile 
they will be able to embrace, and to be attached to, larger communities in their 
feelings and thoughts, their human nature being adapted to more complex social 
cooperation on larger scales. The sentiment of nationalism exemplifies this expansion 
of human sociability, and hopefully the feeling of every human being living in a 




To drive the above points home, ancient societies are usually more 
homogeneous and more oppressive than modern ones, due to their limited means to 
communicate a coherent system of rules all across the whole society, while more 
recent societies tend to allow more freedom to its membership agents, due to their 
more advanced communication systems, and another interrelated phenomenon, their 
more complicated systems of practical actions. Primitive societies, in this sense, are 
like animal ―societies‖ such as ant societies, whose social fibers are characterized by 
rigid rules or even social instincts, while more advanced human societies allow more 
flexibilities and more innovations in their social norms. This rough line of 
development can be called the historical direction of individuation of human beings, 
or more appropriately, the direction of history as liberalization. As a general tendency 
of the history of human civilization, people living in earlier stages usually rely more 
on each other, and on their communities, to maintain moral and political order. The 
blood vessels of these earlier societies are fewer and thicker, so to speak. This makes 
people feel more comfortably at home, but people with innovative minds will find it 
                                               
149 David Reidy argues, and I agree, that Rawls‘s theory of international justice does not stick to current 
post-Westphalia system of nation states, with every nation only worrying about its internal business, 
but rather encourages institutional development towards a more cosmopolitan economic and political 
order: ―Within such a [Rawlsian international] politics, liberal democratic peoples are free to engage in 
a variety of undertakings aimed at promoting liberalism and democracy around the world.‖ See Reidy, 
―Rawls on International Justice: A Defense,‖ Political Theory, Vol. 32, No. 3 (June 2004), p. 312.  
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more oppressive and more stifling. As more blood vessels are created to connect more 
people together, sense of attachment to each other is loosened, while at the same time 
social cooperation at larger scales becomes possible.  
To understand why growing complexity in practical actions within a society 
leads to greater individuation, we need to remember that all practical actions are 
ultimately to be carried out by individual agents of a society. This in no sense implies 
that we are endorsing an individualist conception of the person; indeed, 
institutionalism holds a more integrated view about the relationship between 
individuals and their society, as is demonstrated in the first chapter.
150
 In 
institutionalism, we analyze a society into the practical actions it sustains, and the 
institutions it uses to guide and constitute these practical actions for the sake of 
maintaining social order. Ultimately, a society can be well in order if all its 
institutions are internalized and followed by every relevant individual agent. 
Obviously, assuming a society maintains the same number of individual agents, when 
the possibility of practical actions in this society grows, the corresponding regulating 
and constitutive institutions will also grow, and so will the number of institutions an 
individual agent is supposed to internalize and to honor in her now more complex 
structure of actions. By the last specification I mean that an individual agent is now 
required to carry out more practical actions by herself and with other individual 
agents in coordination and cooperation within the collective agencies of the society. 
As a result, individual agents in a more advanced society, generally, will be more 
acutely aware of their being individuals. Their social positions on the social network 
                                               
150 Max Weber, who studies societies on the basis of actions, also emphasizes on ―individual human 
beings‖ as the only ―intelligible performers of meaningful actions.‖ Weber further believes that this 
emphasis in no sense ―implies a certain valuation of ‗individualism‘ (in any possible sense of that 
word).‖ See chapter 1 of Economy and Society. I cite these two paragraphs from pp. 17, 21 of Max 
Weber: Selections in Translation, edited by W.G. Runciman, translated by E. Matthews, Cambridge 
University Press, 1978.  
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are constantly in motion and reshaping, no longer fixed by stagnate relations; in order 
to know how they are to perform their now more complex social roles, they need to 
reflect on their whereabouts and themselves more often than before.  
The process of liberalization of individual agents is only the other face of this 
process of individuation. Since individual agents are now required to internalize and 
follow more institutions, the society can no longer hope that they will stabilize their 
socialization in early ages, and follow a rigid pattern of actions thereafter. What kids 
learn in schools will prove to be less useful in their adult lives; past experiences are no 
longer sure guidance for the future. Individual agents are therefore required to 
participate in their social institutions more actively, first in the implementation of 
institutions, then in the creation and legitimization of institutions. By contrast, in a 
less modernized society, the patterns of actions, the institutions guiding practical 
actions and their legitimacy, are highly dependent upon the long tradition laid down 
by ancestors. Individual agents in a pre-modern society were only required to blindly 
follow traditional institutions; in most cases, all the significant things they do in their 
lives only repeat what their ancestors have done in previous incarnations. In short, 
liberalization of individual agents simply means that as individual agents are obliged 
to honor more institutions in a quickly changing social environment, they will be 
endowed with more participating rights in the formation, implementation, and 
legitimization of these institutions. In this sense, liberalization and democratization 
are two closed connected concepts in institutionalism.  
Another consequence of the growing demands for institutions of a more 
complex society with more complex structure of practical actions is that the 
enforcement of social institutions is now less dependent upon moral norms through 
peer pressure, and more dependent on legal and political administrations. This in turn 
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requires bigger and more complex institutional structures, which are supposed to 
administer social institutions in the name of the collective agency of the whole society. 
Nevertheless, the same irony is also at work in this aspect of social evolution: on the 
one hand, to enforce the now more complex social institutions, and to carry out the 
now more complex collective actions such as national defense and welfare 
distribution, institutional structure of a society tends to become more powerful and 
more penetrating; on the other hand, as social institutions become more complex, the 
effectiveness of the enforcement of social institutions become more dependent upon 
individual agents‘ voluntary thinking and voluntary actions. In other words, in order 
to realize social control in a more complex society, its social institutions must be more 
responsive to individual agents, on whom the society relies to carry out the now more 
complex practical actions, at the individual level and different collective levels. This 
dialectical process also leads to liberalization and democratization.  
Before we further solidify this direction of liberalization and democratization, 
we need to be aware of possible complications of this historical development. The 
process of liberalization and democratization doesn‘t constitute a straight line of 
progress in every society. Specific degrees and conditions of homogeneousness and 
oppressiveness in different ancient societies may vary, and a later stage of society 
might not necessarily freer than a previous stage. But these variations can be 
accounted for within our theory of agency formation and institution building. People 
of more ancient times, such as citizens of classical Athens and of the Roman Republic, 
might enjoy more freedom than people living in the later Macedonian Empire and 
Roman Empire. In these cases, the enlargement of society is so rapid and so extensive 
that bigger community means more oppressiveness and less liberty. Even in the early 
modern time, the advancement of industries, communications and social organizations 
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did not immediately lead to bigger space for private life, but to different forms of state 
absolutism and totalitarianism. This is so because to secure social order, the collective 
agency for a bigger society must be built first, with only very raw materials of 
building at hand, and leaving more elegant adjustments in individual or other 
membership agencies for later development. History rarely proceeds with good 
preparation; it‘s not like building a pyramid, with higher level of collective agencies 
only added to the top of lower levels of collective and individual agencies. Sometimes 
a society can enlarge itself gradually and peacefully, such as the American society 
especially after the Civil War (this is not to disregard the sufferings of the Indians, by 
the way). But oftentimes the changes in the environment are so threatening and the 
need to create and solidify a bigger collective agency is so urgent that there is not 
enough time to wind up together in an incremental manner. When the possibility of a 
higher level of social organization and a bigger scale of collective practical action is 
on the horizon, there will be certain individual agents who emerge as Napoleons, 
whose foresight, ambition, and charisma give them the capability of moving people 
towards the realization of this possibility, or in the cases like that of Alexander and 
Napoleon, moving people even further than what is actually possible, that is, to 
embrace too large a territory into one country or one collective agency. People see in 
these heroes the power of doing things that were unimaginable before, but what these 
heroes are really capable of doing is arousing the people to this power (think about 
how powerless Napoleon was on the island of Saint Helena). Fortunately or 
unfortunately, those big empires built up by swords often have shorter lives than 
smaller political entities; they usually consume themselves before they can integrate 
all the different peoples they felt so eager to conquer. These empires deserve to 
collapse, since they could not turn their subjects into their membership agents so that 
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these people can identity themselves as members of the collective agency, as 
members of ―our‖ empire.  
Cultural differences may also bring complications to this process of 
liberalization and democratization, but ultimately what is decisive is the expansion of 
communication and the possibility for collective actions at bigger scale. Many 
civilizations in human history, such as the Maya and the Incan, did not have chances 
to develop into modern forms before they perished, mainly due to their limited 
geographical positions, and in consequence, their lack of opportunities to grow bigger 
or interact with and learn from other civilizations. Indeed, in the history of human 
civilization, only one continent has produced modern forms of human life, or forms of 
life closer to modernity. The Euro-Asia continent, due to its vastness and the 
continuous interchange between the diverse forms of life it is able to produce, had 
been the center of the evolution of human civilization. On this continent, the part of 
the Western Europe was especially important for the emergence of modern 
civilization, perhaps due to its geographical openness and cultural diversity.
151
 This in 
no sense implies, however, that only people of Western Europe are suitable for 
modern ways of life, characterized with liberalization of individual agents by 
advanced systems of social institutions and democratization in political participation. 
                                               
151 Many students of modernity, such as Karl Marx, emphasize on the importance of scientific and 
industrial revolutions for the creation of modern social forms. Some other students of modernity, such 
as Max Weber, believe instead that the evolution of cultural values and social institutions is more 
important for the emergence of modern social forms. Institutionalism explored in this essay obviously 
leans to the latter side. This is not to devaluate the scientific and industrial revolutions, but only to 
understand these revolutions within the background of the evolution of social institutions. For one thing, 
Chinese people had put into use many advanced technologies, such as paper, gunpowder, and compass, 
centuries before Europeans got a chance to know, but the same technologies leading to scientific and 
industrial revolutions in Europe did not cause much social change in China. Weber gives a quite 
institutional explanation of why China did not develop capitalism by its own in The Religion of China: 
Confucianism and Taoism (1916), translated and edited by H.H. Gerth, Free Press, 1951. Marx‘s 
―historical materialism‖ is most clearly presented in German Ideology (1845) and the Preface to 
Toward a Critique of Political Economy (1859). For a systematic exploration of Marx‘s ―Historical 
Materialism,‖ see G.A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History, Princeton University Press, 1978.  
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Indeed, European people came into the modern age with their own struggles, with 
religious persecutions, religious wars, civil wars, national wars, world wars, the 
holocaust, etc. European modernization was also accompanied by colonization of 
almost every other part of the world, while American modernization was smeared by 
slavery and the deprivation of the Native Americans. The historical process of 
liberalization and democratization in no way means smooth transformation.  
After the modern form of life has taken shape, other people from other 
civilizations will first be pushed, then be eagerly committed, to learn the successful 
institutional practice from the west. After all, the process of institution building is 
nothing but the solidification of successful experiences, and the process of social 
evolution is only a process of learning from the past.
152
 As they are imitating the west, 
however, they are also communicating and interacting with the west, and so is the 
west with them. As a result, they are now both participating together in the process of 
externalization and internalization of new institutional rules guiding and empowering 
new forms of practical actions and interactions. Some parties may play bigger roles, 
some parties may be involved mainly in passive ways, but for a stable social and 
political order to be implemented all around the globe, engagement of every party is 
required. In our own age, dialogues between civilizations are emerging large on the 
global stage, oftentimes leading to violent confrontation. If our sanity is strong 
enough, we will be able to externalize and internalize more advanced and more 
reconciling forms of institutions to sustain a global collective agency, with all human 
beings and all human communities its membership agents. History does not end in our 
own time; it will never end, as long as the expansion of human communication, 
                                               
152 Hayek says, ―in social evolution the decisive factor is not the selection of the physical and 
inheritable properties of the individuals but the selection by imitation of successful institutions and 
habits.‖ See Hayek, ―Freedom, Reason, and Tradition,‖ Ethics, Vol. 68, No. 4 (July 1958), p. 233. This 
article was later adapted into his The Constitution of Liberty (Routledge, 1960) as Chapter 4.  
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human practical action, and human institution building are still at work. In fact, ―the 
end of history‖ happens only in a much less exciting fashion. The collapse of the 
Roman Empire is such a case, and so are the collapses of many ancient Chinese 
dynasties. During these periods, stagnation and corruption in public space make the 
current moral and political order no longer sustainable, and people were forced to 
withdraw to smaller units of social universe, such as local communities and families, 
to get a sense of order.  
To sum up, liberalization and democratization is a general trend within a 
bigger general trend, that is, the trend of the expansion of human social organization. 
Any human society, to be a stable social system, must work out a way to 
communicate its norms to its members, and to have its norms internalized by its 
members. Without a set of shared institutional rules, people with different norms of 
social conduct in their minds will unavoidably come into conflict when they meet. In 
earlier societies, when communication across the society is more rudimentary and the 
life forms of its members more restricted to local communities, social norms are 
usually more general and more oppressive. Membership agents of an ancient society 
are usually not required to actively participate in building up the collective agency of 
their society; they are rather passive recipients of social norms, and are required to 
internalize these norms without much arguing. In fact, there was no much chance for 
people to get together, arguing for and exchanging their thoughts, let alone reforming 
their own institutions.
153
 As communication improves and interaction between people 
becomes more complicated, more specific social norms are called into place, and 
                                               
153 This, again, doesn‘t mean that whatever ideology or institution will be internalized by the individual 
members of those ancient societies; those ideologies and institutions that threaten the survival of the 
majority, such as the Mayan practice of human sacrifice in large numbers, cannot bring about stable 
social union in the long run. Such societies will ultimately collapse, either because the majority rise up 
in rebellions, or because it destroys its population.  
 152 
membership agents of a society are required to play more social roles than they used 
to. As a result, more active participation from the membership agents in the adoption 
and the adaptation of social norms become necessary, while blind compliance 
becomes less efficient and less useful. The representative of the collective agency of a 
society used to be a monarch, the throne being inheritable, as well as most other social 
positions; now the changing social needs over time require that the collective agency 
of a society being more immutable and more responsive to the quickly changing 
environment and to the various and changing needs of the membership agents. The 
collective agency of a society can no longer be claimed in the divine or royal names; 
it must be claimed in the name of the people. Thus a society is liberalized and 
democratized.  
This concludes our discussion of the process of liberalization and 
democratization through agency formation and institution building. In the next section, 
we will use this institutionalist theory of political development, and more generally, 
the theory of institutionalism developed in this essay so far, to provide new 
perspectives on our ideal of liberal democracy.  
 
The Ideal of Liberal Democracy and Political Development 
Simply put, liberal democracy is an ideal that social norms should be created 
and legitimized by the consent of all the applicable agents, whose liberties and 
interests are bound to be under the influence of these norms. This way a seamless 
compliance can be secured all across the society, under the supposition that every 
agent will stick to her consent and will abstain from taking advantage of free riding. 
In reality, however, free riding is a dominant issue for any society to fight with, and 
seamless compliance, even under the condition that all the social norms are endorsed 
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by unanimous consent from the whole body of the citizenry, is rarely secured. This 
makes the problem of enforcement essential for every social order. A social order is 
secured only when different agents are willing to coexist with each other peacefully 
and submit themselves to the same set of social norms when disputes arise. When 
some agents try to manipulate or violate certain social norms so that their rational 
interests can be better advanced, appropriate punishments should be carried out so 
that those social norms are recovered and reinforced. When the norms of a society are 
systematically violated, the social order will lose its grasp, and a vicious circle will 
bring this society into chaos. A society without an efficient system of enforcement is 
therefore unstable, and efficient enforcement, in the long run, relies on the legitimacy 
of the social institutions to be enforced.  
This observation in no sense presupposes that human beings have a corrupted 
or evil nature, or that human beings are selfish by nature,
154
 or that human beings are 
naturally fond of rebelling, as the story of the original sin suggests. Rather, 
compliance with social norms is hard to maintain perhaps mainly because information 
available for norm construction, and for every agent in her decision making, is always 
incomplete. This incompleteness of information can be further analyzed into two 
categories. First, since social norms must be abstract in their forms and general in 
                                               
154 To be sure, separate rational interests of different agents do have influences on their choices of 
compliance and disobedience. In a famous book, the economist Mancur Olson analyses the evolution 
and corruption of social orders on the basis of the problem of free riding. According to Olson, ―If the 
members of a large group rationally seek to maximize their personal welfare, they will not act to 
advance their common or group objectives unless there is coercion to force them to do so, or unless 
there is some seperate incentive, distinct from the achievement of the group objectives.‖ For Olson, 
therefore, the necessity of enforcement is entailed by people‘s separate rational interests. Our argument 
here can admit the merit of Olson‘s point, or similar points. See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective 
Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Harvard University Press, 1965, p. 2. Olson continues 
his thinking in this spirit in a later work, in which he argues that societies like Roman Empire 
ultimately collapse exactly because free riding problem will get out of control as these societies enlarge 
upon their success yet cannot develop corresponding effective systems of enforcement. See Mancur 
Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities, Yale 
University Press, 1982.  
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their applications, they unavoidably bring about inconveniences in certain situations. 
As a result, mechanically following social norms might be undesirable in many 
circumstances, even from the point of view of the society as a whole. Usually, a 
society would give its agents, and the enforcers of social norms, certain elbow room 
for discretion. As a consequence of the incompleteness of information for norm 
construction, no system of social norms can be so rigid that compliance with social 
norms is only a matter of ―mechanical jurisprudence.‖
155
 Second, when individual 
agents make their decisions about how to comply with social norms and how to 
interpret social norms so that the best meanings of these norms can be realized in 
different situations, they also face the incompleteness of information. There is no way 
to guarantee beforehand that their discretions and interpretations indeed honor the 
best meaning of the corresponding social norms, or that other agents will agree to the 
same discretions and interpretations given the same circumstances. With these two 
senses of incompleteness of information, a system of social norms will be unstable 
even if we suppose that every agent has absolute good will towards herself and her 
co-community members.  
An effective system of enforcement is therefore necessary for any system of 
social norms. In reality, the function of enforcement is usually assigned to a certain 
group of people under the social division of labors. As a result, in real history, the 
relationship between different agents under the same structure of social norms is 
rarely in absolute symmetry. Nevertheless, although the creation of an enforcer 
function can better guarantee and stabilize compliance with social norms, it brings 
about further complications for social order. The enforcers of social norms carry 
                                               
155 For this point, see Roger A. Shiner, Norm and Nature: The Movements of Legal Thought, Clarendon 
Press, 1992, pp. 33-4.  
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social powers with them, and when they can abuse public power for their own 
benefits, they are very likely to do so, unless they are monitored by higher levels of 
social norms and higher levels of norm enforcers. This in principle can bring the 
levels of norm enforcers to an infinite regress, with two possible exceptions: either 
there is an absolute enforcer, who has the absolute power to enforce social norms, or a 
circle of enforcement is formed, so that every enforcer is under the monitor and 
enforcement of at least another enforcer. These two exceptions, as two solutions to the 
problem of infinite regress of norm enforcement, are therefore universally used in 
every human society, with different degrees of mixture that constitute a continuum of 
power distribution. A theocracy, which makes the sovereign ruler the ultimate source 
of social norms and the absolute enforcer, is at one end of this continuum, while a 
liberal democracy, which makes every agent both the creator and the enforcer of 
social norms, is at the other end.  
Before we explore the ideal of liberal democracy, another important concept 
needs to be analyzed in light of the institutionalism. This is the concept of rights, 
which is closely connected with the concept of duties. Here we see that the cunning of 
history is also at work: in order to lay more responsibilities to its membership agents 
so that more complex social actions and interactions can be organized, the society 
now bestows more individual liberties upon these agents.  
Duties and rights, in institutionalism, are both understood as institutional rules 
constituting and regulating practical actions and interactions. Individual persons, as 
constituents of different levels of institutional agencies, externalize their deliberations, 
desires and concerns into institutional rules, and internalize these rules in their actions 
and interactions so that a common understanding is shared between them and their 
interaction is stabilized. Duties and rights are therefore nothing but constitutive and 
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regulative rules of the social institutions; they can be assigned to both individual 
agents and collective agents, according to their institutional statuses. In other words, 
duties and rights do not internally ―belong‖ to the relevant agents; they are assigned to 
these agents by institutions, which are general and abstract rules applicable to every 
membership agents of a society. As such, rights and duties of one person are always 
involved with some ―other‖ persons; as well put by Rex Martin, ―rights always 
involve normative directions for the conduct of second parties—and thus rights lay 
the hand of duty, or something like it, on such persons…the duties in question are, all 
of them, institutional duties.‖
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 Natural rights theories, in this sense, are only 
rationalist justifications of rights and duties; they do not account for the real process 
through which rights and duties are created and administered. On the other hand, even 
the basic human rights promoted in international politics, as David Reidy puts it, must 
be understood ―in terms of their practical function within the international order‖ in 
order to be real rights. ―They are not timeless, prepolitical, natural rights belonging to 
the moral fabric of the universe or flowing directly from some universal human 
nature.‖
157
 The institutional understanding of rights therefore is totally different from 
natural rights theories.  
Duties and rights, of course, are both very complicated legal and philosophical 
concepts, of which our analysis here in no sense constitutes a general theory. For 
example, we do not, and can not, deal with various institutions enforcing rights and 
duties. For our purpose of arguing for the general tendency of liberalization in the 
                                               
156 See Rex Martin, A System of Rights, Clarendon Press, 1993, pp. 304-5. Martin defines rights as 
―established ways of acting.‖ This definition obviously fits our institutional understanding of rights 
very well, since the institutionalism is centered on practical actions. It is to be noted, though, that the 
institutionalism developed here is far less a comprehensive theory of rights as presented by Martin.  
157 See David Reidy, ―Political Authority and Human Rights,‖ in Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A Realistic 
Utopia?, edited by Rex Martin and David Reidy, Blackwell, 2006, p. 174. Rex Martin also observes 
that ―natural rights,‖ ―resolutely non-institutional‖ as they are, can only provide ―reasons or grounds 
for saying that certain ways of acting or of being treated ought to be civil rights.‖ See A System of 
Rights, p. 125.  
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evolution of social organization, we need only establish two connections: that as more 
institutional rules are to be internalized by individual agents, they will be assigned 
with more duties for carrying out institutional rules; and that there is a general balance 
between the assignment of duties and the assignment of rights. The first connection is 
intuitively clear in our presentation of the theory of institutionalism, while the second 
connection merits a few more words of clarification regarding our theory of 
institutionalism.  
Institutionalism believes that certain rights can be claimed for some agents 
against other agents only if certain meaningful corresponding duties can be laid upon 
relevant agents by appropriate institutions. This means that how many rights an agent 
can have is dependent upon how many duties can be institutionally laid upon those 
agents who are capable of violating those rights. This is especially true for welfare 
rights, but it is also true for other rights, even those rights as basic as the right to one‘s 
life. In the battlefield, for example, a soldier doesn‘t have a legal right to his own life, 
since there is no way to lay legal duties upon the enemy soldiers to respect such a 
right. A soldier, when getting on the battlefield, must be ready to die for his cause, 
without the right to demand that whoever on the enemy side kills him would be held 
legally accountable. This is how the institution of war works. For another example, no 
individual agent can be endowed with the right of life when it comes to her own 
suicidal effort, simply because there is no way to punish suicide besides persuading 
people into the belief that suicides will go to hell.
158
 But in a domestic society, a right 
to one‘s own life must be generally and universally secured by institutional rules; 
                                               
158 This is not to say that this kind of belief cannot be institutionalized. In fact, the Catholic Church, as 
well as some other churches, used to be able to establish, legitimize, and enforce a set of very effective 
institutions based on this kind of beliefs. As we explored before, this kind of belief has high potentiality 
to be institutionalized, since they are understood as God‘s commandments, therefore are automatically 
legitimized in the believers‘ hearts.  
 158 
otherwise the social order cannot be well maintained. In pre-modern societies, people 
with institutional power could manage to escape punishment after killing innocent yet 
powerless people, but as these cases accumulated, these societies sooner or later 
collapsed due to their incapability of maintaining a sense of security and order among 
the people. On the other hand, whenever there is no enforceable way to lay 
institutional duties, no meaningful rights can be claimed. As Joel Feinberg famously 
articulates, ―A man has a legal right when an official recognition of his claim (as valid) 
is called for by the governing rules…A man has a moral right when he has a claim the 
recognition of which is called for…by moral principles, or the principles of an 
enlightened conscience.‖
159
 The right of the people in poor countries to be assisted by 
advanced countries, for instance, is not meaningful until we have some enforceable 
trans-national institutions to lay the corresponding duties to assist, or enough 
―enlightened conscience,‖ upon the advanced countries. Until then, people living in 
poor countries do not really have the right to be assisted.  
This dependence on how far an institutional structure can lay duties upon 
relevant agents in turn means that institutional agents will gain more and more rights 
as the degree and the scope of applicability of social institutions are improved. In this 
sense, liberalism, the political philosophy based on rights claims, should not be 
understood as a stagnant goal. We are not to follow the libertarians and argue that we 
have certain rights to be protected, and so long as these rights are effectively protected, 
                                               
159 See Feinberg, Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty, Princeton University Press, 1980, p. 154. It 
is Joel Feinberg who defines rights as ―valid claims.‖ This definition is perhaps a little bit wider than 
our institutional understanding of rights, but it can be largely fit in the institutionalism, in the sense that 
it takes as the other party‘s recognition as essential for a person to have a right. Henry Shue agrees to 
this view of rights when he says that ―Being socially guaranteed is probably the single most important 
aspect of a standard right, because it is the aspect that necessitates correlative duties.‖ See p. 16 of 
Basic Rights: Subsistance, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2nd edition, Princeton University Press, 




 Rather, institutional liberalism is internally a progressive 
doctrine: it says that just as our institutional rules will always be improved and 
expanded as time goes by, so will the system of our liberties. Institutionalism supports 
a liberalism defined as an endless process of liberalization rather than a process of 
realization of certain list of ―natural‖ liberties.  
A possible way to oppose our institutional doctrine of rights and our 
institutional understanding of liberalism is this: rights are not defined by institutions; 
rather, rights set limits to institutions. It is argued that although people know it is 
necessary to have coercive institutions in order to create and maintain public order, 
they don‘t want the coercive power of institutions to trespass their ―inalienable rights‖ 
or ―negative rights‖ of being left alone in their personal pursuits that are harmless to 
others.  According to this reasoning, therefore, rights are not limited by institutions; 
on the contrary, institutions are limited by rights.
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 This way of defining rights, 
however, is in fact not contrary to our doctrine of rights; the only problem with it is 
that it stops halfway. Suppose people do want to set some limits to institutional power, 
how could they implement these limits? Not surprisingly they need more institutions, 
                                               
160 Typically, libertarianism defines liberties as pre-institutional belongings of individual persons; 
based on this definition, Nozick argues that only minimal state is justifiable. See Robert Nozick, 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Basic Books, 1974. In a later work, Nozick insists that ―a right is 
something for which one can demand or enforce compliance,‖ leaving how a person can enforce her 
own rights not clarified. See Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, Harvard University Press, 1981, p. 
499. For Rawls‘s criticism of libertarianism, see Lecture VII of PL.  
161 Rights and liberties have been largely advanced in the name of this simple claim that people have 
rights against the government. Isaiah Berlin typically holds this view on rights and liberties when he 
emphasizes the importance of ―negative liberties.‖ See Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1969. Ronald Dworkin defends this sense of rights against the government with 
certain reservations in Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard University Press, 1977, especially in chapter 7. 
Henry Shue, on the other hand, argues that ―it is impossible, therefore, meaningfully and exhaustively 
to split all rights into two kinds based upon the nature of their implementing duties, because the duties 
are always a mixture of positive and negative ones.‖ See his ―Afterword‖ to the 2nd edition of Basic 
Rights: Subsistance, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy, Princeton University Press, 1996, p. 155. Here 
Shue refers to Jeremy Waldron‘s vivid illustration about how the protection of the ―negative‖ rights of 
being left un-interfered may require ―successive waves of duty,‖ such as the collaborative efforts by the 
police, the court, and the legislature. For Waldron‘s similar institutional theory of rights, see Waldron, 
Liberal Rights: Collected Papers, 1981-1991, Cambridge University Press, 1993. Rawls disregarded 
the necessity of the distinction between positive rights and negative rights as early as in 1971. See TJ, 
section 32.  
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such as constitutional protection and judicial review, to make these limits enforceable. 
These institutions in fact constitute parts of the institutional structure we are talking 
about here.  
Before we conclude our presentation of institutionalism as a theory of agency 
formation and a theory of institution building towards liberalization and 
democratization, we need to address two doubts that might have been haunting our 
readers from the very beginning: is the institutionalism presented here treating 
individual persons as only puppets controlled and manipulated by society and its 
institutions? Is the general trend of liberalization and democratization justified by 
institutionalism the same thing as a rationalist prediction of the end of history in 
liberal democracy, or for that matter, any other type of social order?  
The answer to both questions is clearly ―no.‖ To see why this is so, we can 
look at the ideal of liberal democracy, which has been confirmed in institutionalism 
when we treat liberal democracy as a process of liberalization and democratization 
through institution building. It is helpful to view liberal democracy as an ideal state of 
affairs, as long as we admit that the actual realizations of this ideal can differ in 
different times and places, and the realization of the ideal of liberal democracy in no 
sense leads to the end of history. To view liberal democracy as an ideal makes it clear 
to us, creatures living in certain places and certain period of history, what we are 
striving for in our normative construction of institutions. Doing philosophy by 
constructing and justifying certain ideals is a valuable practice endorsed by Rawls as 
constructing ―a realistic utopia.‖
162
 This practice is totally different from a prediction 
or an advertisement of a rationalist end of human history.  
                                               
162 See JF, p. 4, where Rawls says, ―we view political philosophy as realistically utopian: that is, as 
probing the limits of practicable political possibility.‖ Rawls‘s ideal of an overlapping consensus over 
his liberal principles of justice, or a generic liberal principle of justice, is in no sense claimed as the end 
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It is worth noticing that in light of our theory of institutionalism, this ideal of 
liberal democracy can be interpreted as the ideal form of agency formation through 
institution building. From our historically gained vantage point, liberal democracy, as 
an ideal if not in its different realizations in different places, is the highest form of the 
ideal of agency formation that human beings can imagine and can implement in their 
communal life. On the one hand, the ideal of liberal democracy gives every individual 
member of a body politic
163
 a separate, independent and equal status of agency; on the 
other hand, this ideal insists that any level of collective actions should be carried out 
in the name of a corresponding level of collective agency, which is nothing but the 
will of the individual members of that collective agency.
164
 In short, the ideal of 
liberal democracy is the ultimate ideal of agent autonomy at every level of agency 
formation and practical action. If our historical process of institution building leads to 
liberalization and democratization, as has been argued for in institutionalism, then 
ultimately, individual agents are not puppets of social institutions, but the very 
creators of their institutions.  
Something like the above mentioned process of liberalization and 
democratization through institution building, I contend, is the general direction of the 
evolution of human social organization. The ideal of liberal democracy can be 
                                                                                                                                      
of human history, but is only a construction of social ideal from the current state of liberal democratic 
culture. Rawls would never dream of a foreclosure of human history.  
163 Here I am not assuming that nation state is the best form of embodiment of a liberal democratic 
body politic. I leave it open for the possibility of a global body politic in the future, although I believe 
that our current moral psychology may prove to be insufficient to initiate such a global body politic, 
due to the limits in our moral imagination and moral sentiment, if not the limits in our moral 
understanding. Cosmopolitans have proved that at least for some members of our species, moral 
understanding has already reached such a level.    
164 Rawls works out only the principles of justice for liberal democratic nation states as bodies politic. 
He admits that principles of justice for other kinds of organizations, such as families and local 
communities, may deviate from his justice as fairness. What I hope to achieve is to argue that there is a 
general principle of liberal democracy that guides all kinds of collective agencies. To some extent, 
Rawls‘s political liberalism might be interpreted as such a general principle, although his explicit 
intention might not be so.   
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confirmed within institutionalism as an ideal of agency formation, which, even if it 
will never be actually realized in any real circumstance, is a guide for our normative 
institution building. With this we conclude our general presentation of institutionalism 
as a theory of agency formation, and a theory of political development.  
In the next and the last chapter, we will see how the theory of institutionalism, 
and its implication for political development towards liberalization and 
democratization, can be squared with Rawls‘s delicate system. So far we have been 
using Rawls‘s doctrines and arguments at will to promote our own theory. Now it‘s 
time to see whether such a use of Rawls is legitimate or not. By interpreting Rawls‘s 
system as an instantiation of institutionalism, we will make Rawls‘s eloquent 
arguments work for the ultimate purpose of this essay, namely, a culturally neutral 




Chapter IV Rawlsian Institutionalism  
and Political Development 
 
In this chapter I will develop an interpretation of Rawls‘s system according to 
our institutionalism, and argue that Rawls‘s system, as an instantiation of 
institutionalism, can be read as a culturally neutral defense of the ideal of liberal 
democracy. Two reasons make this interpretation an integral part of this essay: first, 
many basic ideas of this essay owe their origin to reading Rawls, and since we have 
been freely using Rawls to support our arguments, there is a legitimate question about 
whether Rawls is really a friend of institutionalism; second, if we can prove that 
Rawls‘s well constructed system is an instantiation of institutionalism, the advantage 
of adopting institutionalism rather than rationalism as a strategy to justify moral and 
political doctrines will be further supported, due to the widely acknowledged 
reputation of Rawls‘s delicate system. I also believe that an institutionalist 
interpretation of Rawls‘s system will provide a better understanding, and a better 
justification, of his system. Rawls‘s own articulations of his system sometimes 
unnecessarily complicate the issues, and invite unnecessary misunderstandings. A 
simple and contrasting enough theory like our institutionalism can bear out the merits 
of Rawls‘s system in a more conspicuous and more defendable way.  
The most important goal we can achieve by an institutionalist interpretation of 
Rawls‘s system is that Rawls‘s well designed arguments for his principles of justice 
can be read as a delicate and convincing justification of the ideal of a liberal 
democratic political order. This chapter tries to abstract from Rawls‘s system a 
culturally neutral justification of the fundamental principles underlying liberal 
democracy, and argues that this justification implies a normative requirement for a 
political development towards liberalization and democratization. Rawls‘s particular 
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principles of justice, and his systematic arguments for them, will only be discussed in 
connection with this Rawlsian justification of democracy. According to our 
institutionalist interpretation, the major contention of Rawls‘s system is not that his 
two principles of justice should be adopted in certain societies, but that some similar 
principles are normatively justified for any sustainable modern society. Understood in 
this way, Rawls‘s justification of liberal democracy will stand, even if we do not 
agree to his particular principles of justice or any particular conclusion.
165
  
The main point of developing an institutionalist interpretation of Rawls is, 
therefore, to bring out the dimension of political development towards a well-ordered 
liberal democratic society implied in Rawls‘s theory of justice. Rawls himself 
suggests in many places that he works only within the tradition of liberal democracy, 
or within the tradition of modern liberal thinking. The basic conceptions Rawls uses 
to develop his theory of justice, such as society as a cooperation system, persons as 
free and equal citizens, and the ideal of a well-ordered society, are all ―fundamental 
ideas familiar from, or implicit in, the public political culture of a democratic 
society.‖
166
 But this practice does not in any sense imply that Rawls‘s justification of 
liberal democracy is only valid for the context of liberal democracy as a western 
tradition.
167
 Even if Rawls‘s expected major audience is only citizens of western or 
                                               
165 In his later thinking, Rawls suggests that his own principles of justice are only ―an example‖ of a 
more general concept, namely, ―political conceptions of justice.‖ (PL, p. xxxviii.) He further argues 
that even if his justice as fairness would not be adopted as an object of overlapping consensus, some 
generic ―liberal political conceptions of justice‖ will be adopted anyway, and they are more or less 
similar to his own conception of justice in that they all specify ―certain rights, liberties, and 
opportunities,‖ ―a special priority for these freedoms,‖ and ―measures assuring all citizens, whatever 
their social position, adequate all-purpose means to make intelligent and effective use of their liberties 
and opportunities.‖ (PL, p. xlviii.) This is why Rawls says that ―justice as fairness is a form of political 
liberalism.‖ (JF, p. 40; see also PL, p. xxxi.)  
166 See JF, p. 27. This point is emphasized throughout Part I of JF, which introduces fundamental ideas 
to be used in Rawls‘s major arguments.  
167 For example, see Ed Wingenbach, ―Unjust Context: the Priority of Stability in Rawls‘s 
Contextualized Theory of Justice,‖ in American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 43, No. 1 (January 
1999).  
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American style of liberal democracies, the attractiveness of his message would not 
necessarily be limited to such an audience. A practical project as it is, Rawls‘s system 
tries to show that a liberal democratic political order can be just and stable, and by 
showing the desirability and feasibility of this ideal to a democratic people, Rawls 
also proposes a political ideal for other peoples. Our institutionalist interpretation of 
Rawls, by providing a universalistic foundation for Rawls‘s system, strengthens this 
legitimate point, and frees Rawls from any suspicion of relativism or contextualism.  
This institutionalist interpretation of Rawls will be worked out in three main 
steps. First, I will prove that Rawls‘s major methodology of justification, the public 
justification of a public conception of justice as the foundation of a social order, 
accords with institutionalism. This is so because such a public justification gives 
priority to social order, and takes the establishment and justification of a public 
conception of justice, which in turn is the foundation of social institutions, as the first 
task of political philosophy. This part is important for establishing a Rawlsian theory 
of political development because the pursuit of a well-ordered society will be shown 
as the normative end of human institution building. Second, I will prove that Rawls‘s 
conception of the moral person is also institutionalist, in the sense that this conception 
of the person is not a pre-institutional conception of human nature, but rather a 
conception informed and constructed by normative engagement with social 
institutions, or ideals of social institutions. This step is necessary because Rawls‘s 
conception of the moral person has been misunderstood so often as an abstract 
conception of the rational person, while our interpretation provides an easy way to 
distance Rawls‘s conception from such a rationalist one. Third, I will argue that 
Rawls‘s proof of liberal democracy as a well-ordered society is a justification of 
 166 
democracy, and this justification will normatively encourage a political development 
towards such a well-ordered society.  
For the convenience of writing and reading, these steps will be further divided 
into smaller sections with subtitles. The first section argues that Rawls has a unified 
project that stays coherent across time, namely, to provide a public justification of a 
public conception of justice, so that a well-ordered society with justice, legitimacy 
and stability can be established and maintained. This project will be demonstrated as 
compatible, if not consciously based on, institutionalism. For the limited purpose of 
this chapter, we will pay more attention to Rawls‘s arguments concerning legitimacy 
and stability, and leave Rawls‘s detailed theory of justice largely aside. The second 
section looks into Rawls‘s central methodology of public justification, and 
distinguishes the concept of ―reasonableness,‖ which is central to a public justification, 
from the concept of truth. This clarification further distances Rawls‘s methodology 
from rationalism, but it also unleashes two possible challenges to Rawls‘s 
methodology. One challenge says that just because a justification is publicly endorsed 
doesn‘t necessarily mean it is normatively binding, the other says that there must be 
some limitations put on how far a public justification can go. These challenges will 
then be addressed in the next four sections. Section Three discusses and rebuts the 
criticism against Rawls from perfectionism, which insists that a pre-determined 
conception of human good or common good must be the guidance for any 
justification of any conception of justice. Section Four links this challenge about 
normativity with the problem of legitimate coercion, and defends Rawls‘s own 
conception of legitimacy. Section Five discusses the other challenge in the name of a 
libertarian conception of inalienable rights, and argues that although Rawls gives the 
liberty principle priority over other concerns of justice, he nevertheless holds a view 
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about rights that is different from libertarianism, or rationalism for that matter. 
Section Six rounds up the main point of these two challenges: if Rawlsian 
institutionalism really doesn‘t rely on any pre-determined conception of human nature, 
wouldn‘t Rawls‘s public justification end up endorsing whatever dominant values a 
society happens to have? Wouldn‘t Rawls‘s theory become a version of cultural 
relativism? By laying out the universalism element in Rawlsian institutionalism, I 
argue that Rawls is not vulnerable to this fundamental charge. This finishes our 
defense of Rawls‘s methodology against two main rationalist criticisms.  
In Section Seven, we explore Rawls‘s conception of the moral person, and 
unite it with our conception of institutional agency established in the previous 
chapters. Section Eight further testifies that Rawls‘s conception of rationality, one of 
two moral powers Rawls defines as belonging to moral persons, is not a rationalist 
conception of human nature, as many influential criticisms of Rawls, such as 
communitarian and cosmopolitan ones, seem to suggest. This defense will be carried 
out with a helpful discussion of the moral power of reasonableness. With all the above 
sections, we will have finished presenting a relatively whole picture of Rawlsian 
institutionalism, and can then turn to the argument that Rawlsian institutionalism 
internally demands a political development towards liberalization and democratization. 
In Section Nine, we argue that ―constructivism,‖ the word Rawls himself uses for his 
methodology, is not as good as ―institutionalism‖ in representing Rawls‘s whole 
system. Section Ten begins the exploration of a Rawlsian theory of political 
development by focusing on Rawls‘s pursuit of a well-ordered society, and argues 
that such a pursuit should be viewed as a universal pursuit for any human society. If 
this institutionalist point can stand up, then a proof of any political ideal to be such a 
well-ordered society would normatively demand a political development towards such 
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an ideal. Section Eleven discusses the Rawlsian ideal of a well-ordered society, a 
liberal democracy or ―deliberative democracy‖ justified as the ultimate ideal of 
political autonomy, and argues that this ideal is compatible with our institutionalist 
ideal of liberal democracy as a balanced power structure, which is the ultimate goal of 
human institution building. This then leads us to the Twelfth section, the conclusive 
section of this chapter, in which we finally integrate Rawlsian institutionalism with 
the theory of institutionalism we have so relentlessly developed in this essay, and unit 
them in a normative demand for a political development towards the ideal of liberal 
democracy.  
 
Rawls’s Institutionalist Project 
This essay adopts the following basic reading of Rawls. Rawls‘s theory across 
time is a project of unity, a project to find a public conception of justice to support a 
well-ordered society. His emphasis does shift from the early years (till TJ) to his later 
years (since his Dewey Lectures, accumulated in PL), in the sense that early Rawls 
concentrates more on defending the justice of his conception, while later Rawls 
concentrates more on the legitimacy and stability of his conception, or of the political 
order supported by his conception. This shift, however, is internally required by his 
ultimate target, namely, a well-ordered society. To secure a well-ordered society with 
his conception of justice, the crucial test is not to prove that his conception satisfies 
the requirements of justice, but to prove that his conception, and the social institutions 
based on his conception, can be accepted and internalized by the members of the 
targeted society, therefore can secure legitimacy and stability. What justice requires 
for people varies across the board and changes over time, but without a largely shared 
system of social institutions, a well-ordered society cannot be achieved or maintained. 
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Rawls‘s proof that a liberal democratic political order supported by his conception of 
justice, or any similar conception, can be a well-ordered society therefore constitutes a 
justification of the ideal of liberal democracy.  
Based on this reading, this essay focuses more on Rawls‘s arguments for 
legitimacy and stability, and much less on his early arguments about justice. Indeed, 
this essay treats Rawls‘s legitimacy and stability arguments as his major justification 
for liberal democracy, and insists that his justification is an institutionalist one. In this 
sense, early Rawls is closer to rationalism, and Rawls only gets closer to 
institutionalism in his later, more mature works. His belief in the possibility that 
people who live under social institutions backed by his conception of justice as 
fairness will adopt a Kantian world view, for example, betrays his early tendency 
towards rationalism, while his recognition of the fact of reasonable pluralism, and his 
later theory of public reason, embody the spirit of institutionalism.  
This interpretation is a very uncommon one, yet it accords with Rawls‘s own 
words. In this essay, we will develop this interpretation on the basis of a close 
examination of Rawls‘s texts. In this particular section, we first show how Rawls‘s 
main project is compatible with the institutionalism we have established so far.  
The unity of Rawls‘s system across time hangs on his central concern to 
provide a publicly justifiable conception of justice so that a well-ordered society is 
realizable. This central concern is compatible with the priority institutionalism gives 
to social order through universal internalization of unified social norms.  
Rawls himself is always clear about the unity of his philosophical project. For 
example, when he introduces the ―major change‖ from ―comprehensive philosophical 
and moral doctrines‖ to ―conceptions limited to the domain of the political,‖ he insists 
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that ―otherwise these lectures [of PL] take the structure and content of Theory [TJ] to 
remain substantially the same.‖
168
  
What remains the same through Rawls‘s philosophical career is also clear 
from his own words. In the beginning of TJ, Rawls says:  
a society is a more or less self-sufficient association of persons who in their 
relations to one another recognize certain rules of conduct as binding and who 
for the most part act in accordance with them…A set of principles is required 
for choosing among the various social arrangements which determine this 
division of advantages and for underwriting an agreement on the proper 
distributive shares. These principles are the principles of social justice: they 
provide a way of assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions of society 
and they define the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social 
cooperation.‖ Rawls‘s major goal is therefore to find and justify such a ―public 
conception of justice,‖ which is to be knowingly accepted by every person in 
this society, and is to be knowingly followed by its basic institutions. This 





It is worth noticing that by ―a society,‖ Rawls does not mean a modern constitutional 
democratic society. In fact Rawls believes that every society needs a shared 
conception of justice to settle social conflicts and to facilitate social cooperation. For 
example, Rawls says that ―Some measure of agreement in conceptions of justice is, 
however, not the only prerequisite for a viable human community.‖
170
 From this we 
can of course infer that a shared conception of justice is ONE prerequisite for ANY 
viable society. For another example, he cites Aristotle‘s view with sympathy: 
―Aristotle remarks that it is a peculiarity of men that they possess a sense of the just 
and the unjust and that their sharing a common understanding of justice makes a polis. 
Analogously one might say, in view of our discussion, that a common understanding 
of justice as fairness makes a constitutional democracy.‖
171
 In its literal meaning, this 
paragraph implies that a shared conception of justice is necessary for every human 
                                               
168 PL, pp. xvii-xviii.  
169 TJ, pp. 4-5.  
170 TJ, p. 5.  
171 TJ, p. 214.  
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society if social order is to be realized among its members; what is special for a 
constitutional democracy is only the particularity of the conception of justice it is 
made of. In Rawls‘s view, the shared conception of justice for a constitutional 
democracy is, or should be, his two principles of justice, or more broadly, his 
conception of justice as fairness.  
Another point to be noticed is that by providing and justifying a conception of 
justice for a constitutional democracy, Rawls‘s major goal is not to justify 
constitutional democracy from an external point of view, or against other forms of 
political order, but to prove that a constitutional democracy, if it is based on his 
conception of justice, can be a well-ordered society. This justification is from an 
internal point of view, from the perspective of a normal citizen living within such a 
society. To put this point in another way: if we can say that Rawls does provide a 
justification of democracy in his theory of justice, then this justification is done in the 
argument that a constitutional democracy following his conception of justice, justice 
as fairness, can be a well-ordered society, namely, ―a society in which (1) everyone 
accepts and knows that the others accept the same principles of justice, and (2) the 
basic social institutions generally satisfy and are generally known to satisfy these 
principles.‖
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 Understood in this way, the stability argument as presented in Part III 
of TJ, and in the whole book of PL and other later writings, together with his 
argument from legitimacy, are really Rawls‘s major arguments for liberal democracy. 
Rawls‘s argument for the justice of his principles is, of course, also essential for his 
system, but in light of his major concern for a well-ordered society, the justice 
argument is somewhat peripheral. Surely we can develop, as Rawls repeatedly 
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recognizes, other conceptions of justice rather than his justice as fairness to support a 
well-ordered society.  
Because of this interpretation, Rawls‘s arguments for his principles being just 
will be touched upon only when doing so is necessary, while the focus of this chapter 
will be Rawls‘s legitimacy and stability arguments. We can also use a simplified 
name to refer to both, namely, Rawls‘s stability argument. Rawls‘s legitimacy 
argument, centered on the liberal principle of legitimacy, is only a condition for his 
stability argument. For that matter, a different conception of legitimacy would work 
perfectly for his stability argument if satisfactory justification is provided. The main 
goal for Rawls‘s system is, ultimately, to secure a well-ordered society, or to secure 
the stability of a conception of justice, or the stability of a social order supported by 
such a conception of justice. Different peoples in different societies may adopt 
different conceptions of justice or different conceptions of legitimacy, but there is an 
objective goal towards a well-ordered society that is applicable to any human society. 
In institutionalism, as well in Rawls‘s system, the ultimate test for any form of human 
social order is simply this: is the system of social institutions, or the conception of 
justice supporting such a system, stable enough to maintain a well-ordered society?  
For this reason, Rawls‘s justification of the ideal of liberal democracy as a 
well-ordered society is a universalist justification, not a contextual or relativist self-
proclamation, of the ideal of liberal democracy. To be sure, the stability argument is 
not an argument for constitutional democracy as against other possible regimes, but 
an argument for the stability of a liberal democracy supported by his conception of 
justice, justice as fairness. In this sense Rawls‘s stability argument is an ―internal‖ 
argument. By contrast, a rationalist justification of democracy would first provide a 
pre-institutional conception of human nature, such as the love of freedom, and then 
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show by comparison that democracy serves this human nature better than other 
political regimes. For rationalism, there is a neutral or transcendental standard, by 
which every type of political regime is to be judged. Rawls‘s ―internal‖ justification 
of democracy, on the other hand, doesn‘t rely on a transcendental standard to 
determine what conception of justice best serves our human reason, but rather leaves 
the conception of justice for a social cooperation system to be determined by the 
involved agents, with an eye on their own social circumstances.  
Rawls illustrates this contrast between the traditional methodology of 
justification and his own methodology of justification by asking these questions:  
How are the fair terms of cooperation to be determined? Are they simply laid 
down by some outside authority distinct from the persons cooperating? Are they, 
for example, laid down by God‘s law? Or are these terms to be recognized by 
these persons as fair by reference to their knowledge of an independent moral 
order? For example, are they recognized as required by natural law, or by a 
realm of values known by rational intuition? Or are these terms established by 
an undertaking among those persons themselves in the light of what they regard 
as their reciprocal advantage?‖ Rawls then answers the question: ―Justice as 





Speaking of a well-ordered society, it is important to notice that although 
every society has its own public conception of justice to some extent, it is not true to 
say that every public conception of justice supports a well-ordered society. We must 
recognize the difference between a public conception of justice and a stable 
conception of justice. Any ―viable human community‖ has a public conception of 
justice, but having such a public conception of justice doesn‘t automatically make a 
                                               
173 See PL, pp. 22-23. To be acknowledged, Rawls doesn‘t use ―rationalism‖ in the meaning I define, 
nor does he use the word ―institutionalism‖ to describe his own methodology. The ―rational 
intuitionism‖ in Rawls‘s usage is close to what I call ―rationalism,‖ but ―rationalism‖ can also be used 
to refer to some other doctrines or methodologies criticized by Rawls, such as perfectionism, 
utilitarianism, etc. About the term ―institutionalism,‖ Rawls‘s own word ―constructivism‖ is the closest 
relative. Besides necessary clarifications, I will not systematically discuss the relationship between all 
these names. The main point is to distinguish Rawls from such doctrines or methodologies, and show 
the major differences. No doubt this will lead to a rather radical interpretation of Rawls‘s system, but 
the hope is that this interpretation will present Rawls‘s justification of liberal democracy in a more 
unified and more perspicuous way.  
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society a well-ordered society. To be able to support a well-ordered society, a 
conception of justice must be stable, ―that is, when institutions are just (as defined by 
this conception), those taking part in these arrangements acquire the corresponding 
sense of justice and desire to do their part in maintaining them.‖ Also, different 
conceptions of justice may have different levels of stability: ―One conception of 
justice is more stable than another if the sense of justice that it tends to generate is 
stronger and more likely to override disruptive inclinations and if the institutions it 
allows foster weaker impulses and temptations to act unjustly.‖
174
 By arguing that his 
own conception of justice, or some similar conception of justice, can support a well-
ordered society, Rawls not only accomplishes a defense of the ideal of liberal 
democracy, but also poses a challenge to all human beings who would prefer a 
different political ideal: can your conception of justice support a well-ordered society?  
Rawls‘s later concentration on the stability argument is therefore not a 
deviation from his theory of justice, as some commentators would argue. The major 
goal of Rawls‘s theory of justice, to repeat, is to provide a conception of justice that 
can support a well-ordered society. To realize this goal, simply arguing that his 
conception of justice is just is not enough; he must also prove that the society based 
on his conception of justice is a well-ordered society. This makes the stability 
argument the final and decisive part of his theory. Indeed the third and last part of TJ 
is about the stability argument; Rawls later wrote PL only because he found the third 
                                               
174 See TJ, p. 398. To be noticed, ―stability‖ in Rawls‘s work means two connected ideas: stability of a 
conception of justice and stability of a political society. The former means that citizens of a society 
generally accept the conception of justice governing their basic social institutions; the latter means that 
a political society is generally free from violent contestations and variations. Rawls more often talks 
about the stability in the former sense, but he believes that there is an internal connection between these 
two senses of stability: political stability is usually secured by the stability of conceptions of justice. 
Thus understood, Rawls‘s conception of stability is closely connected with his liberal principle of 
legitimacy, and together they have a priority position in his looking for, and justification of, the 
conception of justice for a well-ordered society. For a general survey of Rawls‘s thoughts on stability, 
see George Klosko, ―Rawls‘s Argument from Political Stability,‖ in Columbia Law Review, Vol. 94, 
No. 6 (October 1994).  
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part of TJ doesn‘t provide a satisfactory stability argument under a realistic condition 
of reasonable pluralism. Even after this so-called ―political turn,‖ Rawls still focused 
on the major concern of his theory. Here I quote several passages to confirm this 
continuity: ―a main aim of PL is to show that the idea of the well-ordered society in 
Theory may be formulated so as to take account of the fact of reasonable pluralism. 
To do this it transforms the doctrine of justice as fairness as presented in Theory into a 
political conception of justice that applies to the basic structure of society.‖ ―Thus, to 
repeat, the problem of political liberalism is to work out a political conception of 
political justice for a (liberal) constitutional democratic regime that a plurality of 
reasonable doctrines, both religious and nonreligious, liberal and nonliberal, may 
endorse for the right reasons.‖
175
 The main point of PL, therefore, is that even with the 
permanent fact of pluralism of reasonable doctrines that characterizes modern 
constitutional democracies, his conception of justice can still support a well-ordered 
society. Rawls‘s final statement of his system also confirms this central concern: ―the 
principles of justice provide a response to the fundamental question of political 
philosophy for a constitutional democratic regime. That question is: what is the most 
acceptable political conception of justice for specifying the fair terms of cooperation 
between citizens regarded as free and equal and as both reasonable and rational, and 
(we add) as normal and fully cooperating members of society over a complete life, 
from one generation to the next?‖
176
  
With these quotes, we end this section and feel now confident that Rawls‘s 
system is compatible with our theory of institutionalism, and has nothing to do with 
contextualism or relativism.  
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Rawlsian Institutionalism and Possible Challenges 
Rawls‘s life project is to discover, and to justify, a public (and political) 
conception of justice, so that the basic institutions of a society can be established and 
adjusted according to this publicly endorsed conception, and social order can be 
secured and stabilized. It is for this purpose that Rawls‘s whole project is oriented: the 
design of the original position, as the central justification device in Rawls‘s system, is 
an ideal forum of public justification, while his later theory of public reason, as the 
central contention of Rawls‘s later philosophy, is a more realistic version of such a 
forum. Even Rawls‘s liberal principle of legitimacy, the central concept of his 
political liberalism, is meant to carry out this idea of public justification: it says that 
―our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is 
exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may 
reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to 
them as reasonable and rational.‖
177
 Indeed, this liberal principle of legitimacy is 
presupposed throughout Rawls‘s project of providing a publicly justifiable conception 
of justice for a well-ordered society; if people don‘t generally have a tendency to obey 
social norms they recognize as just or legitimate, a public conception of justice 
wouldn‘t be able to maintain a well-ordered society anyway. In that case Rawls‘s 
whole argumentation for the possibility of a well-ordered society would be misplaced, 
and Rawls should instead seek for other devices, such as power dominance, to pursue 
a well-ordered society. The ultimate goal of Rawls‘s project, therefore, is to secure a 
well-ordered society with a conception of justice that is publicly justifiable to the 
members of this society.  
                                               
177 See PL, p. 217.  
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Central to Rawls‘s system, and central to our institutionalist interpretation of 
this system, is such a public and political justification of the basic principles of justice 
for a well-ordered society. The first and foremost goal of institutionalism is to achieve 
social order, including moral, political and legal order, through justification and 
internalization of social norms. To achieve social order, institutionalism believes that 
we need social norms to guide social actions and interactions, so that possible 
conflicts in practical actions and interactions among relevant social agents are 
peacefully solved through justified procedures and institutions. In order to make these 
social norms really effective, institutionalism believes that these norms need to be 
justified to, and internalized by, all or most involved agents, and they need to be 
realized in social institutions defining basic rights and duties for these agents, so that 
the legitimacy and the stability of the system of social institutions are secured.
178
 All 
these doctrines of institutionalism fit very well with Rawls‘s pursuit of a public 
conception of justice. We can thus call Rawls‘s methodology of justification 
―Rawlsian institutionalism.‖  
The benefits of this concentration on a publicly justifiable conception of 
justice can be revealed by a comparison between public justification and non-public 
justification of moral and political doctrines. A non-public justification of moral and 
political doctrines centers on the ―truth‖ of these doctrines, whereas a public 
                                               
178 An early effort to develop a theory about social order and social norms can be found in Jovan Brkic, 
Norm and Order: An Investigation into Logic, Semantics, and the Theory of Law and Morals, New 
York: Humanities Press, 1970. This work includes many intuitively attractive comments on this subject, 
such as this one: ―no state can exist and be sustained without coercive machinery. And such a coercive 
machinery cannot be set up without a normative order. And the crystallization of such a normative 
order, together with the formalization of a part of it as the legal order of the state, must be independent 
or sovereign; otherwise it would be a part of another normative order.‖ See p. 99.  
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justification relies on the reasonableness of these doctrines, and refrains from 
assigning truth values to these doctrines.
179
  
The concept of truth has a transcendental dimension, while the concept of 
reasonableness intrinsically forms an internal point of view. We can say that certain 
theories may turn out to be false, even though they are now universally accepted by 
scientists. The concept of reasonableness, on the other hand, is internally related with 
people‘s opinions. What is reasonable is always reasonable to somebody. Although 
we can also say that a doctrine that is reasonable to one group of people may not be 
reasonable to another group, or may not be reasonable to the same group in the future, 
the final criterion of reasonableness for certain group of people lies within this group 
for the present time. This is not to say that the concept of reasonableness is a closed 
concept. People‘s ideas about reasonableness do evolve across time and vary for 
different individuals and groups, and different groups of people can and do influence 
each other on what is reasonable, but the justification of reasonableness does not, or in 
any case should not, seek for any authority outside human communities.  
To illustrate this difference between the concept of truth and the concept of 
reasonableness with an example, we can see that utilitarianism, in the sense that it 
encourages people to act according to a neutral and maximized utility index, does not 
really accord with the concept of reasonableness, although it may use the word 
―reasonable‖ to define its central tenets. Utilitarianism can be true, but it is 
unreasonable to expect, as utilitarianism does, that people would not care more about 
themselves or their perceived relatives and friends, and take an absolute neutral or 
objective perspective to maximize the aggregate or average utilities in their actions. In 
                                               
179 For Rawls‘s distinction between the concept of truth and the concept of reasonableness, see Lecture 
III of PL, especially section 8.  
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this sense, utilitarianism might be a transcendental truth, but it is not a reasonable 
doctrine. On the other hand, Rawls‘s conception of public justification is always done 
from an internal point of view, by citizens living in a society to citizens living in the 
same society. This internal perspective in no sense prohibits real communication 
between different societies, but even that kind of communication needs to be done 
from an internal point of view, namely, no society should force its own conception of 
justice to another society simply in the name of objective truth.  
This difference between the concept of truth and the concept of reasonableness, 
of course, should not be exaggerated. To some extent, we can say that in order to find 
truths, we have nothing to rely on except human epistemological efforts. On the other 
hand, whether we can persuade people with reasonable ideas very often relies on the 
truth values of our assertions. To argue that people need to take actions to reduce 
greenhouse emission, for example, we must prove that greenhouse emission does 
have a negative and humanly undesirable influence on the environment. To some 
extent, therefore, appeals to truth involve appeals to reasonableness in people‘s minds, 
while appeals to reasonableness involve appeals to objective facts and therefore truth.  
Even though these two concepts are not totally separate, they are still different 
concepts with different practical consequences. When some doctrines are deemed 
untrue, for example, there is little room for negotiation or compromise, whereas when 
some doctrines are judged unreasonable, the holders of such doctrines do not 
necessarily feel cornered. Furthermore, the concept of reasonableness internally 
forbids the practice of forcing other people to agree to some moral and political 
doctrines on the basis that they are true no matter what they might think. In both cases, 
the concept of reasonableness leaves much larger space for compromise and toleration. 
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This space justifies our choice of using the concept of reasonableness rather than the 
concept of truth in public justification of moral and political doctrines.
180
  
Rawls‘s idea of reasonableness has a very important role to play in his 
argumentation. We will look further into this idea when we discuss Rawls‘s 
conception of the moral person. For now, we need to be aware of several possible 
challenges to Rawls‘s focusing on public justification, and the priority Rawls gives to 
social order. Addressing these challenges will further illustrate the advantages of 
Rawlsian institutionalism.  
To the priority that Rawlsian institutionalism gives to social order, and to 
public justification, there are many possible challenges, of which two deserve 
responses in this essay. One challenge concerns the problem of normativity: it says 
that just because some moral and political doctrines are publicly accepted doesn‘t 
mean that they have normative force. The other challenge concerns the problem of 
rights, or the normative limits to institutional designs: shouldn‘t the pursuit of social 
order and public justification be limited by personal rights? Isn‘t it the case that no 
social order that violates personal rights is justifiable?  
These two challenges, I will argue, are both based on rationalism. Addressing 
them is part of our effort to distance Rawlsian institutionalism from rationalism. I will 
illustrate these two challenges from the examples of perfectionism and libertarianism 
in the next several sections. By doing this, we address these challenges and further 
clarify the merits of Rawlsian institutionalism.  
 
                                               
180 Now does this distinction reflect the dichotomy of fact and value? Does this distinction presuppose 
the so-called naturalist fallacy? Does institutionalism ultimately result in emotivism? In the sense that 
institutionalism assumes that human beings are capable of being reasonable, we can say that morality, 
according to institutionalism, is based on the fact human beings do have moral sentiments. But these 
questions are difficult to answer, and will not be systematically addressed in this essay.  
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The Challenge from Perfectionism 
A perfectionist
181
 may challenge the sufficiency of the institutionalist 
understanding of the primary function of social institutions. The perfectionist believes 
that it trivializes social institutions to say that the primary function of social 
institutions is to secure social order. He would rather say that the primary function of 
social institutions is to better pursue what people want to realize in themselves with 
respect to a good life, especially those things they cannot realize by themselves 
independently of social unions. In other words, for perfectionism, which is a 
teleological doctrine, the ultimate goal of societies is the realization of the public good, 
or more specifically, the perfection of human excellence.  
A perfectionist can challenge an institutionalist with this question: if the 
primary function of social institutions is to achieve and maintain social order, is a 
structure of social institutions automatically legitimate if it does maintain social order? 
This question is challenging because for a perfectionist, the primary function of social 
institutions and the primary reason to legitimize these social institutions should be the 
same thing, and in his own theory, the perfectionist can stay consistent on these two 
fronts. For a perfectionist, social institutions are created for the purpose of achieving 
human excellence, and the primary reason for social institutions to be justified or 
legitimized is that they are really working for this purpose.  
The institutionalist, of course, can stay consistent too. He can claim that since 
the primary function of social institutions is to achieve and to maintain social order, 
social institutions should be justified or legitimized first and foremost in terms of this 
function, that is, in terms of the test whether they can really achieve and maintain 
social order. But in order to avoid admitting that whatever society can maintain social 
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order is legitimate or justified, the institutionalist can emphasize the difference 
between an apparent, short term social order, and a real, self-sustainable, and long 
term social order. Short term social orders are not ―real‖ orders because when people 
perceive a social order as a short term deal, they will very likely choose the strategy 
of non-compliance or withdrawal, which in turn will further destabilize such a short 
term social order. You can prove the legitimacy of a structure of social institutions 
only if you can publicly prove to all or most of the subjects of this structure that this 
structure can secure social order in the long run, or to use Rawlsian words, that this 
structure is stable, for all citizens in their whole life and for generations of citizens to 
come.  
Now what does this criterion mean? The institutionalist would say that 
stability of a social order in the long run requires that its social institutions can gain 
the endorsement from the majority of its subjects, if not from all of them. The 
assumption here is Rawls‘s liberal principle of legitimacy: if people do not agree to 
some institutions, they will very likely to disobey when there is a chance, and will 
likely to revolt when the deterrence against revolt is perceived as low and the chance 
of success is deemed high. This assumption does not say that when people agree to 
some institutions, they will ALWAYS comply with these institutions automatically. 
The free rider problem does exist, which is why institutional enforcement is necessary 
even for a perfectly just society. To assure everybody that other persons will also 
comply with the same institutions, coercive enforcement of social norms is always 
required.
182
 But it is a tested moral psychology that if people don‘t perceive certain 
rules as fair or just, they are unlikely to follow these rules voluntarily. As a result, 
these social institutions would be unstable in the long run.  
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This tendency reveals from the opposite side the deep faith in our sense of 
justice within Rawlsian institutionalism. One major contribution Rawls has made to 
the social contract tradition is that for Rawls, the reason for people to be able to make 
contracts with each other and stick to the contract is that they have a sense of 
justice:
183
 when they recognize the contract as fair or just, they have a tendency to 
stay loyal to the contract. The whole point of making a social contract would be lost if 
people don‘t have this tendency. Social contract theory, according to Rawls, should 
not be understood as founded only on people‘s rational power of contriving and 
pursuing their own good. Instead, moral agents, according to Rawls, have a power of 
being morally motivated by reasonable social norms. This doesn‘t mean that there is a 
general definition for reasonableness,
184
 or that what is reasonable is the same in 
every circumstance. But as made explicit in our presentation of institutionalism, the 
motivation from reasonableness is nevertheless an inalienable motivation if we want 
to understand social norms as reasons of actions.  
Institutionalism further believes that without such a confidence in people‘s 
moral tendency, no moral or political doctrine can ever be justified anyway. On this 
issue institutionalism runs directly against those philosophers who claim that they can 
derive people‘s moral sense from the rationality of contriving and pursuing self-
interest alone. For institutionalism, rationality and reasonableness are two separate 
motivations with two separate sources. Consideration of rationality usually provides 
us widely open options, but consideration of reasonableness is usually more certain. 
As Douglass North puts it, ―institutions have been devised by human beings to create 
                                               
183 See Rawls, ―The Sense of Justice,‖ in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 72, No. 3 (July 1963), for a 
―psychological construction‖ of our sense of justice; it is also collected in CP.  
184 Rawls believes that the idea of reasonableness is not generally definable. See JF, p. 82.  
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order and to reduce uncertainty in exchange.‖
185
 Indeed, considerations of 
reasonableness are usually guided by rules or norms set out, explicitly or inexplicitly, 
by the community or society, not by individuals thinking alone. In this sense social 
norms are by nature social contracts, not individual choices.  
To some extent, perfectionism is a version of rationalism. As expressed by 
Thomas Hurka, perfectionism  
starts from an account of the good human life, or the intrinsically desirable 
life…certain properties, it says, constitute human nature or are definitive of 
humanity—they make humans humans. The good life, it then says, develops 
these properties to a high degree or realizes what is central to human nature. 
Different versions of the theory may disagree about what the relevant properties 
are and so disagree about the content of the good life. But they share the 





In this sense, perfectionism, as a political philosophy, is based on a conception of 
human nature as rationality. For the perfectionist, ―public good‖ is the goal of social 
institutions, and only the realization of ―public good‖ can legitimize social institutions. 
This point does make sense in many contexts, but the problem is that the conceptions 
of public good certain institutional structures are supposed to pursue are in a deeper 
sense constructed by these institutional structures. The integrity of a country‘s 
territory, for example, is definitely a public good for that nation state. But this public 
good is conceivable only when you do have the institutional structure named ―nation 
states.‖ When Quebec pursued its independence from Canada, the public good of 
Quebec and the public good of Canada are obviously different, and Canada cannot 
persuade Quebec by using the public good argument.
187
 You can pursue the public 
good of a firm only if you do have a firm, or you do have institutional structures, such 
                                               
185 See Douglass North, ―Institutions,‖ in The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter 
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186 See Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism, Oxford University Press, p. 3.  
187 For a discussion of the issue of secession, see Allen Buchanan, ―Theories of Secession,‖ in 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Winter 1997), pp. 31-61.  
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as corporate laws and property laws, to make it possible to build a firm. In 
institutionalism, the public good of a collective agency is to some extent determined 
by the construction of this agency through social institutions.  
It doesn‘t make sense to say that institutions are built up to maximize utilities 
or public or private good until you have a conception of these goods, yet very often 
you need social institutions to define these goods in the first place. The fundamental 
problem of rationalism, whether it is in the form of perfectionism or utilitarianism,
188
 
is that it takes rational interests, collective or individual, as pre-institutionally defined. 
A rationalist always ask the misconceived question: given the rational interests, what 
institutional structures can best realize them? To this rationalist question, 
institutionalism answers that there are no given interests to be maximized until you 
have certain institutional structures that define these interests. Even if there are certain 
―primary goods‖ that a rational person would take as her basic interests, how she 
understands and pursues these goods are still framed by social institutions.
189
 The 
major function of social institutions, according to institutionalism, is not to fulfill any 
particular conception of rational interests for any particular units of individuals, but to 
maintain social order in the long run.
190
 We build up social institutions or social 
                                               
188 About perfectionism, Rawls thinks the problem to it is that ―the parties [in the original position] do 
not share a conception of the good by reference to which the fruitions of their powers or even the 
satisfaction of their desires can be evaluated.‖ (TJ, p. 288) Rawls‘s own principles of justice ―manage 
to define an ideal of the person without invoking a prior standard of human excellence.‖ (TJ, p. 287) 
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54) Nevertheless, these primary goods are not supposed to be maximized by institutional arrangements 
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Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good,‖ in Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Autumn 
1988); also collected in CP.  
190 When Rawls takes justice as ―the first virtue of social institutions,‖ when he gives the securing of 
justice the priority over the pursuit of the good, and when he uses the liberal principle of legitimacy as 
the major argumentation structure, as is shown in his argument from the original position and his 
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norms to build mutual trust among people, therefore to secure social order, and we 
adjust and improve social institutions to address new challenges to social order 
ensuing from new social practices, such as the challenges brought up by Protestantism, 
nationalism, industrialization, and the information age. When new practical actions 
become possible, new social norms are called upon to regulate and enable them.  
The Rawlsian reply to perfectionism, or to any doctrine demanding the 
maximization of any sense of public good, is therefore this one: there is nothing 
wrong in pursuing the public good, but this pursuit should always be restrained by a 
public conception of justice, and social institutions based on this public conception. 
Rawls stresses this point when he discusses the ―common good idea of justice‖ in LP:  
the common aim or end (should there be one) is what the society as a whole tries 
to achieve for itself or its members. The common aim or end affects what 
persons receive and their well-being. In the common good idea of justice the 
pursuit of this common aim is to be encouraged, but is not to be maximized in 
and of itself, but rather maximized consistent with the restrictions specified by 
honoring the steps in the consultation procedure, which provides the 





In the end, Rawls is not against the concept of the public good per se, but against the 
perfectionist or any rationalist understanding of the public good as pre-institutionally 
defined.  
 
The Problem of Normativity in Institutionalism 
In a deeper sense, the challenge posed by perfectionism against 
institutionalism touches on the problem of normativity: how social norms could have 
normative powers, or why certain social norms should be obeyed. As mentioned 
                                                                                                                                      
argument from public reason, he is actually arguing that long term stability of social orders is the 
primary function of social institution. This point has been made clear so far in this chapter; what 
follows will further clarify this point to its accuracy.  
191 See LP, p. 71.  
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before, perfectionism believes that a structure of social institutions deserves the 
obedience of its subjects because it promotes their rational good, namely, the 
development of their human nature, or at least the good part of human nature, or 
human perfection. For institutionalism, however, since there is no pre-institutionally 
defined human nature to guide our institution building, perfectionism is not a good 
strategy to justify or to legitimize social institutions.  
Public justification of social institutions, the justification method of 
institutionalism, doesn‘t rely on any pre-institutionally defined interest to be 
maximized. It says that no matter what interests people may happen to have, no matter 
what conception of the good people may happen to harbor, they need to work out a 
conception of justice that can gain the majority support, if not the universal support, 
from the citizens of their society. The legitimacy of an institutional structure, or the 
normative power of a system of social norms, comes only from such a public 
justification of the basic principles behind these institutions, and the universal 
internalization of these institutions or norms thereafter. Institutionalism doesn‘t seek 
any further origin of normativity.  
It is worth noticing that the problem of normativity is not only about justice, 
but also about legitimate coercion. The problem asks two questions: how social norms 
gain normative power over the relevant subjects, and why people should be forced to 
obey these norms if they choose not to. To both questions, institutionalism answers 
that people should comply with social norms because they would have agreed to these 
norms if they had thought about them in their mature deliberation. Here we may need 
to make a distinction between actual consent and hypothetical consent, whose 
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normative force may not be the same, as Dworkin famously argues.
192
 But regardless 
of the internal difficulties of the consent theory of normativity, the major challenge it 
must face is that even if people did give actual consent to certain social norms, they 
may still have reasons, or feel temptations, to violate them. It is here we need to call 
just coercion into place. As Rawls argues,  
It is reasonable to assume that even in a well-ordered society the coercive 
powers of government are to some degree necessary for the stability of social 
cooperation. For although men know that they share a common sense of justice 
and that each wants to adhere to the existing arrangements, they may 
nevertheless lack full confidence in one another. They may suspect that some 
are not doing their part, and so they may be tempted not to do theirs. The 
general awareness of these temptations may eventually cause the scheme to 
break down…For this reason alone, a coercive sovereign is presumably always 
necessary, even though in a well-ordered society sanctions are not severe and 




Institutional enforcement, in this sense, not only makes sure that social institutions are 
obeyed, but also communicates this message to the people who are subject to these 
institutions.  
Social norms, assuming that they have passed the test of justice in a public 
justification to their subjects, are normatively binding in two senses: if people comply 
with these social norms out of their sense of justice, then the normative force of these 
social norms could be said to come from their moral attractiveness; if some persons, 
due to unnamed reasons, do not comply with these just norms, then the enforcement 
apparatus of the institutional structure that is based on these norms is there to 
legitimately demand their compliance and to levy retribution in cases of violations. 
Obviously, the first case shouldn‘t concern us so much, since there the normative 
force of social norms automatically carries the tide. We do not need to go any further 
into the details about people‘s moral psychology and ask why on earth they would 
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comply with social norms they consent to. Once we assume that people do have a 
sense of justice, this problem goes away. It is the second case that concerns us: how to 
justify coercion against practical agents who violate the justifiable social norms based 
on a justifiable public conception of justice.  
The problem about legitimate coercion is a problem about how to justify 
coercion of an institutional structure to its subjects. In institutionalism, as well as in 
Rawls‘s system, this legitimacy problem is solved in the public justification of the 
basic principles of justice behind those social institutions, and the universal or 
majoritarian acceptance and internalization of these institutions or norms thereafter by 
the people who are subject to the rule of these institutions. To demand people‘s 
compliance with social institutions, or with the authorities created by these institutions, 
we have no reason other than that the actions of these authorities, and the social 
institutions behind them, are actually publicly justifiable. When such a public 
justification is secured for a conception of justice and the institutions based on it, the 
coercion of this institutional structure from the authorities created by these institutions 
will be legitimized, and people living in this society will have a coherent and unified 
system of social institutions to internalize. Such a public justification and 
internalization will then secure a stable social order. As time moves and circumstance 
changes, new rounds of justification and internalization will be necessary, but so long 
as this process can be carried out through the procedure mentioned above, long term 
stability can be achieved.  
 
The Challenge from Libertarianism and the Problem of Liberty 
Another challenge against the institutionalism‘s primary concern with social 
order comes from libertarianism. A libertarian believes that the major purpose of 
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social institutions is to protect the liberties or rights individual persons have prior to 
any social arrangements. Libertarianism challenges institutionalism, or any political 
philosophy that justifies substantial institutional redistribution, by the argument that 
these pre-institutional rights, therefore the dignity of moral persons, are unduly 
violated in the name of social order. For a libertarian, ―no one has a right to something 
whose realization requires certain uses of things and activities that other people have 
rights and entitlements over.‖ Individuals are not ―instruments or resources,‖ but 
―persons having individual rights with the dignity this constitutes.‖
194
 Any social 
cooperation must be ―voluntary‖ cooperation among such individuals.  
A libertarian would disagree with Rawls and institutionalism over the primacy 
of social order. For the libertarian, social order would be meaningless if personal 
freedoms are not secured. The goal of everything about society is, or should be, 
personal liberties, while social order is only a means for protecting and realizing 
personal freedoms, not an end by itself. For this reason, a libertarian is more 
concerned with limiting the power of social institutions than with creating and 
maintaining social institutions. Any violations of personal freedoms are internally 
unjust, even if they are done in the name of the society as a whole. To use Nozick‘s 
words, ―Individuals have rights, and there are things which no person or group may 
do to them (without violating their rights). So strong and far-reaching are these rights 
that they raise the question of what, if anything, the state and its officials may do.‖
195
  
There are two issues involved in the challenge posed by libertarianism against 
institutionalism, one is about the problem of normativity as we discussed before, the 
                                               
194 See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Basic Books, 1974, p. 238, 334, respectively.  
195 See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Basic Books, 1974, p. ix.  
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other is about the origins of rights or freedoms. We will deal with these two issues in 
order.  
Libertarianism seems to suggest that the normative force of any social 
institution must come from their being respectful of personal rights, which exist prior 
to any social arrangements. In this sense it is a form of rationalism: it requires a pre-
institutional conception of human nature to normatively empower social institutions.  
To distinguish institutionalism from libertarianism, it is important to recognize 
that when an institutionalist says that the problem of normativity doesn‘t need an 
answer beyond people‘s endorsement and internalization, he is not talking about 
individual persons thinking rationally and voluntarily independent of any influence 
from institutions. Remember that institutionalism doesn‘t rely on such a concept of 
the person; rather, the institutionalist concept of the person is that people understand 
themselves, and understand each other as human beings,
196
 with the help from their 
understanding of social norms. Modern western societies, for example, have an 
individualist conception of persons, but in history, western people used to have 
different understandings of persons. Western feudal societies, for example, supported 
a conception of the person attached to familial origin and class of birth. These two 
conceptions of persons are both constructed within an institutional background. The 
differences in institutional structures engender the differences in conceptions of 
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 So when the institutionalist says that endorsement from the subjects is 
necessary for the long term stability of a social order, he is actually saying that the 
institutions of this society, when properly justified and internalized, have a tendency 
of cultivating and reinforcing compliance by the subjects.  
To address the challenge to Rawlsian institutionalism from libertarianism, we 
need a Rawlsian theory of rights and liberties. Libertarianism claims that individuals 
have rights prior to any social arrangements, and social arrangements should respect 
these pre-institutional rights in order to be just. It is obvious that Rawls also intends to 
justify liberal rights. By contrast, Rawls‘s view about liberties and rights are 
institutional, not pre-institutional. Rawls defines liberty as ―a complex of rights and 
duties defined by institutions.‖
198
 To be sure, the ―liberty‖ that Rawls is concerned 
with is ―liberty in connection with constitutional and legal restrictions.‖ It is in these 
cases that ―liberty is a certain structure of institutions, a certain system of public rules 
defining rights and duties.‖
199
 But this category of liberties is all that political 
philosophy cares about. Liberties of conscience, freedom of speech, freedom of 
association, property rights, and all other liberal rights that concern libertarians, for 
Rawls, are liberties based on social institutions. About these liberties and rights, 
Rawls has an institutionalist view similar to the theory of rights and liberties we 
developed in the previous chapters.  
Now it might be contended that with such an institutionalist view about 
liberties and rights, Rawls might be willing to sacrifice people‘s liberties in order to 
secure social order, since his primary concern is, as we have argued, social order, and 
liberties and rights for Rawls are not as pre-institutionally demanded as for 
                                               
197 For an excellent account of the origin of modern western conception of person, see Charles Taylor, 
Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, Cambridge University Press, 1989.  
198 See TJ, p. 210.  
199 See TJ, p. 177.  
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libertarians. Given such a contrast between Rawls‘s view of liberties and a libertarian 
one, it is indeed a wonder that Rawls does end up arguing for the priority of liberties 
in his theory of justice. Rawls even claims that his principles of justice ―provide the 
strongest arguments for freedom.‖
200
 This leads us to a further examination of the 
reasons why Rawls argues for the priority of liberty.  
Generally, Rawls can be interpreted as arguing that rights and liberties are to 
be respected and to be given priority over other considerations exactly because of the 
need for social order. In his argument from the original position, for example, the 
liberty principle is to be selected by the representatives, and to be given priority, 
because this is the best way to attract loyalty to the target principles of justice, 
therefore to secure the social order supported by these principles. In the original 
position, parties take their basic rights and liberties as their ―highest-order interest,‖ or 
the most fundamental interest through which their other interests can be fulfilled. 
Giving these basic liberties priority in the basic principles of justice would attract 
their endorsement to these principles. Also, once such a priority is secured by the 
institutional structure, it will give every person living in such a society the equal sense 
of her own worth or her self-respect, therefore make the social order governed by this 
institutional structure stable in the long run. If equal basic liberties were not 
guaranteed with priority, people would find themselves obsessed with competing 
against each other for higher status, and ―are set at odds with one another in the 
pursuit of their self-esteem.‖ Since higher statuses are always compared to lower 
statuses, such a struggle would never end, and the social order under such an intense 
competition for status would be highly instable, if not totally impossible.
201
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Institutionalism believes that human freedom, understood as freedom in a 
social world, is facilitated by the practice of human institution building. This 
institutional view of freedom leads us to an institutional conception of rights: how 
many rights a person can have is dependent upon how many duties she can lay upon, 
through institutions, her co-community members in their actions towards her, just as 
how free a person can be is dependent upon how many restraints she can put on, 
through institutions, her co-community members in their actions towards her. In both 
cases, by co-community members I mean not just individual persons in the relevant 
society, but also collective or institutional bodies of persons, including the state itself 
and its various branches.  
Compared with the libertarian view of rights, the institutional conception of 
rights does not promote a closed set of rights and liberties, but actually encourages 
rights and liberties to grow as our practice of institution building proceeds. In other 
words, the institutional conception of rights internally encourages political 
development towards more rights for more people. We will discuss the dimension of 
political development implied in the Rawlsian conception of rights later. For now, we 
need to address another meaning implied by the libertarian challenge to Rawlsian 
institutionalism.  
 
Institutionalism Does not Mean Simple Indoctrination of Institutions 
Now the libertarian can challenge institutionalism: isn‘t it the case that all 
institutions have this same tendency of encouraging internalization and compliance, at 
least according to institutionalism? Here the assumption is that according to 
institutionalism, people will endorse whatever institutions they are actually living 
under. The institutionalist cannot accept this proposition, of course. Otherwise 
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institutionalism would be simply a version of cultural relativism. But to distance 
himself from such a position, the institutionalist must explain why people would not 
simply internalize whatever institutions to which they are exposed. It seems that 
institutionalism must introduce some resilient characteristic into human nature, so that 
human beings are not as flexible as simply endorsing whatever institutions surround 
them. In other words, it seems that institutionalism must find a ―deeper‖ ground to 
explain why people accept or reject certain social norms. Habermas, although not a 
libertarian, makes this point very clearly when he says that ―Rawls must make a 
sharper distinction between acceptability and acceptance.‖
202
 A libertarian would 
agree with Habermas on the point that mere acceptance is not morally binding by 
itself: ―Nothing follows morally from the fact that everyone within a group has agreed 
to abide by certain guidelines unless the agreement itself enjoys normative 
force…Unless there is some independent norm that can underlie an agreement, the 
agreement fails to obligate morally.‖
203
  
Here we have reached the core of difference between institutionalism and 
rationalism. If in answering this challenge, institutionalism admits that there are 
substantial and universal elements in human nature that determine what social norms 
we would voluntarily endorse in the long run, institutionalism seems to converge with 
rationalism over a pre-institutional conception of human nature.  
This solution is not unavoidable if we attend to the fact that the need for social 
order can be satisfied with different institutional arrangements in different societies, 
and people with different possibilities of practical actions in minds would reason 
differently, and accept different social arrangements, when they pursue social orders. 
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The complexities of different societies, in terms of the practical actions possible in 
them, are hugely different. Such difference in levels of complexity is recognized in 
institutionalism, which, like rationalism, is not a moral and political theory about any 
particular society, but a theory about all human societies. What is different between 
institutionalism and rationalism is that institutionalism can accommodate and explain 
different forms of social order better than rationalism.  
Rationalism believes that for any human society, social order can be 
established and sustained only if its social institutions fit with human nature. As such, 
rationalism is internally a normative theory: it demands that a social order loyal to our 
rational nature should be established. When a rationalist is asked why this rational 
order has not been always followed in human history (for example, how come slavery 
can be maintained for so long and in so many societies), he blames limitations of 
historical circumstances, which are guilty of preventing our rational nature from full 
materialization. Yet this answer begs the question if we ask her: ―how could you be 
sure that the current social background you are living in is not just another limited 
historical circumstance?‖  
Institutionalism, on the other hand, is more capable of taking the historical 
variations and cultural diversities connected with human institutional practice as what 
they actually are, and explaining them as different adaptations of human sociality. 
Institutionalism says that to realize social order among different groups of people with 
different ranges of practical actions and interactions, different social institutions are 
created by these people to regulate these actions and interactions so that possible 




 procedures. For institutionalism, therefore, people in different historical 
conditions and social circumstances would voluntarily or be forced by their situation 
to endorse different institutional arrangements for different reasons, since their 
different manners of actions and interactions, or their different practical lives, give 
them different understandings of themselves and their co-community members. To 
persons living in a feudal or patriarchal society, for example, the overriding 
importance of their relationship with their family members and extended relatives and 
co-local people makes certain very restraining moral conceptions of family loyalty 
and inter-family regulations acceptable to them. During some periods of Chinese 
feudal history, fathers can even legally punish their children with death if the children 
committed heinous familial offenses. Modern societies, by contrast, usually allocate 
all or most of these punishment powers to a concentrated institutional apparatus called 
the state. This development is surely not due to changes in human nature, but due to 
the changes in the system of practical actions a society needs to empower and to 
regulate.  
Admitting the historical relativity of human practical reason does not 
necessarily lead to cultural or historical relativism, since it doesn‘t encourage the idea 
that whatever a certain group of people endorse is right. People must accept social 
norms for right reasons, and which reasons are right can usually be determined in 
light of specific social contexts. Institutionalism says nothing beyond the admission 
that our institutional practice for getting social order does change across time and vary 
across cultural boundaries. It is not the same thing as claiming that whatever is 
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accepted is always acceptable. Indeed, in the sense that institutionalism can account 
for institutional differences of different types of society, it is actually a form of 
universalism as against particularism or relativism. Institutionalism asserts that for 
any human society, if it is to be in stable social order in the long run, it must find a set 
of social norms that can be accepted and internalized by all or most of its members, so 
that all or most social conflicts can be solved through procedures backed by these 
consensual social norms.  
On the other hand, the universalism behind rationalism is ambiguous or even 
self-contradictory. Assuming that a set of social institutions can guarantee social order 
in the long run only when they respect a pre-institutional human nature, why did the 
correct social form for rationalism, whether it is democracy or any other form, not 
always prevail? If the rationalist social form failed to prevail in human history 
because of the historical limitations of different social or technological circumstances, 
how could we be sure that our current rationalist understanding of human nature and 
social order are not limited by historical circumstances? A rationalist justification of 
any social order would ultimately face this dilemma, yet there is no available 
rationalist answer to it.  
For institutionalism, people always need to justify their social norms, and their 
normative propositions about how to adjust social norms, with good reasons they can 
provide before their co-social members, taking the possible practical actions allowed 
by particular social circumstances into consideration. Without such a process of 
public justification, unified social norms cannot be established across a society and be 
internalized by all or most of the members of this society. People living within the 
same society need to engage with each other, reasoning about how best to 
institutionally secure their peaceful co-existence and their fruitful cooperation. People 
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living within a society always present their cases to each other, not just through verbal 
arguments, but also through all other forms of practical actions that are available to 
them. When it is possible, they can use economic transactions, migrations, social 
protests, and even military struggles to achieve their own goals, whatever goals their 
real lives may motivate them to pursue. Social institutions are the responses to the real 
conflicts among the people of a society; they solve these conflicts through procedures 
that are acceptable to the relevant parties, so that social order is maintained and 
mutual destruction is avoided. What makes a democratic society different from a non-
democratic society is the idea that in a democratic society, citizens are supposed to 
engage with each other in the forum of public reason with the understanding that all 
citizens are free and equal in the dialogue, and thus ideally, all internal strives can be 
settled through peaceful procedures and peaceful solutions.  
Although institutionalism is a universalism, it admits no way for getting a 
standard version of justification for all social institutions in all contexts, since there is 
simply no standard institutional structure for all social circumstances. Pursuing such a 
standard justification requires that we adopt the strategy of rationalism, which is, at its 
deep foundation, a desire to transcend our historicity. An institutionalist must resist 
this rationalist temptation to become a philosopher king or a prophet. As Rawls 
clarifies, in the dialogue of public reason, ―a philosopher has no more authority than 
other citizens. Those who study political philosophy may sometimes know more 
about some things, but so may any one else.‖
205
  
Now it may be objected that Rawls‘s idea of public reason only ―belongs to a 
conception of a well-ordered constitutional democratic society‖ (CP, p. 573), and as 
such it presupposes the political relationship between the free and equal citizens of a 
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democracy. Obviously citizens of a non-democratic society don‘t have, nor do they 
think they have, such a free and equal relationship, therefore it might make no sense 
to say that they need to engage with each other in the forum of public reason.  
No doubt this objection has some weight. Rawls‘s theory of justice, especially 
his idea of public reason, would have more appeal if we limit it to the context of a 
modern constitutional democracy. But on the other hand, according to institutionalism, 
to secure a shared understanding of the same system of social norms, therefore to 
secure social order, public justification of these norms to the citizens of this society is 
almost logically necessary. This public justification might take the form of 
indoctrination of ideology, such as the doctrine that the power of the kings is endowed 
and legitimized by the creator of the universe and each and every human being. But in 
the long run, the majority of the people‘s thinking cannot be too removed from their 
own real practical life. By this I mean that even the worst indoctrination, if it succeeds 
in the long run for a relatively large population, must have its public justification 
beyond pure indoctrination. Ancient Rome used to be a republic, and even after it 
became an empire, the knowledge about their republican past, including the 
knowledge about ancient Greek democracies, must have remained available to the 
Roman people. Yet even with such a democratic alternative in mind, those noble 
Romans who struggled for republicanism still failed, while the institutions for a 
powerful emperor prevailed. As another example, in Chinese history, in over 2,000 
years of empires and monarchies, there were always intellectuals remembering a 
democratic era in ancient times, when the rulers were selected by the people instead 
of being hereditary. The reason why non-democratic institutions and ideologies 
prevailed while democratic institutions and ideologies failed in these cases, therefore, 
cannot simply be that the indoctrination strategies of those dictators were more 
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successful than those of the democrats. The only reasonable explanation for such a 
political development is that within those historical circumstances, the available 
practical actions and interactions could only sustain the prevailing forms of political 
society, and with continued practical trial and error, people living in those 
circumstances finally settled down on those social institutions that could bring long 
term social peace and social cooperation. To continue exploring the examples listed 
above, ancient and medieval empires and dynasties did not settle on democratic 
institutions (some democratic elements, such as the institutions of consolers and 
imperial meetings, might be present) because they integrated so many people into a 
single society, yet since most people were bound to their local land and limited 
economic production, there was no way to organize all the people into a democratic 
engagement.  
A more convincing example to show that public justification of a system of 
social norms cannot be simply indoctrination is the modern history of democratization 
around the world, including both the so-called developed countries and the developing 
countries. France was perhaps not the first country to harbor modern democratic ideas, 
but the French revolution was the most influential democratic revolution in modern 
history. The wide-spread democratic ideas among French population, however, were 
not even strong enough to support a French republic for long, let alone promote 
democratic institutions all around the world. What the troubled history of French 
republics in the 19
th
 century shows is not how powerful democratic ideas were, but 
the exact limit of any ideology. If we look at the history of democratization of the 
developing world in the 20
th
 century, the same pattern of undulation presents itself. 
Latin American countries, for example, had several waves of democratization, each 
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one was followed by the return of dictatorship or other forms of autocracy.
206
 Before 
the stable conditions for a modern democracy develop, powerful ideas about 
democracy were simply not powerful enough to support real democratic institutions.  
In light of this consideration, it doesn‘t make any sense to say that Rawls‘s 
ideal of public reason only applies to an ideal state of affairs called ―modern 
constitutional democracy.‖ Internally, modern democracy is a process of 
democratization, not any realized or mature form of government in any particular 
country. Rawls‘s ideal of democracy is the construction of a ―realistic utopia,‖ which 
aims at a normative political development towards more democratization, not at a 
stagnant description of a sterile state of affairs.  
Before we return to such a Rawlsian theory of political development, however, 
we need to discuss Rawls‘s conception of the moral person. This conception is central 
to Rawls‘s system, yet there are many misunderstandings of it, some of which are 
even from influential critics of Rawls. Exploring this conception will help to develop 
an accurate interpretation of Rawls.  
 
Rawls’s Conception of the Person 
Many previous discussions of Rawls in this chapter demand a further 
understanding of Rawls‘s particular conception of moral persons. This section will 
present this conception, and further clarify the meaning of Rawlsian institutionalism.  
By ―person,‖ Rawls doesn‘t simply mean individual persons. As he clarifies, 
―This expression is to be construed variously depending on the circumstances. On 
some occasions it will mean human individuals, but on others it may refer to nations, 
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provinces, business firms, churches, teams, and so on. The principles of justice apply 
to conflicting claims made by persons of all of these separate kinds.‖
207
 This 
definition of moral person fits very well with the concept of ―agent‖ we developed as 
one of the central concepts in institutionalism. Moral ―persons‖ in Rawls‘s system just 
means the agents behind the relevant levels of practical actions, whether it is 
individual actions or collective actions.  
Rawls‘s conception of the moral agents, for both the context of domestic 
justice of a liberal democratic society and the context of global justice, can be 
abstracted into a theory of institutional agents, who have the moral powers of being 
rational and being reasonable and therefore can interact with each other in fair terms 
within the relevant institutional context.  
In the first original position for domestic justice in a liberal democratic society, 
Rawls assumes that moral persons represented by the parties have two moral powers: 
the power to rationally conceive and pursue one‘s own conceptions of the good, and 
the power to offer, accept, and act from reasonable terms of cooperation when 
interacting with co-citizens.
208
 In the second original position for global justice, Rawls 
also assumes that the involved agents, the peoples or nations around the globe, are 
agents with these two moral powers: they are rational in the concerns for securing 
their domestic structures of justice, the integrity of their territories, and a due respect 
by other peoples, and they are reasonable in the willingness to offer, accept, and act 
from reasonable cooperation terms.
209
  
For Rawls, therefore, the relevant moral agents for an institutional structure 
can be either individuals or collective bodies of individuals, but in either case, moral 
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agents are to be assumed as both rational and reasonable so that interactions between 
them can be governed by fair terms. In this sense, moral agents can also be treated as 
―institutional‖ identities.
210
 This unity in Rawls‘s conception of the moral persons 
suggests that a more universalist theory of moral agents (or institutional agents) might 
be presupposed by, or can be worked out from, Rawls‘s system. For example, we can 
define any institutional structure as a rule-governed practice, and for it to be willingly 
endorsed by the involved parties and therefore to be stable for the right reasons, its 
constitutional terms must treat these parties as agents with the moral power of being 
rational and being reasonable. This universalist undertone partly explains why Rawls 
stipulates that the parties attending the ―meeting‖ are not and should not be real 
persons. Real persons are all individuals, and the diversity of real persons might 
distract us from reflections on the institutional identities within an institutional 
structure. What we are pursuing here, after all, is to understand their institutional 
relationship with each other, not their particular social connections in general.  
With this universalism of Rawls‘s conception of moral persons in mind, it is 
important to notice that Rawls defines the moral power of rationality for the two 
domains of justice in different terms. For example, Rawls assumes that in the context 
of domestic justice, individual moral agents, as rational agents, have certain 
comprehensive conceptions of the good to pursue; but for the institutional agents in 
the context of global justice, the major concern is not any comprehensive conception 
of the good, but to secure their domestic social order with their own public conception 
of justice.
211
 Also, while individuals as institutional agents strive to maximize their 
rational gains from the domestic social cooperation system through distributions and 
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redistributions, peoples (nations) as institutional agents, according to Rawls, should 
not be concerned with distributional or re-distributional gains at the global level, but 
should only be concerned with securing the rational interests they already have, and 
the rational interests they can gain from international exchanges.
212
  
This apparent discrepancy in rational power of the relevant institutional agents 
has not been positively received. Communitarians have long been charging that Rawls, 
by limiting rationality in the domestic context to the concern for individual interests, 
doesn‘t provide enough motivation for moral persons to keep their allegiance to their 
political communities;
213
 nationalists, perhaps as a species of communitarians, 
criticize that Rawls doesn‘t justify nationalist sentiment as a legitimate branch of our 
moral power as rationality, therefore fails to sufficiently address the legitimacy 
problem for liberal democracies.
214
 Cosmopolitans, on the other hand, believe that 
Rawls, by taking nation states (peoples) as the only relevant institutional agents in the 
context of global institutional structure, provides in effect a conservative justification 
of the status quo, which covers its injustice under the name of the autonomy of 
national agents.
215
 Cosmopolitans also believe that Rawls underestimates 
interdependence in international economic interactions and the power of rationality in 
peoples (nations) as institutional agents in international politics; once the advantages 
the advanced countries have been gaining from international transactions is duly 
admitted, they claim, these countries should be laden with more responsibilities to 
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assist the less advanced countries, to initiate certain global distributional and re-




What these philosophers suggest, I think, are two things: negatively, they 
accuse Rawls of impoverishing the moral power of rationality in the formation and 
evolution of our institutional life; positively, they believe that instead of connecting 
agents of an institutional structure with an overlapping consensus over a public 
conception of justice based on the moral power of reasonableness, or so-called ―civic 
friendship,‖ or what Mill calls ―common sympathies,‖ we should rather use the 
concept of collective rational interest to justify the need to create and stay loyal to a 
political community.  
In light of our institutionalist interpretation of Rawls‘s conception of the moral 
person, we can defend Rawls against the negative charge along this line. As 
mentioned above, Rawls in fact allows the moral power of rationality to be adapted to 
different levels of collective identities or collective agents, who pursue different levels 
of collective interests; what Rawls wants to dispute is whether rational power in this 
sense alone is sufficient for establishing the relevant levels of institutional structures. 
Instead of accepting all these rational pursuits as what they are, Rawls believes that 
we should instead restrain our collective rationality with an ideal of the reasonable 
appropriate for the institutional context. Nationalism, for example, as a collective 
rational pursuit, is only acceptable in the name of ―liberal nationalism‖ or ―civic 
nationalism‖;
217
 other kinds of collective rationality should also be restrained by the 
appropriate concerns of reasonableness. Unless we can develop the appropriate 
                                               
216 For updated discussions in this direction, see Charles Beitz, ―Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice,‖ 
The Journal of Ethics (2005) 9:11-27; Thomas Pogge, ―Real World Justice,‖ The Journal of Ethics 
(2005) 9:29-53.   
217 For Rawls‘s endorsement for ―liberal nationalism,‖ see PL, p. lx, n37.  
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constraints of reasonableness for different levels of collective rationality, Rawls can 
claim, we would not be able to build just and stable institutional structures in the 
relevant context. As Rawls says, ―the reasonable has priority over the rational and 
subordinates it absolutely. This priority expresses the priority of right…‖
218
  
Compared with Rawls, therefore, the positive contention of these philosophers 
is in effect that people support a coercive regime not because they have an 
overlapping consensus over a public conception of justice, but because they generally 
recognize that the regime is protecting and promoting rational interests at the relevant 
levels.
219
 They believe that reasonableness as a motivation is not strong enough to 
maintain loyalty to, and the stability of, a political regime. The legitimacy of a 
coercive political regime over its agents, according to these philosophers, comes 
rather from such a general recognition concerning common rational interests. 
Cosmopolitans are the exception in this case, for they more or less agree with Rawls 
on the necessity of the introduction of the idea of the reasonable. They also agree with 
Rawls that the legitimacy and stability of an institutional structure should be secured 
by a public conception of justice; what they are complaining is that by not giving the 
rational element of international politics a more sufficient consideration, Rawls 
doesn‘t provide strong enough reasonable terms for the international cooperation 
system, therefore doesn‘t sufficiently honor the idea of the reasonable and the idea of 
reciprocity in the context of global justice.  
                                               
218 See p. 82 of JF.  
219 Besides the philosophers we listed above, there are other philosophers, who also develop positive 
theories of democracy on the considerations of rationality. For example, David Gauthier, in Morals by 
Agreement (Oxford University Press, 1986), believes that rational calculation alone is strong enough to 
sustain a stable liberal democratic order. Ian Shapiro puts forward a theory of democracy that more or 
less confirms a Lockean conception of power balance, or a conception of democracy as non-dominance. 
See The State of Democratic Theory, Yale University Press, 2003.   
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On his part, Rawls has no problem in admitting that the rational concern for 
self-interest is part of the motivation for moral agents to comply with an institutional 
structure. After all, a well-ordered society
220
 is defined by Rawls ―as one designed to 
advance the good of its members and effectively regulated by a public conception of 
justice.‖
221
 Rawls also admits that in order to make the rules of an institutional 
structure effective and just, we need to consider possible strategies and tactics the 
institutional agents might adopt in order to make the institutional rules work for their 
own rational interests. Without foreseeing these rational strategies, the institutional 
rules we make may become vulnerable to manipulative abuses, while the institutional 
structure may suffer from corruption and instability.
222
 Rawls can also endorse the 
concept of common interest or common good, in the sense that the ―public order and 
security‖
223
 supported by a just institutional structure is good for all the members, or 
that acting justly is a common good for all the members of a well-ordered society. As 
Rawls says, ―It is to citizens‘ good, of course, that their rights and liberties are 
respected, yet respecting them is what citizens owe one another as the shared end of 
their republican regime. So much is true of any liberalism of freedom, whether that of 
Kant or J. S. Mill, or of A Theory of Justice. It is incorrect to say that in a liberalism of 
freedom the state has no publicly shared common ends but is justified entirely in 
terms of the private aims and desires of its citizens.‖ 
224
  
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Rawls doesn‘t regard collective interests 
per se as relevant for the legitimacy problem. When discussing legitimacy for both 
                                               
220 In the sense that both liberal peoples and decent peoples, who together constitute Rawls‘s ideal 
society of peoples, are well-ordered domestic societies (p. 4, LP), the society consisted with these 
peoples, as an international society, is also a well-ordered society. This society of peoples is also 
ordered by a public conception of justice, and is therefore stable for the right reason.   
221 See p. 397, TJ.   
222 See section 10 of TJ.  
223 See section 34 of TJ.  
224 See Rawls, ―Social Unity and Primary Goods,‖ in CP, pp.365-366.  
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domestic and international contexts, Rawls always assumes that the institutional 
structure under discussion is a closed one, and the major function of the institutional 
structure is therefore to address conflicts of claims about rational interests among its 
own members, not to organize all the members to pursue a collective goal as the 
common good. For Rawls, the concern for collective rational interests against the 
claims of outside agents has little to do with the problem of legitimacy.  
In the end, Rawls believes that if a stable social order is to be achieved, there 
must be a balance or congruence between the rational and the reasonable as two 
independent moral powers of the involved institutional agents. This belief in balance 
can be illustrated with Rawls‘s theory of international justice. Instead of defining the 
rational power of the peoples as pursuing national interests on the global stage, Rawls 
limits the rational concern of the peoples as institutional agents for the context of 
global justice to the concern for securing a sustainable peaceful coexistence. This 
rendering is perhaps due to a rather realistic observation of the status quo of 
international politics, namely, that a legitimate global coercive government is not yet 
in place to govern the so-called international distribution or re-distribution. Indeed, 
Rawls believes that, at least at the current stage of human history, this global coercive 
government should not be pursued, since such a world-government ―would either be a 
global despotism or else would rule over a fragile empire torn by frequent civil strife 
as various regions and peoples tried to gain their political freedom and autonomy.‖
225
 
Rawls believes so perhaps because he deems the current level of disagreement over 
conceptions of justice held by different peoples too high to support an overlapping 
consensus over a public conception of justice for a global government. Or maybe, he 
believes so because he knows very well how the rationality of those strong nations 
                                               
225 LP, P. 36.  
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can lead them to benefit from the global system at the price of weaker nations‘ 
suffering.  
In any case, Rawls has good reason to limit the rationality of peoples as 
institutional agents to the concern for peaceful coexistence, instead of allowing a 
more expansionist rational motivation to them. Since for Rawls, the only overlapping 
consensus we can achieve on the current global stage is the common concern for 
collective security, the rational element in the moral motivation for the relevant 
institutional agents should only be defined as the desire to secure their respective 
domestic structures of justice within a peaceful global coexistence. In other words, the 
primary purpose for Rawls to propose his conception of global justice is to secure a 
―democratic peace‖ among more or less just peoples. By doing this, Rawls assumes 
that once domestic justice is fairly secured within the relevant nations, a peaceful 
coexistence would be secured among these peoples. International insecurity, for 
Rawls, only arises from domestic injustice, not from the so-called conflicts of national 
interests.  
At least so far as the problem of justice and legitimacy is concerned, Rawls 
doesn‘t underestimate the role played by rationality in the international arena. Indeed, 
it is arguable that Rawls has a very reasonable view of the role that is usually played 
by rationality in this arena. That is, once encouraged, the moral power of rationality of 
the institutional agents (the nations) can get out of control. If liberal democracies 
follow the cosmopolitans‘ reasoning and adopt a foreign policy that is based on equal 
liberal rights for every human being, then their aim ―will be to act gradually to shape 
all not yet liberal societies in a liberal direction, until eventually (in the ideal case) all 
societies are liberal.‖ What‘s wrong with this foreign policy is that it ―simply assumes 
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that only a liberal democratic society can be acceptable.‖
226
 This foreign policy would 
unavoidably lead to oppressive use of national power over other peoples, therefore 
create more international injustices.  
More generally, the hope to have a just and legitimate global institutional 
structure, as in the case of domestic institutional structure, lies in the development of 
the moral power of reasonableness in the institutional agents of international politics. 
When this power is not yet well developed, we should be cautious with various 
projects of expanding global governance; when so many developing nations are in a 
very weak bargaining position, the powerful nations may manipulate these projects to 
further their own rational interests. As well put by Thomas Nagel, ―Prosperous 
nations have reasons to want more governance on the world scale, but they do not 
want the increased obligations and demands for legitimacy that may follow in its 
wake.‖
227
 In light of our recent experience with globalization and international 
interventions, this is rather a serious concern. Although cosmopolitans are only 
calling for global justice in a more egalitarian direction, the real consequences of 
legitimizing more international governance may turn out to be less desirable, 
especially for those not yet well developed societies.  
So far in this section, we have clarified Rawls‘s conception of the moral 
person as a conception of an institutional agent, and cleared Rawls‘s system of several 
charges in relation to this conception. In the next section, we will look further into 
Rawls‘s conception of rationality, and distinguish this conception from a rationalist 
conception of human nature.  
 
                                               
226 See LP, pp. 82-83.  
227 See ―The Problem of Global Justice,‖ Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2005), p. 136.   
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Rationality as a Moral Power, not Human Nature 
In various versions of rationalism, rationality is taken as the major component 
of ―human nature.‖ Different institutional structures are viewed as different ways to 
satisfy such a human nature, and the best political order is the one that suits this 
human nature the best. But in Rawlsian institutionalism, rationality is a necessary 
moral power for human institutional engagement, not a part of human nature acting as 
a reference frame for institution building. People‘s concerns for rational interests, 
according to institutionalism, are not pre-institutionally determined, or at least not 
sufficiently so as to provide a reference frame for institution building, but are framed 
and modified by their engagement with their institutional environment. The major 
question moral and political philosophers should ask about rationality is therefore not 
how to satisfy our rational interests, but how to use and improve our moral power of 
rationality to make our institutional life better.  
The inadequacy of the idea of the rational for solving problems of justice and 
legitimacy can be illustrated in the following way. The moral power of rationality can 
be assumed by different levels of ―self‖ as either individual or collective moral agents. 
Rational interests can be conceived and pursued for different levels of ―self,‖ such as 
personal interests, family interests, tribal interests, local interests, and national 
interests, etc. This moral power of conceiving and pursuing rational interests for 
different levels of ―self‖ is a very important element in our moral life; many moral 
and political phenomena in human societies, such as families and nations, would not 
come into place if this moral power were lacking. The issue of justice and legitimacy, 
however, has a dimension of ―otherness,‖ that is, justice and legitimacy become issues 
only when there is a plurality of agents involved, with interests and conceptions of 
interests that are not identical. If we take a body politic and the group of people living 
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under it as a bigger ―self,‖ or as Hobbes does, as an ―artificial‖ person,
228
 then perhaps 
the issue of legitimacy wouldn‘t come up in the first place, or even if it comes up, it 
would only concern the absolute legitimacy of the sovereignty of the state or the 
monarchy as the collective rational agent; the issue of justice, in this case, is only 
about a matter of obeying the sovereign whatever it ordains, since not obeying the 
sovereign will ultimately send everybody back into the misery of the state of nature, 
where the lack of a collective agency makes everybody at war with everybody. If we 
take rationality as the sole criterion for legitimacy, then at least we cannot get any 
kind of liberal or democratic conception of legitimacy.  
In order to solve the problems of justice and legitimacy, Rawls introduces 
another moral power of moral agents, namely, reasonableness. This moral power is 
appropriate for dealing with other-regarding human relations, not merely self-
regarding rational interests. For a just society to be possible, Rawls believes, we must 
assume that moral agents have a moral power of being reasonable, so that our rational 
power will be restrained by the consideration of reasonableness or the consideration 
of reciprocity. For this purpose, the idea of the reasonable must not be reducible to the 
idea of the rational. For example, our moral power of being reasonable cannot be 
reduced to agents‘ seeking for mutual rational advantage through interpersonal 
exchange, nor could it be reduced to rationality as impartiality as represented in 
classical utilitarianism. Thus Rawls defines the idea of reciprocity as lying between 
the idea of impartiality and the idea of mutual advantage.
229
  
Under these considerations, Rawls introduces the moral power of being 
reasonable into his conception of moral agents. Thus understood, the requirement for 
                                               
228 See Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 121; see also 
Quentin Skinner, ―Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person of the State,‖ The Journal of Political 
Philosophy, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1999).  
229 For Rawls‘s definition of the reasonable, see section 1 of Lecture II of PL.  
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reasonableness is always central for any context of institutional justice. The moral 
power of rationality for moral agents can vary in reality as we move from one context 
to another; so long as the moral power of reasonableness can develop correspondingly, 
so that it is strong enough to restrain the moral power of rationality, a reasonably just 
society will remain a possibility.  
We have so far established that Rawls has good reasons to introduce the moral 
power of the reasonable into his conception of the moral person, and that by relying 
more on the idea of the reasonable than the idea of the rational, Rawls can justify his 
liberal conception of justice and legitimacy on a more solid ground. Now we need to 
understand why Rawls feels it necessary to endow the relevant institutional agents 
with the moral power of rationality. Besides setting the subjective circumstance for 
the problem of justice, what does the idea of the rational provide for these institutional 
agents? Wouldn‘t justice be more easily realizable if all the members of a society 
have only the moral power of being reasonable?  
This question may sound redundant or even ridiculous, for it is obvious that 
people in real life are motivated by rational concerns, and a conception of moral 
agents, being normative as it is, cannot be taken seriously if it totally disregards 
rationality as a moral motivation.  
Nevertheless, it is also obvious that the rational power of the institutional 
agents in various contexts is usually hard to contain. When it comes to the matters of 
justice, non-compliance and instability always come from disproportional 
considerations of rational interests. To secure the legitimacy and the stability of a 
body politic, it is obviously desirable if we can restrain or even eliminate the moral 
power of rationality in our normative conception of moral agents from the very 
beginning. Indeed, many moral theories, such as stoicism and Christianity, believe 
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that morality is possible only if we can eliminate rationality for good. Rousseau‘s 
concept of general will can be interpreted as an encouragement for the citizens to 
dissolve their rationality into reasonable concerns for others and for the body politic. 
In the Marxist ideal society, the real communist society, people are also supposed to 
have no rational desire to take advantages of others; for people living in the 
communist society, rationality is present as objective needs for the function of a 
biologically and socially normal human being, not as subjective desires or motivations.  
By introducing the moral power of rationality into his conception of moral 
persons, Rawls faces a tremendous difficulty in establishing the legitimacy and 
stability of his conception of justice. How could different moral agents, with different 
conceptions of the good to pursue, end up endorsing a reasonable conception of 
justice, so that the legitimacy and the stability of the body politic can be secured? This 
question consumes perhaps half of the energy of Rawls as a moral philosopher.
230
  
To understand Rawls‘s reason for introducing rationality as a moral power, an 
easy answer is that rationality is a necessary moral motivation for moral agents who 
would engage with each other in institutional structures. As Rawls says, ―Merely 
reasonable agents would have no ends of their own they wanted to advance by fair 
cooperation; merely rational agents lack a sense of justice and fail to recognize the 
independent validity of the claims of others.‖
231
 To engage with each other in a social 
cooperation system, therefore, moral agents must have their own conceptions of good 
to pursue. To give the moral agents only the power of reasonableness would make 
them puppets of institutional arrangements, cooperating merely for the sake of 
cooperation.  
                                               
230 For the major question addressed by later Rawls, see Lecture I of PL.  
231 PL, P. 52.  
 216 
The moral power of rationality is introduced into Rawls‘s conception of moral 
agents, therefore, because their engagement with institutions needs to be motivated by 
their own free will. It is another matter whether they are metaphysically free, but they 
must conceive themselves, and others as well, as free agents of cooperation. In this 
respect, the freedom of the moral agents means three things: they are free to form and 
pursue their own conceptions of good; they are self-authenticating sources of valid 
claims against institutions, not puppets for institutions to manipulate; they are capable 
of taking responsibilities for their own choices of rational ends.
232
  
In the sense that rationality in Rawls‘s system is a moral power, we should not 
identify it with people‘s rational concerns for given wants and desires. This 
distinction is important, for it will decide whether Rawls‘s liberalism is vulnerable to 
a typical charge against liberalism, namely, it takes people‘s desires and wants as the 
given, and it prohibits any social institutions from correcting or improving people‘s 
understandings about what is rationally good.
233
 If this charge is applicable to Rawls, 
then perhaps Rawls‘s system is compatible with the possibility of such a society, 
which is well-ordered by Rawls‘s conception of justice, but is nevertheless a society 
of mediocre persons, who are simply stuck in their harmless yet foolish preferences, 
such as shopping, playing video games, watching soaps, talking nonsense, etc. Some 
may understand that liberalism doesn‘t and shouldn‘t intend to improve human 
rationality in any circumstance. They can cite Mill‘s ―harm principle,‖ which states 
that so long as a person‘s interests or preferences do not cause harms to others, he is 
free to do whatever he wants.
234
 They can also cite Rawls to prove this point, since 
                                               
232 See Leif Wenar, ―The Unity of Rawls‘s Work,‖ The Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2004, p. 270.  
233 See Brian Barry, ―Liberalism and Want-Satisfaction: A Critique of John Rawls,‖ Political Theory, 
Vol. 1, No. 2 (May 1973).  
234 See J. S. Mill, On Liberty, Bobbs-Merrill, 1956, p. 13, where he says, ―That the only purpose for 
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to 
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Rawls says that people‘s rational preferences and conducts can be restricted only on 
the ground that they ―interfere with the basic liberties of others or else violate some 
obligation or natural duty.‖
235
  
There is no doubt that Rawls‘s principles of justice, especially his equal liberty 
principle, are not principles of perfection. As Rawls says, ―While justice as fairness 
allows that in a well-ordered society the values of excellence are recognized, the 
human perfections are to be pursued within the limits of the principle of free 
association.‖ People living in a liberal regime ―do not use the coercive apparatus of 
the state to win for themselves a greater liberty or larger distributive shares on the 
grounds that their activities are of more intrinsic value.‖ Although Rawls‘s liberalism 
does not take the satisfaction of people‘s rational desires as the goal of social 
institutions, as utilitarianism usually does, it does not aim at advancing human 
excellence either, as various forms of perfectionism do. In this sense, justice as 




Nevertheless, to say that all institutional agents have the moral powers of 
rationality and reasonableness does not necessarily mean that the rational pursuit of 
good of every citizen is of equal value.
237
 Indeed, justice as fairness recognizes that 
different rational ends do have different values; it is only that as a matter of justice, 
public social institutions should not give special favors to those rational ends deemed 
more valuable. The values of different rational ends should be left to people‘s own 
                                                                                                                                      
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.‖ Although 
Mill is only talking about legitimate coercion, and Mill‘s own version of liberalism is kind of 
perfectionist, the idea expressed here is a typical liberal principle of letting people alone in their own 
choices and desires.  
235 TJ, p. 291.  
236 TJ, p. 289, p. 287, respectively.  
237 TJ, p. 289.  
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judgment; they can deal with these issues in their personal quest or voluntary 
associations.  
The above considerations lead us to this point: rationality does not just 
constitute negative obstacles on the road to justice; it is also a positive moral power 
with a constructive role to play in our pursuit of justice. At least in Rawls‘s 
conception of moral persons, we should be aware of this crucial point. To put this 
point in a simplified form, it is not only the case that ―the rational divides while the 
reasonable unites‖; it is also the case that ―justice draws the limit, the good shows the 
point.‖
238
 Rawls‘s institutional agents need the moral power of rationality not because 
they are born with a human nature of selfishness. They may be selfish in many senses, 
but the point is that rationality gives them a moral motivation to freely engage with 
each other in a just social structure. For Rawls, rationality is not a human nature 
waiting to be satisfied by institutional structures, but a moral power of the institutional 
agents. This power makes human institution building possible, and is to be cultivated 
and improved in our institutional pursuit for social order.  
To sum up, Rawls‘s institutional agents in well-ordered societies have two 
higher order interests in developing their two moral powers, rationality and 
reasonableness. These moral powers should not be understood as conceptions of 
human nature in the traditional sense; rather, they are both necessary conditions for 
social cooperation, and they are to be improved and expanded as social cooperative 
systems move forward. Together they are an essential part of a normative conception 
of moral agents, who need these powers in their endless pursuit of a well-ordered 
society secured by a public conception of justice. This conception of institutional 
                                               
238 See Rawls, ―The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good,‖ Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 17, 
No. 4 (Autumn 1988), p. 252. See also JF, p. 141.   
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agents confirms our interpretation of Rawls‘s methodology as institutionalism, as 
against rationalism.  
To see the difference between Rawls‘s conception of moral agents and the 
rationalist conceptions of human nature, we need to pay special attention to a dilemma 
involving the reciprocal relationship between human beings and their institutions. The 
dilemma goes like this: to know what institutions are good for human beings, we need 
some general assumptions about what human beings are, but we cannot have 
knowledge about human nature beforehand, since social institutions have profound 
influence upon ―human wants and men‘s view of themselves.‖
239
 This dilemma seems 
to force us to be satisfied with two different yet equally deficient approaches: we can 
start with a perfectionist conception of human nature and then look for institutions 
suitable for this nature, as rationalists would do, or we can admit that what we want to 
achieve in ourselves is influenced by the current institutions in which we live, and 
therefore what we can achieve is only culturally and historically relative ideals. The 
rationalist approach is deficient because it begs the question as to where the 
conception of human nature comes from, while the relativist approach is deficient 
because it only achieves ideological justification of the status quo or false 
consciousness.  
Now from our exposition of Rawls‘s conception of institutional agents, we can 
see that Rawls‘s approach is better than these two alternatives. Rawls‘s conception of 
institutional agents is not a rationalist conception of human nature, since it leaves 
                                               
239 See TJ, p. 230. Section 41 of TJ in general is illuminating in light our interpreting Rawls‘s 
methodology as institutionalism. For example, on p. 229 Rawls says, ―Moreover, the social system 
shapes the wants and aspirations that its citizens come to have. It determines in part the sort of persons 
they want to be as well as the sort of persons they are. Thus an economic system is not only an 
institutional device for satisfying existing wants and needs but a way of creating and fashioning wants 
in the future. How men work together now to satisfy their present desires affects the desires they will 
have later on, the kind of persons they will be.‖  
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what human beings want to achieve in themselves largely open to their reciprocal 
engagement in institution building. Neither is Rawls‘s conception of institutional 
agents a relativist conception, since it carries a tone of normative universalism, that is, 
whatever the actual social institutions are, in order to achieve social order, the 
relevant institutional agents need these two basic moral powers, namely, being 
rational and being reasonable.  
With this hint, we can now complete our discussion of Rawls‘s conception of 
the moral person, and turn to the element of universalism in Rawlsian institutionalism, 
especially the dimension of political development in his justification of the ideal of 
liberal democracy. But before we do this, we need a clarification regarding the 
appropriate name for Rawls‘s system.  
 
“Institutionalism” or “Constructivism” 
So far we have proven that Rawls‘s conception of public justification and his 
conception of the moral person all accord with institutionalism. But 
―institutionalism,‖ after all, is not the actual word Rawls uses to describe his 
methodology. Rather, Rawls calls his own methodology ―constructivism,‖
240
 and 
many other philosophers follow him in naming his methodology.
241
 In this section, I 
will argue that although this name may represent the structure of Rawls‘s argument 
from the original position very well, it lures misunderstandings of Rawls in three 
directions. When these possible misunderstandings are exposed, it will become clear 
                                               
240 This name appears in Rawls‘s works for the first time in ―Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory.‖  
241 For example, see Onora O‘Neill (1998), ―Constructivism in Ethics,‖ in E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge, 1998. See also her Constructions of Reason: Explorations of 
Kant’s Practical Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 1989; Towards Justice and Virtue: A 
Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.  
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that ―institutionalism,‖ as we have argued so far in this chapter, is really a better name 
for Rawls‘s methodology and philosophy.  
First, while Rawls‘s intention for adopting this methodology is to bypass the 
very concept of the epistemic objectivity of morality,
242
 the word ―constructivism‖ 
leads the readers to the impression that Rawls is arguing against moral realism.
243
 In 
fact, for Rawls, whether we should adopt moral realism or moral anti-realism is 
beside the point for practical philosophy.
244
 The objectivity of moral and political 
reasoning, according to Rawls, should not be understood in terms of a ―causal view of 
knowledge.‖ The problem for practical reason is not about ―knowledge of given 
objects,‖ but about ―the production of objects in accordance with a conception of 
those objects.‖
245
 In other words, the point is how we, as free moral agents, should 
conceive ourselves when we try to build a reasonably just social union among 
ourselves.
246
 Practical philosophy concerns those values or ideals, which, when 
                                               
242 Thus Rawls says, ―it is important to notice here that no assumptions have been made about a theory 
of truth. A constructivist view does not require an idealist or a verificationist, as opposed to a realist, 
account of truth.” See “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory” in CP, pp. 351-2.  
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Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 1989, chapter 11, ―Constructivisms in Ethics.‖ Christine 
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Kantian Constructivism?‖ in Ratio Juris, Vol. 17, No. 1 (March 2004).  
244 Thus Rawls says, ―in what I have called ‗Kantian constructivism,‘ we try to avoid the problem of 
truth and the controversy between realism and subjectivism about the status of moral and political 
values.‖ See ―Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,‖ Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 14, 
No. 3 (Summer 1985), p. 230; in CP, p. 395. There are good reasons for Rawls to try so hard to avoid 
the problem of truth in his political philosophy. One of them is that the language of truth has a flavor of 
intolerance to be avoided in liberal political philosophy: once a truth is established, it is not tolerable if 
someone is unwilling to submit to it.  
245 See Lecture III of PL, especially sections 5 and 6.   
246 Jeremy Waldron also believes that the controversy between moral realists and moral anti-realists is 
misleading when it comes to solve moral disagreements. See his Law and Disagreement, Clarendon 
Press, 1999, chapter 8, ―The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity.‖  
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justified and internalized, will guide our practical actions. This explains why many 
ideologies based on totally imaginary scenarios can in time build strongholds in 
human minds.  
Second, the word ―constructivism‖ is doubly ambiguous: it is not clear 
whether the supposed construction is the construction of the moral agents of 
institutional structures, or the construction of the philosophers who promote the 
constructivist theories; neither is it clear whether the construction is done by the 
representative agents inside the original position, or by the real agents living real 
institutional life. In ―Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,‖ Rawls calls the agents 
in the original position ―agents of construction,‖ which suggests that Rawls might 
connect his constructivism especially with the argument from the original position. 
Since the original position doesn‘t constitute the whole argumentation of Rawls‘s 
system, calling Rawls‘s overall methodology ―constructivism‖ is obviously a mistake 
of identifying the whole with a part.  
Rawls‘s argument from the original position should be understood under his 
wider normative standpoints. That argument is neither neutral nor decisive by itself. It 
is not neutral because the setup of the original position, including the specific tailoring 
of the veil of ignorance and the specific rendering of the rationality of the parties, 
reflects our wider normative considerations of justice, which in turn reflect our 
culturally and historically cultivated values; it is not decisive because we can hold the 
thought experiment whenever we need to solve controversies over fundamental issues 
of social justice. The choice of the principles of justice in the original position is 
ultimately binding only in the sense that the representative agents are to make their 
choices under this condition so that full compliance will be secured, not in the sense 
that the real institutional agents should restrain themselves forever with the final 
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choice of a particular original position meeting. The original position argument is not 
decisive also because the options presented before the representative agents do not 
constitute a complete or comprehensive list of candidate principles of justice.  
Overall, the argument from the original position is only an abstract 
idealization of Rawls‘s normative ideal of political autonomy. This normative ideal of 
political autonomy, in its totality, can be captured by the name ―institutionalism,‖ 
while the name ―constructivism‖ invites the misunderstandings listed above.  
Third, the name ―constructivism,‖ with its construction metaphor, alludes to 
an idea of completeness, yet there is no reason to read Rawls‘s conclusion regarding 
his conception of justice as a closed or final one. Rawls‘s ideal of overlapping 
consensus over a political conception of justice is not another utopian dream about the 
end of the history. A better and more truthful interpretation of Rawls‘s later 
philosophy is to view his conception of public reason as implying an endless journey 
towards the ideal of overlapping consensus. There is no such a final overlapping 
consensus upon which a well-ordered society will dwell forever. If we must use the 
metaphor of construction, then that construction will never be finished in real time.  
Compared with this last misunderstanding, the benefit of adopting the name 
―institutionalism‖ is, of course, the bearing out of a Rawlsian theory of political 
development, to which we now turn in the rest of this chapter.  
 
Rawls’s Pursuit of a Well-ordered Society 
The central argument of this chapter is that Rawls‘s theory of justice, 
interpreted as an instantiation of institutionalism, aims at providing and justifying a 
public conception of justice for a well-ordered society. This section looks into the 
possibility that Rawls is in fact, or can be interpreted as, arguing that societies trying 
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to be well-ordered should seek for a political development towards some kind of 
constitutional democratic social order.  
To our attempt at connecting Rawls‘s conception of well-ordered society with 
a theory of political development towards liberal democracy, an immediate protest 
would be this: Wait a minute! Doesn‘t Rawls also believe that there are other possible 
well-ordered societies? Do you forget that in LP, Rawls also calls those decent 
societies ―well-ordered‖ societies? If for Rawls, a well-ordered society is not 
necessarily a constitutional democracy, how can you say that Rawls‘s theory implies 
that a political development towards constitutional democracy is normatively 
encouraged?  
This protest is only fair enough. But we need to notice that although Rawls 
also calls decent societies ―well-ordered,‖ he does not mean to say that they should be 
totally satisfied with their current status as decent societies. When arguing that liberal 
peoples need to show due respect to decent peoples, Rawls says that  
if a liberal constitutional democracy is, in fact, superior to other forms of society, 
as I believe it to be, a liberal people should have confidence in their convictions 
and suppose that a decent society, when offered due respect by liberal peoples, 
may be more likely, over time, to recognize the advantages of liberal institutions 




For Rawls, therefore, the ultimate point of offering toleration to decent peoples in the 
law of peoples is not to maintain the status quo of those decent peoples, but to 
encourage their ―reforms in a liberal direction‖ from within.  
In addition, if we attend to the reasons for Rawls to call these societies ―well-
ordered,‖
248
 we will see that a decent society in Rawls‘s sense is not so different from 
                                               
247 See LP, p. 62.  
248 It should also be noticed that Rawls denies straightforwardly the possibility of ―tyrannical and 
dictatorial regimes‖ being members of a ―reasonable society of peoples.‖ (CP, p. 530) From this we can 
infer that for Rawls, once liberal democracies are established in this world, they cannot rely on a 
peaceful coexistence with those tyrannical and dictatorial regimes, at least not in the long term.  
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a liberal democracy anyway. The reasons can be inferred from Rawls‘s second 
criterion for a decent hierarchical society:  
(a) …a decent hierarchical people‘s system of law, in accordance with its 
common good idea of justice, secures for all members of the people what have 
come to be called human rights…(b) …a decent people‘s system of law must be 
such as to impose bona fide moral duties and obligations (distinct from human 
rights) on all persons within the people‘s territory…(c) …there must be a 
sincere and not unreasonable belief on the part of judges and other officials who 





From these criteria, we can safely conclude that Rawls‘s major reason to call such 
decent hierarchical societies ―well-ordered societies‖ is that these societies, or their 
laws or basic institutions, are governed by a ―common good idea of justice,‖ just as is 
a well-ordered constitutional democracy.
250
 The only meaningful difference between 
these two kinds of societies is that in a decent hierarchical society, members are not 
recognized as free and equal citizens as in a liberal democracy; instead, their 
relationship with the body politic is an indirect one, with their separate groups as the 
medium.  
Rawls‘s own words about the relevance between his theory of justice and a 
justification of liberal democracy are usually humble and inexplicit. Rawls suggests, 
in different places, that ―both Theory and PL attempt to say how a reasonably just and 
well-ordered democratic society might be possible,‖ or ―whether a just democratic 
society is possible and can be stable for the right reasons.‖
251
 According to these 
words, Rawls seems to be more worried about the survival of democracy than about 
the spread or expansion of democracy. Yet these very words in fact show, in the 
                                               
249 See LP, pp. 65-66. Rawls‘s first criterion of a decent hierarchical society is, understandably, that it 
―does not have aggressive aims, and it recognizes that it must gain its legitimate ends through 
diplomacy and trade and other ways of peace.‖  
250 See LP, p. 71, footnote 10, where Rawls admits that a well-ordered liberal democracy is also 
governed by such a common good idea of justice.  
251 See PL, pp. lx, lxi; LP, p. 6.  
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background of his theory of justice, Rawls‘s concern with a justification of democracy. 
Indeed, the major concern behind Rawls‘s whole system is to prove that a liberal 
democratic society, backed by his conception of justice, is possible and stable, since it 
can be a well-ordered society.  
Institutionalism, including Rawlsian institutionalism, believes that human 
beings engage with each other in institution building because they care about a just 
and stable social order, without which their lives would be threatened by constant 
conflicts and miserable prospects, if not totally meaningless. To use Rawls‘s own 
words, the big question behind the whole project of Rawls‘s political philosophy is 
―whether it is worthwhile for human beings to live on the earth‖ if it is not possible 
for members of a society to subordinate their power to reasonable moral aims. For 
Rawls, if a just and stable social union among human beings can only be facilitated by 
power and coercion, not by a publicly justifiable and internalized conception of 
justice, human life would be not worth living.
252
  
Now if we agree with Rawls that a constitutional democracy is indeed well-
ordered and worth fighting for, what should we, readers from non-liberal and/or non-
democratic cultural backgrounds, do? Rawls‘s own words become even more elusive 
when it comes to this question. Is Rawls only writing for people already living in 
liberal democratic societies? Are Rawls‘s arguments only developed to give these 
people some sense of self-satisfaction with their own situation? Can Rawls achieve 
more than such a trivial goal in a justification of the ideals of liberal democracy? Does 
Rawls believe that his theory of justice requires or necessitates a theory of political 
                                               
252 See the final paragraphs of The Law of Peoples and the second Introduction to Political liberalism, 
where Rawls articulates his major motivation for philosophizing rather explicitly.  
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development towards liberalization and democratization?
253
 Or is Rawls really a 
cultural relativist, who has no further interest other than a proud confirmation of his 
own value system?  
Rawls‘s main work contributes to building and justifying an ideal well-ordered 
society, but he says little about how different societies could move towards this ideal. 
Regarding his own society, Rawls does provide some clues about this political 
development. For example, his discussion of moving from a modus vivendi to a 
constitutional consensus and then to an overlapping consensus
254
 is clearly an effort 
on this score, and so is his discussion of moral psychology leading to stability in Part 
III of TJ. But overall, this theory of political development is a rather latent theme in 
Rawls‘s system. This makes the project of this essay more meaningful, if not more 
difficult.  
To deal with these challenging questions, I will, in the next two sections, use 
our newly established institutionalist interpretation of Rawls‘s system, and therefore 
use the theory of institutionalism we have developed in the previous chapters, to look 
into the connection between a Rawlsian institutionalist justification of the ideal of 
liberal democracy and a normative theory of political development towards 
liberalization and democratization. This will naturally conclude this chapter on Rawls, 
and the whole essay on institutionalism and political development.  
 
                                               
253 For example, when trying to distinguish a political conception of justice and a comprehensive 
conception of justice, Rawls says that ―while political liberalism is of course liberal, some political 
conceptions of right and justice belonging to political philosophy in this sense may be conservative or 
radical; conceptions of the divine right of kings, or even of dictatorship, may also belong to it.‖ Here 
Rawls does emphasize that ―in the latter two cases the corresponding regimes would lack the historical, 
religious, and philosophical justifications with which we are acquainted,‖ but nevertheless he claims 
that ―they could have free-standing conceptions of political right and justice.‖ One of the central 
contentions of this essay is to show that Rawls‘s such comments are not really defendable. See Rawls‘s 
―Reply to Habermas,‖ in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 92, No. 3 (March 1995), p. 133.  
254 See sections 6 and 7, Lecture IV, PL.  
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Democracy as Power Balance and Democracy as Political Autonomy 
So far in this essay, we have established a theory of institutionalism, and have 
proved, in the third chapter, that institutionalism implies a theory of political 
development towards liberalization and democratization; we have also demonstrated, 
in this chapter, that Rawls‘s methodology is totally compatible with, if not 
consciously based on, institutionalism. The natural question now is whether Rawls‘s 
justification of the ideal of liberal democracy implies a normative encouragement for 
a political development towards liberalization and democratization.  
To answer this question, we attend to the perspective of power structure in 
institutionalism, a perspective Rawls doesn‘t explicitly talk about, but is important for 
revealing the political development dimension of institutionalism. I will argue that 
Rawls‘s conception of the rule of law, and more generally his theory of deliberative 
democracy, which justifies liberal democracy as an ideal of political autonomy, 
confirm this power structure perspective of institutionalism. Since the power structure 
perspective of institutionalism takes the ideal of liberal democracy as the ultimate 
goal of human institution building, and since Rawls also views the ideal of liberal 
democracy as the ultimate goal of political autonomy, Rawls‘s theory of justice, I will 
argue, indeed encourages a normative development towards the ideal of liberal 
democracy, or towards liberalization and democratization.  
According to institutionalism, to secure social order among certain people, 
public norms need to be created so that all or at least most members of such a society 
can carry out practical actions, and can seek their particular conceptions of the good 
or their interests, under the guidance of the same set of norms that is accepted and 
internalized by all members of the society. Without a common understanding about 
what they can or cannot do, institutionalism believes, mutual trust among these people 
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cannot be established, nor can there be a sense of security and order. Social norms, 
however, carry power with them, due to their empowering and regulating effect on the 
norm practitioners. With power, there comes social hierarchal structure, which is 
created by a system of social institutions. Once a social order is established among 
certain people, public offices with public power need to be created to make sure that 
the social norms do bind people‘s behavior, and to carry out different functions on 
different levels of collective agencies, including the hierarchal orders of offices and 
different functional offices at the same levels of hierarchy. For these offices to 
function, appropriate powers or authorities need to be bestowed upon these offices, so 
that people occupying these offices can enforce the related social rules and carry out 
appropriate levels of collective actions.
255
 As a result, persons in these offices will 
have these powers at their disposal. Since more important offices carry bigger powers, 
there will be a hierarchy of power structures among different offices. Taking those 
who do not occupy any public offices into consideration,
256
 we have a hierarchy of the 
whole society. Ultimately, the need for social order brings about the need for social 
norms, while social norms, demanding norm enforcement and collective practical 
actions, precipitate structures of social powers and authorities.  
With powers come the possibilities of power abuses, which demand further 
social norms to regulate and to deter. Power abuses exist not because human beings 
are by nature corrupt, but rather because no social norms, not even the norms 
                                               
255 Maybe certain moral rules, such as the rules regarding inter-personal manners, do not necessitate 
public authorities. But no social order can be established by such moral rules alone. Especially in a 
society more complex than a family, such moral rules can only act as supplementary rules.  
256 Rawls calls citizenship within a liberal democracy a public office. In this sense everybody has 
certain public power. Indeed, the reason a liberal democracy gives every citizen the political powers of 
free speech, freedom of association, voting rights, etc., is perhaps the intention of reaching a power 
balance within the society, so that politically weakened majority who don‘t occupy any public office 
may still be able to restrict the behavior of public officials. In the same sense, even the citizenship of a 
dictatorship can be viewed as a public office, since the institutions of such a society define duties to its 
citizens. The difference between the citizenship of a democracy and the citizenship of a dictatorship 
lies in the rights and duties protected to such an office by the corresponding institutional structures.  
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regulating the use of social power, will be automatically followed until appropriate 
enforcement mechanisms are in place. Human beings are not ―created‖ for any 
particular social norms, and as such no social norms will be followed automatically or 
mechanically; on the contrary, all social norms need to be enforced, through required 
levels of social pressure or social surveillance. As it is commonly said, social laws are 
different from natural laws because social laws can always be violated while natural 
laws can never be violated without losing their status as laws.  
Social powers are created in the first place to make sure that social norms are 
enforced, yet after offices of norm enforcement are created, a whole new range of 
practical actions, the practical actions to be carried out in the name of the newly 
created collective agencies or public offices, become available, and additional norms 
are called for in order to regulate these new practical actions and the new agencies. 
Without these second-order social norms, social powers will be abused, sooner or 
later. After all, social norms are nothing but ways of socially controlling practical 
actions for the sake of social order.  
Now when certain institutions to prevent power abuse are lacking, or when the 
system of social institutions has some breaches or weak points, social norms tend to 
be constantly violated, and the social order these norms are meant to guarantee tends 
to deteriorate. In the last years of the Roman Republic, for example, when the 
generals gained more and more military power and popular support through one 
conquest after another, senators living in the city of Rome, who were institutionally 
bound to make and enforce laws and elect executive officials, slowly lost their 
leverage on these generals. People in the conquered regions, on the other hand, didn‘t 
have legal or political means to monitor these generals either. The result is that when 
more and more people were incorporated into the Roman Republic, more and more 
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people became passive participants of the collective agency of the social order, 
without corresponding power to lay enough social pressure on the public officials, 
who therefore could easily concentrate social powers into their own hands, and use 
power according to their own pleasures. So even though the Roman Empire was big, 
it was nevertheless weak from inside, since effective social norms regarding public 
offices could not be maintained. Many empires and dynasties in ancient times and the 
middle ages faced the same dilemma: they needed to grow bigger in order to be able 
to defend themselves against invasions from neighbors, or to be able to quell internal 
strife, yet after they became big enough for self-protection and self-maintenance of 
social order, they also became too big for internal regulation of their internal political 
powers.  
According to institutionalism, human beings have always been trying to 
establish a stable and self-sustainable social order, through different levels of social 
norms or institutions regulating different levels of practical actions, including the 
practical actions of those who occupy public offices. To some extent, we can say that 
they are getting better and better at this effort, not along a straight line of course, but 
are getting better nevertheless. If we compare the qualities of different social orders in 
terms of how social powers are created, grabbed, executed, and so on, we can see that 
the modern practice of the rule of law is more stable and more self-sustainable than 
the rule of kings in the old regimes. When peaceful means and procedures are 
followed in all processes involving power, a social order gets close to the ideal of the 
rule of law. Rule of law, of course, doesn‘t mean the rule of the same laws for all the 
time. Laws can also be created, changed, and polished. But the ideal of a rule of law is 
that the creation and revision of laws also follow certain laws and procedures.  
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Although Rawls doesn‘t systematically discuss power relations engendered by 
social institutions, Rawls does have a high regard for the idea of rule of law. When 
Rawls discusses rule of law, what is in his mind seems not just to concern modern 
democracies, but also social order in general, or more particularly, legal systems in 
general: ―A legal system is a coercive order of public rules addressed to rational 
persons for the purpose of regulating their conduct and providing the framework for 
social cooperation.‖
257
 As an idea, a legal system is supposed to satisfy certain 
precepts concerning the rule of law, such as ―ought implies can,‖ ―similar cases 
should be treated similarly,‖ and ―no offense without a law.‖ These precepts are 
supposed to ―be followed by any system of rules.‖
258
 ―Other things equal, one legal 
order is more justly administered than another if it more perfectly fulfills the precepts 
of the rule of law.‖
259
 Some societies get closer to the ideal of rule of law, and 
therefore closer to a more stable and more sustainable social order. They have a better 
understandings of, and better means to fulfill, the idea of rule of law.  
For any society, if stable and sustainable social order is to be achieved, it is 
essential that public agencies with public power be regulated with corresponding 
social norms, and these social norms be enforced through appropriate social 
institutions and social pressure. The best possible situation is that within a society, 
social norms or social institutions are all based on certain principles of justice, which 
in turn are all understood by, and justified to, all the relevant social members, so that 
all members are pushing for these principles, and social norms and institutions based 
on them, to be followed by all the agents to carry out practical actions at all levels of 
collectivity. Within such a society, what each particular person can do for maintaining 
                                               
257 See TJ, p. 207.  
258 See TJ, p. 207.  
259 See TJ, p. 208.  
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the well-orderedness of her society may be very limited, but as a whole this society is 
just and stable, since its social institutions are complete and well-maintained, and are 
known to most of, if not all of, its members to be so.  
The ideal of liberal democracy bears out these ideals about the rule of law and 
a well-ordered society very well. In our human practice of pursuing a well-ordered 
society, we have no higher goal to pursue but a real liberal democracy, which protects 
an expanding set of rights and liberties for all its citizens and empowers them to 
participate in public life, so that not only is social order secured by institutions 
accepted and internalized by all or most citizens, but the public powers that are 
responsible for enforcing social institutions are also duly monitored and therefore 
prevented from abusing power and destabilizing the social order. To use a metaphor, 
the way social norms are created, justified and enforced in an ideal democracy draws 
a complete circle around human social institutional structures: with citizens 
empowered to monitor the behavior of all levels of public officials, there is no 
practical actions that is beyond the regulation of publicly justifiable social norms, 
which are the ultimate protector of social order. When a society reaches, or gets close 
to, such kind of state, we say that it has a balanced power structure. In institutionalism, 
a well-ordered liberal democratic society is a balanced power structure. Since 
according to institutionalism, to reach a balanced power structure is the highest goal 
of human institution building, the ideal of liberal democracy is the ultimate ideal of 
human institution building.  
When Rawls uses the ideals of democracy that have been made manifest in the 
historical experience of modern western democratic practice, he is not in any sense 
contextualizing these democratic ideas to western society or western culture. What he 
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has constructed out of the western historical experience is a normative ideal, or a 
―realistic utopia,‖ of human institution building for any human society.  
To confirm this observation, we look at Rawls‘s theory of deliberative 
democracy as an ideal of political autonomy. This theory of democracy has its root in 
the democratic tradition, especially in Rousseau‘s idea of the ―general will,‖ but it 
also inserts new elements into this tradition. Democracy is traditionally understood as 
a contesting process, with different individuals voicing and voting for their different 
interests. Understood as such, democracy still has an external relationship between the 
government and the people, just like all other forms of regime. What is special about 
democracy is only that in its ideal, the majority, instead of some minority group, wins 
the control of the government. This ideal of democracy may have an element of 
autonomy or self-governance, but there is still a clear distance between the ruling and 
the ruled, or the government and the citizens. In Rawls‘s ideal of liberal democracy, 
however, the relationship between the government and the people is presented as if it 
is an internal relationship within civil society. All citizens participate in a public 
forum as free and equal members of the society, and they present their own cases 
from a perspective of ―public reason,‖ which is supposed to be a shared perspective 
for all citizens, ideally. Rawls seems to pay much less attention to the diversity of 
interests among citizens of a democracy, and the contesting tendency among these 
interests. It is as if the relationship between the state and the society, or the 
relationship between the government and the people, is only an internal one, and 
power hierarchy does not, or should not, exist among members of a democratic 
society. Democracy, according to this view, is not about how to balance the power 
structure, but about how to realize the political autonomy of the people. In the sense 
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that Rawls‘s theory of democracy is different from the traditional view of democracy, 
many scholars call Rawls‘s model of democracy a ―deliberative democracy.‖
260
  
The difference between the ideal of democracy as a balanced power structure, 
as presented in the name of institutionalism, and the ideal of democracy as a political 
autonomy, as presented in Rawls‘s theory of deliberative democracy, however, is only 
a difference on surface. On their foundations, both ideals strive to secure and maintain 
social order with a publicly justifiable and internalized conception of justice. What the 
theory of deliberative democracy has added to the traditional theory of democracy is 
this: it points out that in an ideal democracy, citizens should not voice and vote only 
from the perspective of their own particular interests, but should also take a stance 
that can be reasonably accepted by other reasonable citizens. In other words, citizens 
of an ideal democracy are not only capable of rationally pursuing their own interests; 
they also reason together and form a common point of view of the whole society, and 
voice and vote according to this perspective of reasonableness. Compared to the 
theory of deliberative democracy, the ideal of democracy as a balanced power 
structure puts more emphasis on the idea of rationality—it basically says that by 
giving people with different interests and values a balanced opportunity to defend, 
and to fight for, their own interests and values, democracy can achieve a state of 
justice and stability. Taking this theory of democracy as a balanced power structure 
alone, without supplementation from the theory of deliberative democracy, the ideal 
of liberal democracy wouldn‘t be wholly understood. An ideal liberal democracy 
cannot consist only of rational citizens; for such a democracy to be a well-ordered 
society, its citizens must also think and act from a reasonable point of view. As we 
                                               
260 For the concept of deliberative democracy, see Samuel Freeman, ―Deliberative Democracy: A 
Sympathetic Comment,‖ in Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Autumn 2000). For Rawls‘s 
view about deliberative democracy, see his ―The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,‖ in The University of 
Chicago Law Review, Vol. 64, No. 3 (Summer 1997), p. 772f.  
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have made it clear, Rawls‘s theory of justice, as a Rawlsian institutionalism, indeed 
has given both of these viewpoints, or moral powers, a fair and balanced 
consideration.  
From the point of view of our institutionalism, these two ideals can be 
integrated into a single ideal of human institution building, which is also the highest 
ideal of human institution building. By proving that Rawls‘s system is an instantiation 
of institutionalism, we unit these two ideals, and reveal the political development 
dimension internal to them. The ideal of power balance and the ideal of political 
autonomy are the two faces of the universal ideal of human institution building, 
towards which every human society should develop if it strives to become a well-
ordered society with justice and stability.  
With this recognition, we now turn to the concluding section of this chapter.  
 
Rawlsian Institutionalism and Political Development 
When we say that Rawls‘s justification of liberal democracy normatively 
demands a political development towards a liberal democratic political order, people 
may naturally dispute as to the sense in which Rawlsian institutionalism is different 
from a rationalist justification of democracy. After all, isn‘t this institutionalist 
justification of democracy leading to the same conclusion that democracy will 
ultimately prevail, therefore is the end of the history, so to speak? Isn‘t this the same 
conclusion a rationalist would draw? Yet this whole dissertation claims that a serious 
distinction can be drawn, and should be drawn, between institutionalism and 
rationalism.  
To address this reasonable doubt, we develop two more arguments in the last 
section of this essay: (A) institutionalism does lead to the conclusion that a political 
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development towards liberalization and democratization is not only normatively 
desirable, but also unavoidable in the long term future of the social evolution; (B) 
institutionalism draws this conclusion from a logic different from rationalism. These 
two arguments are based on the theory of institutionalism (including Rawlsian 
institutionalism) we have established so far, and formally seal this theory with its 
logical conclusion.  
According to institutionalism, to secure peaceful co-existence and social order 
among people who interact with each other continuously through some available 
space of transportation and communication, social institutions need to be created to 
enable and to regulate their practical actions and interactions. For the purpose of 
social order, these social institutions or social norms need to be internalized, through 
public justification, in most, if not all, members of such a society. When most, if not 
all, members of such a society endorse and internalize the social institutions based on 
a public conception of justice, and comply with these institutions, a well-ordered 
society is realized. To make such a well-ordered society stable and sustainable in the 
long run, its social institutions, and the principles of justice behind them, need to be 
continuously adjusted and justified in light of any newly available space of practical 
actions and interactions. Without such a process of continuous adjustment and 
justification, social institutions tend to be manipulated and abused for some members‘ 
benefits, especially for the benefits of those who hold public offices empowered by 
social institutions.  
Now in order to understand the direction towards which such a process of 
adjustment and justification will move, we need to know to which direction our 
practical actions and interactions are moving. The latter direction is much more 
transparent than the former one. As our knowledge and technologies grow, people 
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will more easily encounter each other, and interact with each other, through the new 
medium of transportation and communication, by commerce and by other activities. 
As more and more practical actions and interactions become available to us, new 
social norms or institutions need to be put into place, and to be justified to all or most 
participants, so that social order can be established among newly available human 
actions and interactions.  
When a larger space of practical actions become available to members of a 
society, it looks like their freedom grows, but ironically, they also need to restrict 
themselves with more obligations, so that this increased freedom can turn into 
meaningful political freedom.
261
 Thus increased space of practical actions demands 
more social institutions, and more institutions, if they are going to work, put more 
obligations on the members of a society. If not balanced with increased political rights 
granted to these members, however, these increased obligations would put too much 
power in the hands of those who hold public offices and therefore are in charge of 
laying obligations upon the people through newly established social institutions. This 
enormous power will then bring about power abuse on an enormous scale, which will 
ultimately bring the social order to an end, and make the majority suffer in a state of 
social anarchy.  
When we look at the history of human societies, the pattern of establishment 
and erosion of social order clearly present itself. In most ancient societies, social order 
was established when political authority was grabbed by a heritable monarchy. Such a 
monarchy establishes a monopoly over the use of violence throughout the society, 
therefore guarantees an effective enforcement mechanism for a unified system of 
social norms. For the convenience of ruling, the monarchy also establishes other 
                                               
261 Recall the section on freedom in Chapter II.  
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public offices, whose power and authority stem from the sovereignty of the monarchy. 
Since most of these offices are also heritable, the law makers and the law enforcers in 
this political system are actually the same group of people, who benefit most from 
such a system of social norms. This institutional arrangement, and its heritability 
through blood lines, gives this elite further motivation to make sure this system of 
social norms really works. So long as these social norms are coherently maintained by 
this elite, so long as the majority are given enough space to lead a normal life, this 
monarchy system usually proves to be able to ensure stability of social order. The 
majority can accept this institutional structure because the social and economic 
circumstances of this society don‘t provide much opportunity for the majority to 
organize themselves and participate in the political process, and the majority can 
therefore only remain passive recipients, the protected, of the social order. Ideologies 
supporting such a social order were then created, which further stabilized such a 
hierarchal power structure and social order. Because the majority has very limited 
institutional rights and power to influence this political process, however, they have 
no official channels to monitor the behavior of the ruling elite. As a result, the power 
elite tend to abuse their power, even though the elite are already those most benefited 
within this society. This power abuse and corruption will then erode the social order 
by sabotaging the institutions supporting it, until the system of social order can no 
longer be sustained. The majority, passive as they are in supporting such a social 
order, are nevertheless active in overthrowing it, since their ability to suffer injustice 
will ultimately be put to its extreme. Such a society with the institutional power 
concentrated in the hands of an elite minority is ultimately unstable, unless it develops 
in the direction of liberalization and democratization, that is, to reform its social 
institutions so that the majority can have more and more rights to participate in 
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justifying the institutions, therefore in securing the social order, in which everybody 
has a stake. Failing to develop in this direction is the major reason for the collapse of 
most ancient regimes, as we have argued in the previous chapter.  
In the sense that a society does need a hierarchal power structure to secure 
order in its internal and external practical actions, modern democracies are not so 
different from ancient monarchies. What makes a modern democracy better than an 
ancient monarchy is how such a hierarchal structure is created, empowered, and 
regulated. Within a monarchy, peasants and other powerless citizens have two options 
to act against the royal laws and decisions if they don‘t like them: to manage a way to 
avoid compliance, or to revolt in order to change the authority‘s minds, or otherwise 
to replace the monarchy itself. Either way the old social order will suffer, while a 
certain level of chaos will ensue. Where a modern democracy is better when it comes 
to facing these problems is in the fact that it has a more peaceful mechanism to solve 
them. Citizens of a democracy are allowed to express their discontents with the 
political authority more freely and more openly, and if people with authority fail to 
address these discontents to satisfaction, a peaceful revolt, namely an election 
favoring the opposition party, can be carried out according to the legal procedures that 
are already in place. Equally important, modern democracies protect a whole range of 
individual rights and liberties for their citizens, so that people with public authority 
cannot manipulate the institutional system to the extent of depriving the people of 
such a democratic order.  
From the perspective of avoiding power abuse or corruption, the difference 
between democracies and despotic regimes is also about quantities, not about qualit ies. 
To secure and stabilize a monarchy, for example, appropriate institutions also need to 
be established and enforced to monitor the actions from public offices, including the 
 241 
monarchy itself. The stability of a monarchy usually depends on how successfully 
these institutions are designed and implemented. Outright dictatorship, with a dictator 
executing public power arbitrarily according to his own pleasure, always leads to 
quick deterioration of social order. Ultimately, democracy is only a more stable 
mechanism to reduce the chances of abusing collective powers of public offices. 
Democracy generally fares better than despotic regimes because it introduces more 
social institutions and social surveillance of the use of these public powers. The 
reason for giving citizens of a democracy the political right to vote, for example, is to 
empower these citizens so that they can make public officials responsible for their 
conduct. Exactly in this sense, Rawls calls citizenship within a liberal democracy a 
public office, which is empowered by democratic institutions, just like other public 
offices.  
If such a comparison between ancient monarchies and modern democracies is 
not fair enough, in the sense that a much better understanding of the historical 
background cannot be presented here, a quick look at the transformation process from 
old regimes of monarchy to modern democratic societies will make our case for a 
political development much stronger. In the early periods of modernization of almost 
every society, we witness the process of power corruption and social order erosion in 
a much more heartbreaking scenario. In terms of damage to their people, modern 
dictators fare far better than ancient dictators. What they grab into their hands are not 
just modern technologies of violence, but more importantly, modern technologies of 
social organization. With these newly gained social institutions, including propaganda, 
mass ideology manipulation, and other technologies of surveillance and control, 
modern dictators can lay ―obligations‖ upon every person of their society, and stretch 
their control to every corner of the human mind.  
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It is this danger of enormous power abuse that makes democracy in a modern 
society both normatively desirable, and objectively unavoidable in the long run. 
Democracy balances the greater number of obligations laid upon people with a greater 
number of rights, so that they are not only regulated by more social institutions in the 
face of a bigger space of practical actions, but are also capable of monitoring the 
establishment, justification, and adjustment of these social institutions. Without such a 
balanced increase in people‘s rights, a modern society will simply become the prey of 
dictators, and social order within such a society, if there is any, cannot be sustainable 
in the long run. In this sense, and exactly in this sense, liberalization and 
democratization are not just normatively desirable, but also practically unavoidable in 
the long run, if human beings‘ march into modern societies is not reversible.  
It is fairly clear that institutionalism gets this conclusion about political 
development through a logic different from that of rationalism. Here we don‘t 
presuppose any idea of pre-determined or pre-institutional human nature; rather, we 
start with the need of maintaining social order through social institutions, and we 
analyze how this need can be satisfied under different social circumstances, with 
different ranges of possible practical actions and interactions. This institutionalist 
understanding of social order, as we have argued, normatively demands, and 
practically necessitates, the tendency of liberalization and democratization throughout 
the history of human social evolution. Human beings, if they have a nature, are 
actually improving their nature as their institutional practice moves forward, so that 
they can maintain and sustain peaceful coexistence and peaceful cooperation with 
more and more people included, and under more and more complicated situations. So 
long as they continue this journey of pursuing social order, their moral nature is open 
to the future, not pre-determined as suggested by rationalism.  
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Final Remarks 
What we have done in this essay is mainly provide three arguments: 1. 
Institutionalism is a universalist theory about every human society and every human 
culture—different cultures, including different religions, so long as they deal with 
interpersonal relations, are nothing but different social norms, or the foundations for 
different social norms, to regulate practical actions and therefore to secure social 
orders. 2. According to institutionalism, the ideal of liberal democracy is the 
normative goal of human institution building because it is the highest ideal of social 
order, or of the most complete and most sustainable well-ordered society. 3. Rawls‘s 
theory of justice, including his different arguments for his conception of justice as 
fairness, are either actually based on, or can be interpreted as based on, such a theory 
of institutionalism. From these three major arguments, we draw the conclusion that 
Rawls‘s justification of liberal or constitutional democracy is not a relativist self-
assertion of American or western culture, but a normative defense of democracy 
against all other forms of social order. As such a universalist justification of 
democracy, Rawls‘s theory of justice encourages political development towards 
liberalization and democratization. Democracy is the ultimate ideal of human social 
order, an ideal that is not to be realized only in certain cultures or under certain social 
circumstances, but to be permanently pursued by all societies through their different 
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